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**BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY
IN THE XXTH CENTURY**

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

A SHORT HISTORY OF BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY IN THE XXTH CENTURY

BY

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TO THE MEMORY OF
SIR GEORGE ROBERT PARKIN, K.C.M.G.
WHO THROUGH A MOST USEFUL AND STRENUOUS LIFE
TAUGHT IN THE TWO HEMISPHERES THE FULL
MEANING OF IMPERIAL CITIZENSHIP



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PREFACE

ABOUT a quarter of a century ago, greatly daring, I sought to cover the whole field of British Colonial Policy in a single volume. If I had, at the time, read as much on the subject as I have had occasion to read in subsequent years, I might have shrunk from the attempt. Still, in spite of faults both of omission and commission, of which no one is more conscious than its author, the book was found to meet a want, and up to the present day still finds readers, not least, I am glad to recognize, in the Dominions. It has, therefore, seemed desirable to deal with the more recent history, though in a somewhat more intensive manner. I am well aware of the lions that stand in the path of a writer who attempts to treat of Dominion politics without a first-hand and intimate knowledge of those great communities. But, on the other hand, not every one has the necessary time and money at his disposal to make a personal investigation; and, ignorant as we in Great Britain may be of Dominion matters, the ignorance in one Dominion about what is happening in another is, I understand, yet more striking; so that a general conspectus of imperial policy is at least as difficult for a Canadian or Australian as it is for a mere Englishman. I have sought to atone for my ignorance of Dominion conditions by calling in aid the *ipsissima verba* of their statesmen and politicians, as reported in the *Hansards*. A Dominion minister may be expected to prophesy smooth things under the genial influence of an enthusiastic reception in Great Britain; but what he says in his own Parliament, when he is facing the music of an alert and critical Opposition, cannot but throw light on the trend of national opinion.

An apology is due for dealing, however briefly, with the well-worn theme of the probable character of the future relations between Great Britain and the Dominions; but the somewhat different standpoint from which the question is approached will, I trust, prevent what is said being a mere replica of what can be found in other books, some of no little ability. When strictly

constitutional questions are concerned, I have gone very lightly over the ground that has been made his own by the highest living authority on the subject, Dr. A. B. Keith.

I have not attempted to deal with India, both because I am not competent to deal with it, and because, whatever the future may have in store, it is not, as yet, a Dominion.

In my short Second Part I have attempted to deal with one aspect of the subject of a dependent Empire. When I wrote my chapters the great work of Sir F. Lugard on *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* had not appeared. Assuredly there was no more opportune moment for an authoritative defence of sane imperialism. Everywhere and on all subjects the aftermath of the war has been accompanied by disillusion and distrust. Even on the side where there is the fairest ground for hope—the future position of the British commonwealth of nations—our minds are clouded with the doubt whether the new nations will be willing to undergo the trouble and sacrifice entailed by that frequent and systematic intercommunication without which the League will degenerate into a mere shadow and a sham. The apparent failure in India of British efforts to enlist the active co-operation of the people in bringing about a slow and orderly movement towards Dominion autonomy has cast a gloom upon the working of the imperial problem, even where conditions are wholly different. The strong prejudice, which is aroused in some minds by the very words “empire” and “imperialism,” is now among certain sections of the community at its flood-tide. How strong that prejudice can be is shown by the case of the shrewd and genial American philosopher, William James, who wrote: “Empire, anyhow, is half crime by necessity of nature.” “To see a country like the United States, lucky enough to be born outside of it and its fatal traditions and inheritances, perversely rushing to wallow in the mire of it, shows how strong these ancient race instincts are.”¹ At the present moment, when men’s hearts are not failing them for fear, their intellects are scornfully repudiating the traditions of the past. At a meeting of brilliant young University undergraduates any allusion to the white man’s burden would be met, I expect, by jeers and questions. Still the burden remains, and the white man has, in the past, made good his claim of superiority. If he can do so in the future, we may

¹ *The Letters of W. James*, Vol. 2, p. 141.

smile at a passing phase of neurotic intellectualism. If he cannot, chaos will have come again—for more than the orderly progress of native communities.

In conclusion, I have to express my thanks to my guide, philosopher and friend in the study of colonial history, Sir Charles Lucas, who read the first three and the last three chapters in MSS. and the whole of the volume in proof. I am indebted to him for several corrections and suggestions. He is not, however, it is needless to add, responsible for any of the opinions expressed.

I have also to acknowledge the courtesy and assistance of the sub-librarian at the Colonial Office and of the librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute, than whom no one is doing better work on behalf of those studies which are connected with his office.

H. E. EGERTON

OXFORD

April, 1922

I had arranged to dedicate this little volume to my honoured and beloved friend Sir George Parkin. On the morning that I received the proofs came the news of his death. I can only now inscribe it to a sacred memory.

H. E. E.

CONTENTS

PART I

THE DOMINIONS

CHAP.	PAGE
I THE VESTIGES OF BRITISH PREDOMINANCE.	I
II THE GROWING PAINS OF NATIONHOOD	21
III NATIONHOOD	55
IV THE QUESTION OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE	78
V DEFENCE	92
VI THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN AS IT AFFECTED THE DOMINIONS BETWEEN 1900 AND 1914	III
VII PARTNERSHIP OR SEPARATION	127

APPENDICES

A. THE NATIVE QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA	172
B. BRITISH INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA	176
C. RHODESIA	181

PART II

THE GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD RACES

CHAP.	PAGE
I AFRICA	193
II MALAYA	229
III CONCLUSION	240
INDEX	253

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

PART I

THE DOMINIONS

The British Empire is my country ; England is my home.

CHAPTER I

THE VESTIGES OF BRITISH PREDOMINANCE

Wisdom is justified of her children.

IN the past, according to a favourite doctrine, policy had, as a rule, very little to do with the issue, the British Empire having expanded by a succession of fortunate accidents. Be this as it may, from the coming of Mr. Chamberlain to the Colonial Office, in 1895, there was undoubtedly a distinct policy at work. That policy was, in the case of the self-governing portions of the Empire, to welcome and encourage any movement towards imperial unity, that should not impair, or seem to impair, the foundations of the most complete Colonial autonomy. In the case of the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, the policy was to attempt, on more scientific lines, to develop those resources of the Empire which had been hitherto, for the most part, too much neglected. Much, doubtless, was effected by Mr. Chamberlain in the latter direction ; but still more would have been done had not his attention and energies become, after a time, largely absorbed in the affairs of South Africa.

Whatever view be taken with regard to the rights or wrongs of the South African War—and it is tolerably clear that it had its origin in a complexity of causes which dated as far back as to the Great Trek and the policy of Lord Glenelg—it may be generally agreed that it gave to the embryonic British

Commonwealth of Nations a baptism of fire, such as had never been in the past. The one great Colonial War of the eighteenth century had been a most disastrous civil war ; and in the previous wars, when British and American troops had fought side by side, narrow-minded arrogance and stupid red tape, on the one hand, and Provincial particularism and bumptious indiscipline, on the other, had brought about that they always left mutual relations worse than they had found them. During the Crimean War and operations in Egypt there had been some glimmerings of the imperial idea—but it is not too much to say that the conception of the British self-governing Empire working, as a single unit, on behalf of common interests, dates from the South African War. To the Canadian or Australian the question at issue in that war seemed simple enough. Were or were not English-speaking people in the Transvaal to receive equal political rights with those belonging to men of another race ? They did not pause to consider the argument, put forward by the Boers, that civil rights involve civil liabilities, and that these immigrant outlanders were not really prepared to undertake these obligations. We need not concern ourselves here with the military events which, after a prolonged and exhausting struggle, led to the complete surrender of the Boer forces ; what only need interest us here are the consequences that resulted from the British victory.

Undoubtedly the issue of the South African War gave an impetus to imperial patriotism, on the full tide of which it seemed as though a distinct advance might be made. "The defence of all British interests," Mr. Chamberlain said in the City on 1 August, 1902, "and the reorganization of the newly acquired territory are inseparably linked with the great scheme by which we hope to make our Empire something more than a mere geographical expression." There was, he maintained, "a new and fruitful conception of imperial destiny, in which the ideas of kinship and mutual obligation have been substituted for the mere pride of possession or of huckstering calculation about profit or loss."¹

But Mr. Chamberlain had behind him the experience of the Colonial Conference of 1902, at which he had found that statesmen from Canada and Australia were by no means ready to give their approval to British plans for more efficient centralized machinery in the matter of defence, and so he was constrained to add : "I

¹ *Speeches*, ed. by C. W. Boyd, Vol. 2, p. 70.

am not so foolish, I never have been, as to suppose that we could attain to an ideal all at once at a single step. I am inclined to think that now we in this country are more advanced in these respects than even is public opinion in the Colonies. It was not always so. . . . If we move slowly, we are moving surely, and I for one have absolute confidence in the future. All our children are invited to this great partnership of Empire, and I believe that, as they grow, and they are growing quickly to the full stature of nationhood, as they enter more completely into the glories and the privileges of our common heritage, we shall not find them blind or backward to the necessity of sharing in an even greater degree the obligations which Empire entails." ¹

Assuredly, from Mr. Chamberlain's point of view, there was need for optimism. The results of the Colonial Conference of 1902 must have been a sore disappointment to him. The proceedings of this meeting of Prime Ministers were not fully reported; but the general conclusions show how reluctant were the great self-governing Colonies (the day of Dominions was not yet) to embark upon the unknown sea of closer union. In the matter of naval defence the attempt to evoke enthusiasm for an imperial navy ended in failure; though the Colonies were willing, for the most part, to increase the amount of their contributions. But even here there was the ominous attitude of Canada which found itself, under the leadership of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, unable to make any offer of assistance because it contemplated the establishment of a local naval force.

Still more unsuccessful were the attempts of the War Office to obtain an imperial reserve force, earmarked for imperial purposes. In spite of the enthusiasm of the New Zealand premier, Mr. Seddon, the *non possumus* of Canada and Australia stood in the way.

With regard to imperial organization Mr. Chamberlain, in his opening speech, had thrown out the suggestion of "a real Council of the Empire to which all questions of imperial interest might be referred." He recognized that such a Council might have to be for a time merely advisory. None the less, it seemed "clear that the object would not be completely secured until there had been conferred upon it executive functions and perhaps also legislative powers."

¹ *Speeches*, ed. by C. W. Boyd, Vol. 2, pp. 72-3.

Whatever was doubtful, this at least was clear, that Colonial public opinion, at the time, would not for a moment have tolerated such a Council ; and the most that could be achieved was the establishment of the Conference on a more permanent footing, by the passing of a resolution that it should be held at intervals not exceeding four years.

The imperial conference, as it has developed, has become a meeting of allied Governments, wherein questions of general interest can be discussed and policies agreed upon ; whilst each Government retains its exclusive responsibility to its own Parliament. It is therefore clear why this form of co-operation has been held in special esteem by those who deprecate any advance in the direction of imperial union.

But with the close of the South African War, a more pressing question had to be answered than the question of the future organization of the British self-governing empire. That question was : what was to be the position of the new colonies of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony in the imperial edifice ? The terms of the Vereeniging Treaty of 31 May, 1902,¹ supplied the outline which only had to be filled in. The burghers were obliged to recognize King Edward VII as their lawful sovereign.² But a clean sheet was provided for the ordinary combatant ;³ and the predominance of the Dutch language was carefully maintained.⁴ The clause with regard to the character of the government in the future was still more noteworthy. " Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony will, at the earliest possible date, be succeeded by civil government ; and, as soon as circumstances permit, representative government, leading up to self-government, will be introduced." ⁵

These terms cannot be described as other than generous and received the whole-hearted approval of the self-governing Empire.

" I pledge my reputation and my name as a British subject," Sir Wilfrid Laurier had said in 1901, " that, if they have lost

¹ *Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa*, 1902, Cd. 1163, p. 156.

² Clause 1.

³ Clause 4.

⁴ Clause 5.

⁵ Clause 7. Lord Shaw in his *Letters to Isabel*, 1921, says, on the authority of General Smuts, that, when the signing of the Treaty was in question, Lord Kitchener told him (Smuts) that, though, of course, he could not speak with knowledge, in his opinion the Liberals would be in power in two years' time, and would, almost certainly, give the Transvaal and Orange River Colony full self-government.

their independence, they have not lost their liberty"; and his words were abundantly made good.¹

It would be idle, however, to pretend that the British Government looked forward with equanimity to a South Africa in which a Dutch population should be completely predominant. Commissioners had been sent out during the war who reported that "a well-considered scheme of settlement in South Africa by men of British origin is of the most vital importance to the future prosperity of British South Africa."² The vast expenditure of blood and treasure might be wasted, unless a sufficient British population was secured to make future trouble an impossibility. The Commissioners, however, gravely underrated the difficulties in the way. Similarly, a few years later, Lord Milner, while recognizing that the bulk of the country population in the two new colonies must remain Dutch, emphasized the necessity of avoiding the mischief of a country population wholly Dutch and a town population mainly British—the difference of race being thus aggravated by difference of habits of life and economic interests—by a systematic introduction of British farmers.³ Land settlement, he had already stated, should be undertaken on a large scale; otherwise, however useful, it would be politically unimportant.⁴ He placed on record his profound conviction that unless, in raising the loans that would be necessary to meet the expenses arising out of the war, a substantial sum was assigned for the purchase of lands, and the settlement thereon of farmers of British race, an opportunity would be lost which would never recur, the neglect of which would have most prejudicial effects on the future peace and prosperity of South Africa.

Unfortunately, apart from other obstructions, the stars in their courses fought against the fulfilment of these ideals. The new colonies were not first-class farming countries; and strange conditions, together with a succession of bad seasons, made the lot of the British settlers far from an enviable one. If Great Britain was to hold her own in South Africa, it would have to

¹ *Can. Hans.*, LIV, p. 1335.

² *Report of the Land Settlement Commission to South Africa*, 1901, Cd. 626, p. 7.

³ *Papers relating to the Administration of the Transvaal and Orange Free State*, 1903, Cd. 1551, pp. 12-13.

⁴ *Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa*, 1902 Cd. 1163, p. 92.

6 XXTH CENTURY BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

do so by other means than that of a powerful British farming population.

Still something was achieved and Lord Milner could describe in the House of Lords the progress as steadily satisfactory and to have reached a stage at which it had been learnt by experience how such progress might be carried on with greater advantage. On the grant of responsible government, however, it could only be carried on, were it taken out of the hands of the Colonial Governments and placed under independent management. But that was a condition which a Radical Government could hardly be expected to fulfil. On no subject did Lord Milner feel more strongly or express himself more bitterly. "There is a higher obligation," he said, "even than the maintenance of policy, and that is the obligation of honour . . . you cannot, surely, add another, and one of the most disgraceful, pages to the dark annals of our chopping and changing in South Africa." ¹

Almost the last appearance of Mr. Chamberlain upon the official stage was one eminently characteristic. For the first time, during his period of office, a British Secretary of State visited a British colony in connexion with political questions.²

In open discussion with the Boer leaders he did much to clear the air of dislike and suspicion. "The terms at Vereeniging," he told the Boer delegates, "are the charter of the Boer people; and you have every right to call upon us to fulfil them in the spirit and in the letter; and if, in any respect, you think we have failed or that in the future we do fail, in carrying out those terms, bring your complaints to us and they shall be redressed."³ Again, "In the terms of peace it was promised that Dutch education should be given to the children of all parents who desired it. That promise we will keep." It is noteworthy that at this meeting General Smuts was the spokesman of the Dutch delegates. He had already declared that the two races must stand side by side in the work of restoration. "We are not really separated," Mr. Chamberlain replied, "either in interests or in character. . . . What are the qualities which we admire in you? Your patrio-

¹ *Hans., Debates and Questions on Colonial Affairs*, 1906, pp. 1949-50.

² The Duke of Newcastle had accompanied the Prince of Wales on his visit to Canada in 1860.

³ *Speeches*, Vol. 2, pp. 74 and 92;

tism, your courage, your tenacity, your willingness to make sacrifices for what you believe to be right and true. Well, those are the qualities which we desire to imitate and which we believe we share." (Mr. Botha was observed to applaud this statement.) "I believe, then, that with consideration on both sides, with strict observance of agreements on both sides, with a readiness to give as well as to take, before many years are over, probably sooner than any of us now can anticipate, we shall all be one free people under one flag."¹

The effect of the visit was perhaps to some extent discounted by Mr. Chamberlain's resignation of office which followed soon after his return to England. Still we may fairly say that the seed bore good fruit. On the delicate subject of Asiatic labour for the gold-mines, which was beginning to be discussed, his words were, in the light of subsequent events, singularly prophetic.² The arguments in favour of the introduction of Chinese labour no doubt appeared a little later overwhelming ; and a course which men like Lord Milner or Sir Godfrey Lagden recommended cannot be lightly condemned. Nevertheless, what happened afterwards shows the force of Mr. Chamberlain's reasoning. Sir A. (Lord) Milner came to believe that the introduction of Chinese labour was vitally necessary for the purposes of his general policy of reforms. Whether he was right or wrong can now never be proved. It is true that afterwards, without Chinese labour, the mines were able to prosper ; but the ground swell, caused by the South African War, had subsided ; and drought in the country districts had driven back the natives to the mines. It is therefore possible that the presence of Chinese labourers may have saved the economic situation at a most critical time. The Transvaal Labour Commission of 1903, it must be remembered, found that the demand was in excess of the supply for the mining industry by some 129,000 labourers.

But, regarding the subject in a more general way, we must recognize that the question of Chinese labour proved a very thorn in the side of the interests of the Empire. The democracies in Great Britain and the Dominions responded to the agitation, not because they saw a distinction between Chinese immigration to the Transvaal and coolie immigration to Trinidad ; but because their instincts told them that the movement was one directed

¹ *Speeches*, Vol. 2, p. 98.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 105-6.

against white workmen and that the aim of the Gold Mine magnates was to obtain labour on the cheap. At first it seemed that Dutch opinion, on the spot, supported the proposal. The farmers required Kafir labourers; and Chinese immigration seemed to favour their interests. But, when the cry became a political one in England, and when the chief beneficiaries under the scheme were their old enemies, the Boers supported, though a little half-heartedly, the demand for the removal of the Chinese; which, in fact, had to be effected more slowly and warily than the fervid language from Radical platforms would have led one to expect. In passing from an unsavoury subject one may note the views of Lord Stanmore, who spoke with great authority on the subject of indentured labour. He pointed out that there had been certain fixed general principles underlying all the older immigration ordinances.

Amongst these was the principle that the immigrants must be allowed to settle in the country at the termination of their contract of indenture.¹

But the necessity for repatriation struck at the roots of the whole system. No sane man would desire to introduce yet another element into the seething cauldron of the South African Native question. But, when moral and political considerations stand in clear antagonism to considerations purely economic, the latter cannot, in the long run, prevail; so that, without condemning Mr. Lyttelton and much less Sir A. (Lord) Milner, we may yet recognize that, even though economically it was a measure of immediate urgency, the introduction of Chinese labourers was still open to criticism.

Moreover, its political results were clearly disastrous. What could be more lamentable than that imperial questions should again be trailed in the mud of British party controversy; and that apparent ground should be given to the old prejudices which regarded imperialism and morality as of necessity opposing forces?

The resignation of Mr. Chamberlain in the autumn of 1903 was followed within less than two years by the departure of Lord Milner from South Africa. Throughout a most difficult time the two great men had worked together in mutual confidence and accord, with consequent benefit to British interests. Now that the clouds of party controversy are blown away, few will deny

¹ *Colonial Debates and Questions*, 1906, pp. 365-8.

Lord Milner's unshaken determination, transparent honesty and unflagging industry. He was, moreover, what is rare in the case of practical politicians, a seer of visions. It must be admitted, however, that his methods of efficiency, invaluable as they were to the development of the country, did not attach to him the sympathies of a conservative people bred in the sunshine of South Africa, and that his successor, Lord Selborne, a practical farmer who knew his Old Testament as well as it was known by the Boers themselves, was a governor more to their mind.

Whilst Lord Milner was still in the saddle, the question arose what modifications should be made in the form of government in the Transvaal. There was much to be said for the continuance for some time longer of Crown Colony government. But there was a general agreement that this was impossible. In this state of things Mr. A. Lyttelton, who succeeded Mr. Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, decided that the old colonial system of representative, without responsible, government should be established. It is difficult to be convinced by the historical arguments he put forward.¹ In fact to set on foot representative government with an executive wholly nominated was, in General Botha's words, to impart "the shadow without the substance." Yet more surprising was Mr. Lyttelton's other reason for postponing the grant of self-government. "In my opinion," he told the House of Commons, "if, instead of having a Government which would in a certain sense be independent of parties, you were to have a Government which would be an ordinary partisan Government, either a Government of the British on the one side, or a Government of the Het Volk, on the other, so far from giving that opportunity for political co-operation to arise, you will inevitably accentuate the racial line which already exists."² He had already laid stress on this point in a dispatch dated 31 March, 1905.³ In other words, racial antagonism was to be buried in common opposition to a British Government. Mr. Lyttelton failed to recognize the possibility that racial fusion might be dearly purchased, if its fruits were a common hostility to the incidents of British connexion. He professed to believe that he was supported in his view by the great body of opinion in the colony itself;

¹ *Papers relating to Constitutional Changes in the Transvaal*, 1905, Cd. 2479, p. 61.

² *Debates and Questions on Colonial Affairs*, 1905, 27 July.

³ Cd. 2400, pp. 2-3.

but, in fact, an association had been set on foot, in 1904, to obtain responsible government ; and, whilst the more progressive of the English were rapidly moving in this direction, the Boers took the perfectly reasonable line that, though they had acquiesced in Crown Colony government, if a change was to be made, anything less than responsible government would be a delusion and a snare.

Whatever would have been the results of Mr. Lyttelton's methods, the whole situation was altered by the general election in Great Britain in 1906, which drove the Ministers from power. The fact that the Government had outstayed its welcome ; that it spoke with an uncertain voice on the question of tariff reform ; that tariff reform was distrusted and disliked by the great majority of the working classes ; the fact, lastly, that much prejudice and indignation had been aroused over the subject of Chinese labour—all these things made the result of the election a foregone conclusion. The only consequence from it with which we are here concerned was that it was decided, forthwith, to set up responsible government in both the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.

The gift of complete responsible government to communities the great majority of whose inhabitants had been, a short while before, at open war with Great Britain, was a leap in the dark which has been attended with the most fortunate results. The welcome it received from the soldier-statesmen, Generals Botha and Smuts, made it a most fortunate event for the British Empire.

But, granting all this, it is not therefore necessary to join in the pæans of praise with which the action of Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman has been extolled. If, indeed, the Liberal Government clearly recognized that Union or Federation was the all-important goal, and that, without the existence of self-government in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, that goal could never be attained, then, indeed, their action was worthy of all praise ; and, in this connexion, it is fair to note Lord Elgin's words that the grant was made " with the hope that the steps now taken will in due time lead to the union of the interests of the whole of His Majesty's dominions in South Africa." ¹ But, if the home Government merely moved with a light heart along the line of least resistance, careless of what the future might have in store,

¹ *Letters Patent and Instructions relating to the Transvaal*, 1906, Cd. 3250, p. 40.

then the case was altogether different. The assumption that the grant of responsible government would forthwith convert quondam foes into loyal friends found really little justification in the case, most often cited, of Lower Canada ; and, in fact, had the Union not come into being, the rebellion that took place at the time of the Great War would almost certainly have found support in the executive Government of the Orange Free State ; whilst, if British interests would have fared better in the Transvaal, the result would have been due not to the prescience of British Ministers but to the greatness of soul and width of mind of the two Dutch leaders already mentioned.

But in paying tribute to these men another name should not be forgotten. The lamentable lapse of the Raid could not obliterate the fact that no one man worked harder to bring about that Union of hearts, which we may believe will one day come about in South Africa, than Cecil Rhodes. Not only by the Glen Grey Act was he the first to propose an enlightened native policy ; not only did he bring into being a new possession for the British Empire and people ; he was also the first plainly to propose the elimination of the imperial factor, where it was unnecessary, by the Union of Dutch and British. Nor did the happening of the South African War alter one whit his conviction of the necessity of such union.¹ The career of Rhodes belongs to the nineteenth century rather than to the period here dealt with. But though he died in 1902, his " immense and brooding spirit " still " quickened and controlled " ; and not only in the country called by his name.

Before dealing with the Union of South Africa which added another to those great Dominions which could speak with assurance in the Councils of the Empire, we may note the difficulties that occur where, in theory, full responsibility has been conferred, and yet where facts seem to prevent such responsibility from becoming a reality.

The standing example of this state of things was the colony of Natal. Here a small white population seemed camping on ground which might at any moment be thrown into the air from under their feet. Nervous apprehension had not led to a solution

¹ See the striking speech to the South African League of October, 1900, reported in Prof. Basil Williams' *Cecil Rhodes*, a book of profound insight as well as knowledge.

of the native difficulty. A strong Royal Commission reported in 1907: "The chasm between the races has been broadening for years, and the attitude of the natives is now one of distance and distrust."¹

"... we have not satisfied any of the various classes who go to form the native section of the community. The exempted native believes that, while asking for bread, he has been given a stone, by being denied the full privileges of the European; the Christian educated native wants more education, fixity of land tenure on mission reserves, and suitable avenues for the employment of his children; the half-caste frets because his cry to be freed from native law and be legally classified with his European ancestor has been persistently ignored; and, as a contrast to this striving for improvement, there is the kraal native, representing the great mass of the population, who simply desires to be let alone, preferably under the sway of his chief, to live his own life of sensual stagnation."²

Not only was the land system at fault through the congestion which had resulted from it; but there was urgent need for a more human and sympathetic administration. The control of the natives should be entrusted to highly skilled and carefully selected officers, possessing the attributes of born rulers, imbued with an ever-present sense of their responsibilities, and with an intense desire for the welfare of the people. The advent of responsible government had only meant to the native a greater intrusion upon them of statutory injunctions. Petty law in the place of sympathy had had the natural effect of inhibiting and neutralizing their confidence.³ In this state of things the commission recommended (1) the delegation of powers by Parliament to a new administrative unit; and (2) the creation of an Advisory Board on native affairs.

Public opinion in the colony had always been opposed to the return of the Zulu chief Dinuzulu which had been allowed in 1898; and in 1906 both the Natal Ministry and the governor, Sir H. McCallum, were agreed that the safety of the colony required his removal from Zululand. There was strong feeling in Natal over the criticisms of the native policy made in the House of Commons,

¹ *Report of the Native Affairs Commission 1906-7, 1908*, Cd. 3889, pp. 7-8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

while, at the same time, the Natal authorities were claiming the services of British troops. They thus exposed themselves to the retort : " The step proposed is very serious, involving as it does, direct responsibility to His Majesty's Government for native affairs in the colony. These . . . have been managed far from satisfactorily since the establishment of responsible government ; and it is essential, in order to justify the use of imperial troops, in what is of the nature of police duty, that I shall have full information to show that proposed action is absolutely necessary, and that it cannot be taken without active support of troops." ¹ The Report of the Native Affairs Commission, Lord Elgin complained, had been set aside, or at any rate, postponed, whilst the inquiry into questions of complicity in the latter rising, to be again followed by a course of repression, was undertaken. The home Government could not possibly become parties to such a policy or defend it in Parliament.²

The Proclamation of Martial Law, against the advice of the Governor (3 December), followed by the arrest of Dinuzulu, was not calculated to increase the confidence of the home Government in Natal methods.

The Natal Ministry took the high line, in the matter of Dinuzulu's trial, that His Majesty's Ministers, apart from His Majesty's Ministers in Natal, had no responsibility for the procedure to be adopted in Natal in criminal trials ; and, on the home Government continuing the payment of Dinuzulu's salary against the wishes of the colony, the Natal Attorney-General declared that the whole policy of British Ministers, since the middle of 1906, had been to let and hinder the Colonial authority in their treatment of Dinuzulu.³

Another member asserted that they were being downtrodden so as to make them wonder whether it was worth while to support the British flag.⁴ " The native was an ignorant fellow at the best ; he did not understand sympathy ; but he regarded everything in the shape of sympathy as weakness."

In any case there was no getting over Mr. Churchill's contention in February, 1906 : " A self-governing colony is not entitled to say one day, ' Hands off ! no dictation in our internal

¹ *Further Correspondence relating to the Native Affairs of Natal, 1900*, Cd. 3888, p. 110.

² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

³ Cd. 4328, pp. 61-75.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

affairs,' and the next day to telegraph for the protection of a brigade of British infantry." ¹

In justice to the people of Natal it should be noted that the Native Administrations Act of 1908 attempted to meet some of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. Appointment was to be made of District Native Commissioners. A Council for native affairs was to be instituted. At the same time the number of members of the Legislative Council was increased by four, who should represent the interests of the Native population.

Another Bill was proposed for the creation and administration of native land settlements. The Bill was intended to promote the objects of the Commission in recommending the establishment of village settlements under a tentative form of local self-government (including local taxation) and the issue of conditional tithes thereon so as to secure fixity of tenure.²

From our point of view the episode is interesting mainly, because it illustrated the need for union, if responsible government was to receive a fair trial.

It is a far journey from the East coast of Africa to the island of Newfoundland, but the dispute between the Newfoundland Government and the United States, over the Fisheries question, opened out the same or similar considerations.

Under the memorable agreement of 1904 between Great Britain and France,³ which was the culminating point of the work of King Edward, a long-standing grievance had been removed from the people of Newfoundland. Under that agreement the French renounced the special privileges under the Peace of Utrecht and subsequent treaties.

But the settlement of the long-continued contest with the French did not bring peace to the Newfoundland fishing interests. In 1906 the Newfoundland legislature passed a Bill respecting foreign fishing vessels, the effect of which, according to the American contention, was seriously to interfere with American fishing rights under the Convention of 1818. This contention the Newfoundland Government maintained was "equivalent to a declaration that seven hundred miles of territorial waters were by that instrument reserved from British jurisdiction and set apart as an area within which American citizens were exempt from

¹ *Debates and Questions on Colonial Affairs*, 1906, p. 453.

² Cd. 4194.

³ *Treaty Series*, No. 5, 1905, Cd. 2383.

statute law and free to use any fishing implement, however injurious." ¹ The real cause of the passing of the Foreign Fishing Vessels Act of 1905 was the disappointment of the Newfoundland Government at the rejection of the Bond-Blaine Treaty by the American Senate. That treaty had made a general settlement of the trade relations between the two countries, which Canada had viewed with distrust. It was pointed out that Canada no less than Newfoundland had an interest in the fisheries of the Atlantic Coast, and if that treaty had come into force, the Americans might have obtained privileges to which Canada had not consented ; but which she would have been debarred from objecting to. However, the only effective remedy, the admission of Newfoundland into the Canadian Confederation, was out of the question ; because it was altogether repudiated by the people of Newfoundland.²

The British Government, realizing the seriousness of the situation, declared the suspension of the Newfoundland measure. The Newfoundland Government protested that this was a direct interference with the powers of self-government granted to the colony ; but the home authorities convincingly could reply that the question was one "of international interest," in which the imperial Government had every right to intervene.³ Meanwhile, in Canada, public opinion chafed at the weak attitude of Great Britain. Sir W. Laurier denied that it was possible for Canada to intervene at that stage ; but he added significantly that at any moment the quarrel might become a Canadian one.⁴

The *modus vivendi* was renewed for another year, in spite of the protests of the Newfoundland Government and their refusal to publish the Orders in Council. At the same time the decision of the whole question at issue was referred to the Hague tribunal. The award of that tribunal, dated September 7, 1910,⁵ was a complete vindication of the British Government's moderation. Upon the main point at issue it was in favour of the British contention, and a wholly satisfactory agreement was, in 1912, arrived at between the United Kingdom and the United States of America.⁶

In the case of Natal, a remedy was found by Union which

¹ *Correspondence relating to Newfoundland Fisheries*, 1906, Cd. 3262, p. 20. For a full statement of the Newfoundland Case, see speech of Sir R. Bond at the Colonial Conference of 1907, Cd. 3523, pp. 587-600.

² *Can. Hans.*, LV, pp. 5796-8.

³ Cd. 3262, pp. 31-2.

⁴ *Further Correspondence*, etc., 1907, Cd. 3765, p. 90.

⁵ Cd. 5396, 1910.

⁶ Cd. 6450, 1912.

threw responsibility upon a larger unit, and one more able therefore to bear it. No question is of more interest to students of constitutional history than the question why the movement for federation or union, which had been the policy of Sir George Grey and of Lord Carnarvon, in both cases meeting with failure from the manner of its presentment, at last, in 1909, was adopted by statesmen of both races and parties. The result was due to wisdom and magnanimity on the part of both the Dutch and the English leaders and to the careful spadework which had been done by a small band of indefatigable labourers in the field. To realize the gravity of the situation one has only to read the masterly memorandum issued in 1907 under the name of Lord Selborne.¹ Not since the publication of the Durham Report had a state paper relating to the Colonies of such importance been issued. In the nature of things, it was pointed out, constant divergence of opinion and of interest arose between the separate Governments and legislatures of Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. The one combining force was the High Commissioner, who was himself the agent of the British Government. Thus, in the case of extreme divergence of opinion, even in respect of matters which were exclusively part of the internal affairs of South Africa, the ultimate decision lay with the imperial Parliament at Westminster.

In three directions, it was pointed out, especially, there lay the threat of danger. The railway system of South Africa was ground profusely sown with the seed of future quarrel and strife. Each colony was engaged in a fierce struggle to obtain traffic at the expense of its neighbour; whilst it was to the interest of the Transvaal that its trade should be concentrated on the Portuguese port of Delagoa Bay.

Again, the only breakwater against the irruption of a calamitous customs war between the rival colonies was the feeble barrier of a Customs Convention which was the outcome of a compromise, distasteful to each individual colony, and only tolerated because of the consequences which might result from its overthrow. The path of safety lay in the direction of a tariff, the deliberate work of British South Africa as a whole, ensuring permanent free trade within the borders of British South Africa.

¹ *Papers relating to a Federation of the South African Colonies, 1907*, Cd. 3564.

Lastly, there was the native difficulty. Native policy to be successful must be consistent and continuous. All South Africans were agreed that the native question was at once the most important and the most difficult question which confronted them ; but by the perpetuation of five or six totally different systems of native administration, they were doing all that in them lay to make the question yet more grave and the problem yet more difficult.

"South Africans," the Paper concluded, "may well ask themselves from what calamities would not their country have been saved, if fifty, or even thirty, years ago, by a movement born of the soil and nurtured by their own statesmen, the federation of South Africa had been accomplished. Shall it fall to the lot of your children hereafter to have to ask themselves the same question ? " ¹

The Selborne Memorandum fell on ground well prepared. In July, 1907, the Cape House of Assembly, on the motion of Mr. Malan, a leading member of the Afrikaner Bond, seconded by the Prime Minister, Sir Starr Jameson, unanimously passed a motion urging the Government to approach the Governments of the other self-governing colonies in South Africa, with the view of taking preliminary steps to promote the Union of British South Africa ; and the change of Government in the following year made no difference in the attitude of the Colony on this question. The immediate cause, however, of the National Convention which framed the Union was the breakdown of the Conference held at Pretoria on May 4, 1908, the object of which was to settle a new Customs tariff and to enter upon a new railway agreement. The Conference, while failing to agree upon the subjects directly before them, was unanimous in its approval of resolutions in favour of holding a Convention of the Colonies to promote closer union.

These resolutions met with no opposition in any of the Legislatures and the Convention met in Durban on October 12, 1908.²

"Everything," said the President, Sir Henry (Lord) de Villiers, "depends upon the spirit with which we approach the performance of our task. Failure is certain if we start with a

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

² A clear account of "How the Convention Came About" is given by Sir E. H. Walton, the present High Commissioner of the Union, *The Inner History of the National Convention*, 1912, pp. 7-30.

feeling of distrust and suspicion of each other, and with the sole desire to secure as many advantages as we can for our respective colonies. Success is certain if we give each other our fullest confidence, and act upon the principle that, while not neglectful of the interests of those who have sent us here, we are for the time being representatives of the whole of British South Africa.”¹

The first question to be decided was should the constitution be a Union or a Federation? Hitherto all proposals for reform had been in the direction of federation; but, when the whole subject was approached more closely, it was recognized that in South Africa there existed none of the conditions that elsewhere had made federation to be inevitable. Here there were no physical barriers; boundaries being purely artificial. Here states were not for the most part divided by race or by religion; Dutch and British confronting each other in Cape Colony and in the Transvaal, one result of which had been that the South African War partook, to a great extent, of the character of a civil war. But whilst unification would not at once obliterate the traces of racial antagonism, it would help, in the larger atmosphere of a more extended environment, to render it less bitter; whilst, under federation it would have been much more difficult to establish a common railway system. In this state of things, all the representatives at the Convention, except those from Natal, were in favour of Union, as proposed by Mr. Merriman; provision to be made for the establishment of provinces, with powers of legislation and administration in local matters and in such others as might be specially reserved to them. In his very interesting account of the discussion at the Convention, Sir E. Walton emphasizes the extraordinary ability and knowledge which General Smuts brought to bear upon the proceedings.² It should further be noted that the Natal representatives, although outvoted on this question, remained members of the Convention.

The next wave that had to be encountered was the language question, a subject that lent itself to distrust and jealousy. There can be no question but that the ready acceptance by Sir Starr Jameson and the other English representatives of General Hertzog's resolution, which declared the complete equality of Dutch and English as the official languages of the Union, did more than

¹ *The Inner History of the National Convention*, 1912, pp. 39-40.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 57-8.

anything else to disperse the feeling of distrust that alone could have wrecked the success of the Convention.

Another wave of a still more menacing character could only be met by avoiding it. The consideration of the franchise qualification opened up the whole native question. A Union which conferred the franchise on the Natives would, most certainly, have been rejected by the Dutch people of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Similarly, Cape Colony was anxious lest its own experimental venture regarding the native vote should be trodden under foot by a prejudiced majority in the Union. The way was therefore open for a compromise, under which the Cape Colony native lost the right to sit in Parliament, a right which he had never been asked to exercise ; but the important provision was secured that no person in the province of the Cape of Good Hope should be disqualified from voting for the election of members of the House of Assembly, by reason of his race or colour only, unless such law were passed by a majority of two-thirds of the members of each House of Parliament.

A further question of some difficulty was what should be the basis on which representation should be allotted ? Should it be on a Voters' basis or on a basis of population ? The first system favoured the British population of the towns ; the other the Dutch population of the country districts. Here again the result was a compromise. The voters' basis was accepted for the Transvaal ; but in the other Colonies the adult white male population was taken as the basis.

A somewhat half-hearted acceptance of the principle of proportional representation was afterwards thrown overboard ; there being little public opinion behind the demand.¹

Electoral areas in the different provinces were to be mapped out by a commission, consisting of a judge of the Supreme Court and two other members. This commission in forming areas should consider (a) community or diversity of interest ; (b) means of communication ; (c) physical features ; (d) existing electoral areas ; and (e) sparsity or density of population. Subject to these considerations the quota of voters should be the basis for distribution ; and when the commission departed from this it should not be to a greater extent than 15 per cent more or 15 per cent less.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

Education was another matter which required careful handling. As a general rule nothing can be more a matter of national concern than what is to be the system of national education. But in the case of South Africa racial jealousy intervened ; so that education, other than higher education, was perforce left to the tender mercies of the Provincial Councils. It is true that this enactment was only made for a period of five years and thereafter, until Parliament otherwise provided. But it is highly improbable that Parliament will provide otherwise.

Still, whatever its deficiencies, the Union of South Africa Act, which embodied the conclusions of the Convention, solved the South African problem at least as satisfactorily as the British North America Act and the Commonwealth of Australia Act had solved the problems of their respective communities. Henceforth another great Dominion had taken its place side by side with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Accordingly what is to be said about its subsequent history will be postponed till these other Dominions have received brief treatment.

CHAPTER II

THE GROWING PAINS OF NATIONHOOD

The five free self-governing Dominions of the Empire are to-day to the Motherland like the five fingers of a great hand. They are all free ; they are all vitally related and they close towards the palm.

Dr. J. A. MACDONALD of the *Toronto Globe*.

THE day is past when British Colonial policy mainly depended upon tendencies at work in the Mother country. At present it is as much, or even more, directed by movements of thought regarding it in the great Dominions. But, in order to understand the relations between Great Britain and these Dominions in the last two decades, it is necessary to know something of the political life of the latter. That political life, indeed, is not always easy for an outsider to understand, because, unless there is a racial antagonism, or unless and until a distinct and aggressive Labour party emerges in the field of politics, the distinction between rival parties is apt to appear somewhat shadowy.

In theory, both in Canada and in Australia, the main dividing issue was the question of the tariff. In Canada the Conservatives had been the followers of Sir John Macdonald, the creator of the National policy of protection to native industries, and the Liberals had been, in opposition, the avowed upholders of freedom of trade. But when they came to power in 1896 they found such difficulties in the way of removing duties that, in fact, their policy differed hardly at all from that of their predecessors. (The subject of imperial preference introduced by them will receive separate treatment.) Similarly, under the federal system of the Commonwealth, free trade was a practical impossibility ; whilst, in its beginning, there was a general agreement that protective duties should not be very high.

Perhaps the best way of realizing Canadian political life at the beginning of the century is to form a clear idea of the

personality and views of the imposing figure who, for the first eleven years of our period, dominated the political stage of Canada.

A consummate speaker in both French and English, Sir Wilfrid Laurier added a dignity and grace to political discussions, such as are not always found in democratic communities. In many ways the bent of his mind was essentially conservative; even while he held strongly some of the cherished convictions of the anti-militarist, anti-socialist, English Manchester School.

As an example of this conservatism, take his views on denominational education; though he was here expressing the opinion of a good, however moderate, Catholic: "We live in a country," he said, "wherein, in the seven provinces that constitute our nation, either by the will or by the toleration of the people, in every school Christian morals, Christian dogmas are taught to the youth of the country. We live by the side of a nation, a great nation, a nation for which I have the highest admiration, but whose example I would not take in everything, in whose schools, for fear that Christian dogmas, in which all do not believe, might be taught, Christian morals are not taught. When I compare these two countries, when I compare Canada with the United States, when I compare the state of the two nations, when I think upon their future, when I observe the social condition of civil society in each of them, and when I observe in this country of ours a total absence of lynching, and an almost total absence of divorce and murders, I thank Heaven that we are living in a country where the young children of the land are taught Christian morals and Christian dogmas." ¹

The same vein of conservatism appeared in his views with regard to state socialism, deprecating imitation of Australian models. ²

It is not therefore surprising to find the same cautious conservatism giving the keynote to Sir Wilfrid's attitude towards the question of imperial relations. In 1901 he maintained that the existing relations were, for the time being, satisfactory. The time would come, in the more or less distant future, when, as the result of Canadian development, they would cease to be satisfactory. "Then the problem would present itself for practical solution." ³

¹ *Cans. Hans.*, LXIX, p. 1458.

² *Ibid.*, LXXX, p. 54.

³ *Ibid.*, LIV, p. 122.

Such being his state of mind, Laurier and the country he represented were inevitably the drag on the wheel when any scheme for closer imperial union was in question. Still, in his own way, he was as loyal as anyone to the imperial connexion and took genuine pleasure in such forms of imperial co-operation as seemed to be based on safe lines. Thus he welcomed the imperial Conference as a Conference between Governments.¹

Laurier was deeply impressed by the presence at the Conference of 1907 of General Botha and by his avowal that he was ready to fight for England with the same resolution as he had fought against her. With regard to the probable Union of South Africa, Sir Wilfrid said: "Such a consummation would be possible nowhere except within the bounds of the British Empire, under the ægis of those British institutions, so broad, so free, so just, so fair, and which alone are capable of such majestic development."² When the words are recalled by which, at the imperial Conference of 1911, he seemed to suggest Canadian neutrality in the event of the Empire being at war, other utterances of his should be placed by their side.

"On more than one occasion," he declared in 1909, "I have said that I would deprecate Canada being drawn into the vortex of militarism existing in Europe. The situation in Europe to-day is one that cannot be described as other than madness. . . . England is the one nation that has not lost her head. . . . I hope the day shall never come when we shall be drawn into the conflicts of Europe. But I have no hesitation in saying that the supremacy of the British Empire is absolutely essential, not only to the maintenance of that Empire, but to the civilization of the world. . . . I have no hesitation in saying that if the day should come when the supremacy of Britain on the High Seas will be challenged, it will be the duty of all the daughters of the nation to close around the old Motherland and make a rampart about her to ward off any attack. I hope that day will never come; but, should it come, I will deem it my duty to devote what might be left of my life and energy to stump the country, and endeavour to impress upon my fellow-countrymen, especially my compatriots in the province of Quebec, the conviction that the salvation of England is the salvation of our own country; that

¹ *Ibid.*, 1908, LXXX, p. 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

therein lies the guarantee of your civil and religious freedom and everything we value in this life." ¹

Again in the debate on reciprocity with the United States, Sir Wilfrid said: "If my poor voice could be heard throughout the length and breadth of the country, and if, without presumption, it could be heard also beyond the frontiers, I would say to our American neighbours that, flattering as may be to their pride the idea that the territory of the Republic should extend over the whole continent, from the waters of the Gulf of Mexico to the waters of the Arctic Ocean, remember that we Canadians were born under the same flag as were your ancestors, a flag under which perhaps they may have suffered some oppression, but which to us has been, and is now more than ever, the emblem of freedom. Remember that, if you have founded a nation upon separation from the Motherland, we Canadians have set our hearts upon building up a nation without separation; that in this task we are already far advanced, with our institutions, with our national entity as a people, and with everything that constitutes a nation, to which we are just as devoted as you are to yours. Remember that the blood which flows in our veins is just as good as your own, and that, if you are a proud people, though we have not your numbers, we are just as proud as you are, and that rather than part with our national existence, we would part with our lives." ²

From these passages can be gathered something of the character of the great man who for some fifteen years directed the destinies of Canada. For present purposes mention need be made of only two other persons. During these years the opposition leader, Mr. (Sir Robert) Borden, was working his way, slowly but surely, into the full confidence of his followers. Meanwhile Sir Wilfrid was not sufficiently ardent in his French-Canadian sympathies to suit some who nominally supported him. In tracing the career of Mr. H. Bourassa, who by dint of ability and energy became the nationalist leader, one notes a fierce reaction against the temper and political creed of Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

To judge him from his public utterances there would seem to be a curious mingling of opposites in Mr. Bourassa's nature. No one spoke with greater discretion and good sense than he spoke

¹ *Can. Hans.*, XC, pp. 3511-12. See also *Ibid.*, CIII, p. 50, and XCIV, p. 2972.

² *Ibid.*, XCIX, 1911, pp. 4770-1.

about the Alaska boundary question ;¹ and when a visit from King Edward VII to Canada was proposed, he gave eloquent expression to the loyal feelings of the French-Canadians.² On the other hand, the charge brought by him against Mr. Chamberlain that he had brought about the South African War so as to enrich himself and his family, through the purchase by the Government of arms and ammunition,³ exceeded the limits of decency ; and, though he may have had provocation from some hotheads in Ontario, it would seem to be true that Mr. Bourassa, more than anyone, was responsible for that rekindling of race bitterness which was the most lamentable feature in the life of Canada during the first seventeen years of the century. Towards the end of the time, questions, no doubt, like conscription, and the treatment of the French language in Ontario, served to fan the flame ; but that the flame assumed such dimensions was due to the ground having been already carefully prepared. It is true that, after a few years, Mr. Bourassa removed his presence from the federal Parliament, but this did not mean any diminution of his influence.

Still, whatever the internal troubles thus created for Canada, the question of the imperial connexion was not in issue. The French-Canadians recognized that their lot would be no better in an independent Canada than in a Canada part of an Empire, built on diversity of races ; and the prospect of absorption in the United States was still less tempting. It would be practically impossible for the province of Quebec to stand alone as an independent nation, and therefore the motto of French-Canadian statesmen must always be to

" Rather bear those ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of."

In 1903 there occurred the last of those great boundary questions which seemed fated to stir up ill feeling between Canada and Great Britain. The decision of the majority of the Court, in the question of the Alaska boundary, unfortunately served to encourage a feeling of distrust toward Great Britain in Canada. We need not, for present purposes, enter into the details of a difficult and controversial subject. The question at issue was what was the meaning of the old treaty of 1825 made between

¹ *Ibid.*, 1903, LIX, p. 14812.

² *Ibid.*, 1906, LXXIV, p. 1691.

³ *Ibid.*, LIV, p. 1294.

Great Britain and Russia, at a time when conditions were wholly different from what they afterwards became. The matter was from the first prejudiced by the deepseated conviction in the Canadian mind that, on boundary questions, Great Britain has always sacrificed Canadian interests. It is in vain that those best competent to speak have pointed out that, in reality, the Maine boundary was in the circumstances a triumph for Canada,¹ and that the Oregon compromise was altogether reasonable, the old contention still held the field. Thus we find even Sir Wilfrid Laurier saying : " I have often regretted, Mr. Speaker, and never more than on the present occasion that we are living beside a great neighbour. Who . . . are very grasping in their national acts and who are determined on every occasion to get the best in any agreement which they make. I have often regretted also, that while they are a great and powerful nation, we are only a small colony, a growing colony, but still a colony. I have often regretted that we have not in our hands the treaty-making power which would enable us to dispose of our own affairs." ² Sir Wilfrid apparently did not see that the first part of his statement afforded a sufficient commentary upon the latter part ; and that why Canada had fared ill, if she had fared ill, was because the United States was the stronger Power, and knew its own mind. If, with the backing of Great Britain, little Canada could not obtain what she wanted, what would have been her chances if she had had to depend unaided on her own diplomacy ?

In any case the question was one of urgency. Any day gold might be discovered in the disputed territory, and an inrush of American and Canadian miners might result in conflict and bloodshed.³ But President McKinley was determined on refusing to allow the question to be decided by arbitration. The strip of land, thirty miles in width on the mainland of the continent, beginning at 50° 40' and extending north-west to the 141st degree of West longitude, had been, it was maintained, recognized as Russian by mapmakers before 1867. American immigrants had formed settlements ; and no arbitration would be tolerated which did not expressly exempt from its operation such settlements.

In this state of things the best that could be obtained was

¹ See especially W. F. Ganong, *The Evolution of the Boundaries of N. Brunswick*, Can. Hist. Soc. Public., Vol. VII.

² *Can. Hans.*, LIX, 1903, p. 1484.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14815.

the institution of a Court of American and Canadian, or British, jurists, to settle the difference. Under the treaty, signed January 23, 1903, the Court was to consist of six impartial jurists of repute, who should consider *judicially* the questions submitted to them ; having subscribed an oath that they would decide the matters in question impartially. The American president and Secretary of State, however, appointed as members of the Court two Senators, Lodge and Turner, who had already freely expressed their views with regard to the irrefutable character of the American contention. The Canadian Government was at a loss what to do ; but found that, while the matter was still under their consideration, the treaty had been confirmed by the British Government ; and an exchange of ratifications had already taken place. Another unfortunate incident was the appointment of a British member of the Court in the person of Lord Alverstone. In the special circumstances of the case, it would have been, surely, expedient that the three members of the Court, representing Great Britain, should be Canadians. Lord Alverstone's actual decision, moreover, was a puzzle to many. No doubt he acted in perfect good faith and judicially, but, while the award, with regard to the strip on the mainland, was accepted with equanimity by those Canadians who spoke with most authority, it seemed difficult to account for the reasoning which accepted the British contention, with regard to Portland Channel, and yet made the boundary line to form a sudden curve, so as to deprive Canada of the two islands, which seemed strategically of no little importance.¹

Another incident of the time was the cause of some unpleasantness. Lord Dundonald, a British officer who had done good work in the South African War, was in command of the Canadian militia. No doubt a system under which a British soldier was in the service of a Canadian Government required for its successful working tact and patience. Lord Dundonald may have possessed the traits of independence that ran in his family. What would have been thought in England had the old Duke of Cambridge expressed himself as openly regarding the Cardwell reforms as did Lord Dundonald when he said, on April 23, 1903, that the

¹ *Correspondence regarding the Alaska Boundary*, 1904, Cd. 1877. See especially opinion of Sir X. Jette, pp. 68-9. See also *Can. Hans.*, 1903, LXIII.

Canadian militia had as their diet promises instead of food ; and praise instead of wine.¹ A crisis was reached when Lord Dundonald found that officers, whom he had appointed, were superseded on political grounds, not even by the Minister of Militia but by the Minister of Agriculture, who was acting for the moment in his stead. The plea was that Dundonald was the unconscious catspaw of a Tory clique ; but, assuredly, he had no object in view save the efficiency of the troops committed to his charge. In any case, under some provocation, he uttered a vigorous protest which, no doubt, rendered it impossible that he should remain in the service of the Canadian Government. Nevertheless one cannot but smile at Sir Wilfrid's description of the episode as "but one more of the numerous contests for supremacy between the military power and the civil power."² In the heat of the moment he described Dundonald as "a foreigner" ; and, though he immediately changed the word to "stranger," the phrase rankled in the breasts of the loyal British of Ontario. Sir Wilfrid's apologia was contained in the striking words : "If sixty years of what I believe have been, after all, an honourable life, a life which has been certainly one of loyal devotion to British institutions is not a sufficient answer to such insinuations, I will not attempt to make an answer."³

During 1907 the question of oriental immigration into British Columbia became acute through the continuous arrival of large numbers of oriental labourers, mostly Japanese, which culminated in riots at Vancouver. The Japanese claims for damages were satisfactorily settled ; but the more important question remained what should be done with regard to the future ? That the Japanese, under the treaty of 1894, were entitled to enter Canada was clear enough, but it was none the less clear that their competition with Canadian labour was a source of danger to the public peace. In this state of things, Canada, with the assistance of Great Britain, entered upon friendly negotiations ; Mr. Lemieux, a member of the Canadian Ministry, visiting Japan for the purpose. A satisfactory arrangement was arrived at under which Japan, while maintaining her legal rights under the treaty of 1894, as applied to Canada in 1906, agreed to restrict in future the emigration of Japanese subjects to Canada. Stringent regulations were

¹ J. Castell Hopkins, *Can. Ann. Review*, 1903, p. 408.

² *Can. Hans.*, LVI, 1904, p. 5553.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 5550.

thereupon issued by the Japanese Government prohibiting, amongst other things, the emigration to Canada of contract labourers, unless they came at the request of the Canadian Government.

The immigration of oriental labourers from countries other than Japan had been stopped by Order-in-Council which prohibited the landing of immigrants, unless they came direct from the country of their birth or citizenship by a continuous journey with through tickets, produced before leaving the country of their birth or citizenship. We shall see in a later chapter the hardship this entailed on the wives of natives of India who were already in the country.

The coming into being of the new provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905, which were carved out of the North-West Territories, was an event that might be big with results for the imperial connexion. These new provinces were to a considerable extent settled by immigrants from the United States; what line would these men take when questions, affecting the Empire as a whole, were at issue? It is impossible, as yet, to gauge what the ultimate effect may be of the shifting of political power to the new provinces, but this, at least, can be said that, at the testing time of nations and of individuals in 1914, no section of the Canadian community responded more wholeheartedly to the call of duty than did the men of the West. Sir W. Laurier told the House of Commons that it would have been a wiser course if, instead of bringing Manitoba at once into the Confederation, full-fledged and fully equipped as a province, maturity had been reached by gradual stages, extending over a few years;¹ but neither at the time nor afterwards was such a line of proceeding found possible.

With regard to the ownership of the public lands, the Manitoba precedent was naturally followed. The claim was that the lands of these provinces had been bought by the Dominion Government and had always remained under its administration. Sir Wilfrid pointed out that in 1881 Parliament had gone so far as to give the C.P.R. an absolute exemption from federal, provincial and municipal taxation.²

Mr. Borden was at the time in favour of leaving to the Provinces the possession and control of their lands; but, on

¹ *Can. Hans.*, LXIX, p. 1423.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1440.

coming to power, was not able to move far in this direction.¹

On the subject of education we find the Conservatives taking the line generally adopted by Liberals. Laurier proposed to continue the existing system of separate schools ; but Mr. Borden maintained that a system, imposed upon them in 1875 . . . is now sought to be made perpetual. The people did not freely establish separate schools in the North-West ; but these were established under the terms of a statute, in framing which the people had no voice ; but to which as good, loyal subjects they had been absolutely obedient, so long as they were in a territorial position. He did not argue against separate schools ; he did not argue for separate schools. It was not for him to determine that question for the people of the North-West. It was for the people of the North-West to determine it for themselves.²

Excellent doctrine, but which helps to illustrate the unreal character of party warfare in the Canada of the early twentieth century. In this state of things, the burden of Conservative complaint was that the Liberals had stolen their thunder. On this, listen to Mr. (Sir George) Foster, speaking in 1905 : " To-day the Minister of Finance says, I cannot tell you what the duties will be ; but I can tell you the principles upon which they will be based. A protective tariff ! That is not enough. A maximum protective tariff ! Even that is not enough. Add to it a minimum protective tariff ! That is not enough protection. Add a retaliatory tariff ! Well, that makes it complete. And then, for the sake of good neighbourship, put a preferential British and colonial tariff along with it. Then you have the tariff principles of the Government, plus Bounties, plus dumping machinery."

The most that Mr. Foster could claim was that eighteen years of Conservative labour and toil, of Conservative expenditure and achievement had laid the foundation for all the greatness and prosperity which their successors boasted of. " After the house had been built and the land had been cultivated, the Liberals had only become tenants of what others had built, and were reaping where others had sown."³

But the Conservatives seemed to be labouring in vain. General Elections in 1904 and in 1908 only served to emphasize the strength

¹ *Can. Hans.*, p. 2949. For an able statement of the Manitoba view, see Prof. Chester Martin's *The Natural Resources Question : the Historical Basis of Provincial Claims*, 1920.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2978.

³ *Ibid.*, LXXIII, pp. 8930 and 8936.

of the Liberal position. Year after year there was the same story of expansion of trade, of growing revenue, of satisfactory business and of increasing prosperity ; ¹ and it seemed as though the barometer of the Liberal party would remain indefinitely at set fair. The cyclones, which, from two opposite sides, altered all this, are dealt with in separate chapters. The Reciprocity agreement with the United States and the Naval Service Act of 1910 related so closely to the general questions of the fiscal and defence policy of the Empire that it seems better to separate their detailed examination from this sketch of internal history.

Although Australasia is, as a general rule, the land of promise for the social reformer, Canada has supplied at least one precedent which is worthy of close investigation. The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907, ² designed to aid in the prevention of strikes and lock-outs in mines and industries connected with public utilities, gives the breathing time which is of such inestimable value in the case of industrial differences.

But, though the Naval Service Act of 1910 and its consequences were a subject of imperial concern, there was a side to them which was purely Canadian. Whilst Mr. (Sir R.) Borden was questioning the wisdom of the measure on the ground that it did not meet the present emergency, his Quebec ally and future colleague, Mr. Monk, was denouncing the measure as the outcome of panic, artfully designed. The Government proposals presented to him the gruesome spectacle of the barbarian " butchered to make a Roman holiday " ; the barbarian being the Canadian native and the butcher the British Government. ³

The Naval Service Bill passed into law ; but its passage was attended with strange consequences. When the reciprocity proposals of the Government, dealt with elsewhere, brought about a dissolution, it was found that the action of the Nationalist leaders in sowing dissatisfaction and distrust in the province of Quebec had been attended with great success. It is impossible to bring to the light of day the dark doings of political intrigue ; and, so far as Mr. (Sir Robert) Borden was personally concerned, nothing, we know, could have taken place inconsistent with the most scrupulous honour. At the same time the ways of the party manager are hard to unravel, and there is the damaging fact that

¹ *Ibid.*, XCI, p. 4583.

² 6 & 7 Ed. VII, C. 20.

³ *Can. Hans.*, 1910, XCIII, p. 1775.

Mr. Monk, the protagonist of the agitation against the Naval Service Bill, had been promised a seat in the Conservative Cabinet, along with two colleagues of his choosing. Conservatives and Nationalists stood side by side on a common platform; and, while the people of Ontario were being roused to enthusiasm by Macdonald's rallying cry, "A British subject I was born; a British subject I will die," little was heard of the question of Reciprocity in Quebec—the Nationalist leader, Mr. Bourassa, giving it a tepid approval,—whilst the whole force of the opposition there was concentrated upon the iniquities of the Naval Service Act.

The agitation was attended with complete success. For the time being the Liberal hold upon Quebec was, in great measure, lost; some twenty-two Nationalists being returned. This defection rendered more serious the Liberal discomfiture caused by the movement against the Reciprocity proposals in Ontario.

It is possible that what happened in Quebec had other consequences more serious from the imperial standpoint. Sir George Ross, the Liberal leader in the Senate, was a strong imperialist; and, but for the increased party bitterness aroused by this episode, he might conceivably have been found willing to agree to the Naval Aid Bill of 1912 which embodied the policy of the Conservative Government.

Moreover, the alliance between Mr. Borden and Monk was, as was inevitable, short-lived; the latter resigning his office on October 18, 1912, on the ground that there should have been a plebiscite before a contribution was offered to the British Navy. (Mr. Borden seems to have been throughout consistent in urging that an emergency contribution should at once be made; and that the general policy, with regard to the future, should be laid before the people before its final adoption.) Mr. Monk's Quebec colleagues, however, did not think it necessary to retire with him.

Undoubtedly the rejection by the Senate of the Navy Contribution Bill was a serious blow to the Conservative Government and diminished their prestige both in Canada and in the world. Still, in spite of the failure of their most important measure, the Government went on its way, proving, by the excellence of its administration, the capacity of its component members; whilst not a little useful legislation was passed. When, therefore, the time of crisis came, Canada, though the eccentricities of its minister of

militia and defence might occasion some anxiety, was not in a weak position as regarded its executive.

AUSTRALIA

The coming into being of the Australian Commonwealth synchronizes with the beginning of our period. A new nation had taken birth, the existence of which could not but greatly affect the future of the British Empire, and, indeed, of the world. Space forbids to enter here into a detailed examination of the new federation. Those interested in the subject will find in Professor Harrison Moore's Introduction to the 2nd edition of his *Commonwealth of Australia* (1910) an invaluable commentary. It is sufficient here to note roughly the form of the constitution. The mutual jealousies of New South Wales and Victoria forbade a Union after the model of the Canadian confederation; and so the American, rather than the Canadian, precedent held the field. All powers that were not expressly delegated to the new central authority remained with the States; and the State Governors were directly appointed by the Crown. From every point of view the weakest side of the constitution was the character of the federal Senate. In a federation of this nature, where such wide powers remained to the separate States, the Senate should have been the body representing those States. Otherwise the equal representation given to each State was a meaningless absurdity. In fact, however, the provision that, for the purposes of election to the Senate, each State should become one huge constituency, coupled with the neglect to make use of the system of proportional representation, where it was especially expedient, led to the result of elections for the Senate being fought on strict party lines, and of the best organized party, in consequence, sweeping the board. During most of these years that party was the Labour party; and so, far from the Senate representing either State interests or sober second thoughts, it has been the special hunting-ground of the doctrinaire socialist.

What, however, we are concerned with here is merely the aspect of the constitution which presented itself to the British and foreign governments. And here the results were not altogether satisfactory. In the case of a Dutch crew, liable to arrest under the Anglo-Netherlands Convention of 1856, the South Australian Government, 1902, claimed to be the proper channel of communication in the matter with the British or foreign authorities. Mr.

Chamberlain protested vigorously against such a reading of the constitution. The aim and object of the Commonwealth Act had been, he insisted, "to merge the six states into one united federal state or commonwealth, furnished with the powers essential to the existence of such. . . . By the act a new state or nation was created, armed with paramount power not only to settle the more important internal affairs relating to the common interests of the United Peoples, but also to deal with all political matters arising between them and any part of the Empire, or (through His Majesty's Government) with any foreign Power. . . . The consequence is that, in respect of all matters declared by the Constitution to be matters of federal concern, the immediate responsibility to His Majesty's Government rests upon the federal Government. Whether the federal Government and Parliament make special provision for discharging any part of that responsibility, or are content for the time to leave it to the State machinery already in existence, is entirely a matter of internal arrangement, and does not warrant His Majesty's Government in ignoring the fact that, in the creation of the Commonwealth, Parliament has, in compliance with the will of the people of Australia, devolved the responsibility upon the federal authority." ¹ The question, as put by the Prime Minister, Sir E. Barton, simply was: "Has the Commonwealth six or seven sets of external relations, or only one? If it has six sets of such relations, are the States severally its agents for the purpose of exercising them? If they were, confusion would be inevitable; but as they base their claim on independent, and not adopted, power, confusion must be worse confounded." ²

It is the more disquieting to find that Professor Harrison Moore seems to agree with the South Australian contention.³

The difficulty at first with regard to the Commonwealth Parliament was the working of party government. There were, as it was said, "no past, no parties, no sharply defined and conflicting policies." ⁴ The natural cleavage might seem to be that between free traders and protectionists. But free trade was an impossibility owing to the necessity of securing a federal revenue, and there was a general agreement that protective duties should not, at first, be high.

¹ *Constitutional Relations of Australian Commonwealth and States*, Cd. 1587, 1903, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 345-50.

⁴ *Australasian*, Jan. 5, 1901.

Almost at once the question of the abolition of Kanaka labour on the Queensland sugar plantations came to the fore ; and nothing could more clearly demonstrate the change that has taken place in public opinion regarding Dominion matters than the fact that *The Times* of 19 October, 1901, seemed to think that the home Government might intervene on behalf of the interests of the Queensland planters. Naturally Mr. Chamberlain was not prepared to take the responsibility of disallowing the Pacific Labourers Act of 1901.¹

Thus early in the life of the Commonwealth we find ourselves confronted with the question which comes to the hearts and minds of the people of Australia more than any other, the question of a white Australia. What it meant to them may be gauged by the readiness with which a liability due to lavish bounties has been incurred, so as to enable sugar to be grown with profit by white labour. The whole question of a white Australia resolves itself into two parts. There is the general question, affecting the whole of the country ; and there is the question as it affects certain special districts. With regard to the general question, no one can deny that a community is fully justified in taking such measures as it deems necessary for its self-preservation. The Australian nation is sparsely scattered over a huge continent, and the purity of its Aryan stock could, assuredly, not withstand the irruption of hordes of Asiatics. It is not therefore surprising that one of the first measures of the Australian Government should have been an Immigration Restriction Bill. At the same time there was a keen desire to adapt legislation to the general exigencies of the Empire ; and the rule in Natal, making an education test the method of exclusion, was adopted as least invidious to the people affected. In the debate Mr. Deakin repudiated with indignation the suggestion of intimidation from Downing Street which had been put forward.²

The first Prime Minister of the Commonwealth was Sir E. Barton, who was thus justly rewarded for his labours on behalf of federation. The Ministry was described as a crew of captains ; not always the most likely method of successful navigation. It contained a Radical of the type of Mr. C. Kingston from South Australia, who differed little from the Labour Party in his political

¹ *Papers relating to the Pacific Labourers Act, 1901*, Cd. 1285, 1902.

² *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1901-2, pp. 48 and 145.

ideals, and a stalwart Conservative of the type of Sir John (Lord) Forrest, an Australian born from Western Australia. Mr. Deakin added strength to the Government by the charm of his character and the power of his eloquence. A certain pathos attaches itself to Mr. Deakin's political career. A most fervent imperialist, he found himself the author of the law which, by the exclusion of the six hatters, caused Australia to be held in distrust by other parts of the Empire ; a conscientious opponent of State Socialism, beyond certain limits, he became, by his indecision in accepting the fusion of parties which alone could have resisted with success the Labour Party before it had consolidated its strength, the Frankenstein of that party. No judgement of labour ideals is thus suggested. What is emphasized is that, from his own point of view, Mr. Deakin's conduct was mistaken. Perhaps the secret of his hesitation lay in the feeling of distrust and dislike aroused in him by the personality of the leader of the opposition, Mr. (Sir) George Reid. Personal predilections play no inconsiderable part in the political world. No Coalition could have been possible that would have had to depend on Gladstone and Disraeli as fellow-members. Mr. Reid was the most ready of platform speakers and a politician of no mean capacity. His practice as a barrister, however, necessitated his frequent absence from Parliament, and his habitual jauntiness laid him open to the charge, levelled at Palmerston, that the tone of public life fell under him.

In 1903, after the passing of the Judiciary Bill, which constituted the High Court, Sir E. Barton took a judgeship in that Court, assigning, with characteristic self-abnegation, the Chief Justiceship to that great lawyer and statesman, Sir S. Griffith. Mr. Deakin became Prime Minister ; but his term of office was brief, as the Government was, in a new Parliament, defeated on an amendment in the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill, the object of which was to include public servants under its terms.

It must be remembered that the first years of the Commonwealth were years of drought and depression. There was little confidence either in the Government or in the opposition ; and the party which stood to gain was that of Labour. The result of the General Election of December, 1903, was a loss of ten seats to the Government and of two to the opposition ; in every case the seats being won by Labour candidates. The real cleavage was between Socialists and anti-Socialists ; and in this state of things the Labour Ministry of Mr. Watson was of necessity short-lived. When it was

defeated in Parliament a Coalition Government was formed from the two other parties. Unfortunately Mr. Deakin found himself unable to work with Mr. Reid ; and, though, at the time, he gave the ministry his blessing, in the following year he changed his mind and became its active opponent. From the imperial point of view it should be noted that Mr. Watson, in assuming office, had stated : " The impression has got abroad in the past that the Labour Party is opposed to any adequate provision being made for defence." So far was this from the case that he proposed an increase in the total military vote.¹

The drought had come to an end by the close of 1902, and successive good seasons opened out a period of abundance. With the defeat of the Coalition Ministry Mr. Deakin accepted the responsibility of office ; but the truth of his own words was to be verified that fusion had only meant confusion. In spite of his claim that the next election would be fought in defence of Australian interests, in the interests of the workers, producers and consumers, and to protect them against unfair competition, against fraud, against the competition of underfed and overtaxed workmen ; that the programme would be protection in all its aspects, fiscal and industrial, and directed against all monopolies ; preferential trade with members of the Empire, and population for the land and land for the people,² the electors at the General Election of 1906 failed to respond to these advances ; the Ministry losing heavily to the opposition and Labour parties. Mr. Deakin had already confessed that, though the Commonwealth Parliament was necessarily federal in its operations, yet every day almost there arose in it the spectre of the conflicting interests of the States. Provincialism was rampant outside ; its echoes were heard within the walls of Parliament. " Not until we get away from those considerations and, with Australia facing the dawn, . . . set ourselves to the business we were sent to do, will the Parliament succeed in justifying itself." ³ At this time he was inclined to agree with the Labour Party that the reason why Australia had fallen so far behind Canada and the United States in the business of attracting immigrants was that the control of the land was within the province of the States and not of the central Government.⁴

¹ *Commonwealth Hans*, 2nd session, 1903, p. 1279.

² *Ibid.*, 1906, p. 80.

³ *Ibid.*, 1905, p. 5515.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4788.

At the same time it is necessary to look at the other side of the shield, and undoubtedly there was another side which acted as a deterrent to immigration. The meaning of the law which forbade the entrance of immigrants, under contract, unless they fulfilled certain conditions with respect to technical qualifications, had been stridently proclaimed throughout the world by the case of the six British hatters, who were, at first, refused admission on Australian soil.

Be this as it may, Mr. Deakin could only hold on if he received the support of the Labour members. At first this was grudgingly given, in return for certain concessions. Thus the new Protection was an ingenious way of reconciling such members of the Labour Party as were still to some extent free traders to a substantial increase in the customs duties. (The new Protection involved high excise duties, to be remitted when goods were manufactured under satisfactory conditions.) That the new Protection was afterwards declared to be *ultra vires* on the part of the Commonwealth does not affect the argument.

On the subject of immigration Labour members professed views very similar to those of Deakin. A Labour Senator declared that, if they could only break open the large estates now locked up, there would be room for hundreds from Great Britain to come and to prosper ; but " until the Government of the Commonwealth determined to impose a tax on unimproved land and compel the utilization of these fertile tracts of country, there was no use in saying that there was room for further population." ¹ The tenure of the Deakin Government was at best precarious ; and in November, 1908, the Labour Party occasioned its fall. At last Deakin recognized the necessity of real fusion between the two anti-Socialist parties, to resist the dominance of Labour. " Twenty years before," Mr. Fisher, the new Prime Minister, reminded the House, they had been told, " if you have grievances why do you not come to Parliament and remedy them ? " " We came to Parliament, we have come in such numbers that we have revolutionized Parliament ; so much so that to-day we find every vested interest, every party of conservative thought getting into one group, with a view to meeting the advancing storm." ²

But the fusion came too late to be successful. Labour could indeed be defeated by a small majority in the existing Parliament ;

¹ *Commonwealth Hans.*, 2nd sess., 1907, p. 79. ² *Ibid.*, 1909, p. 125.

the Coalition Ministry being in power for eleven months ; but, on a General Election taking place in 1910, the party which knew its own mind triumphed in the election for both Houses. The fighting platform put forward amongst its other planks the maintenance of a white Australia ; the new Protection ; the nationalization of monopolies ; and a graduated tax on unimproved land values ; some of which measures would necessitate an amendment of the Commonwealth Constitution.

In its actual working all men were impressed by the good sense and moderation of the Labour Ministry. A strong Conservative recognized that responsibility was having its educational effect on the members of the party, rendering them a Labour aristocracy, a thinking section.¹ Assuredly, from the imperial standpoint, there was nothing to complain about in the action of the new Government. Whatever else was wrong with the Labour policy, critics were agreed that the Minister of Defence, Senator Pearce, was the right man in the right place. When defence was in question, whether by sea or by land, the Ministry proved themselves active.² The Imperial Conference of 1911 is dealt with elsewhere, but it is pleasant to note in the Governor-General's speech of 5 September, 1911, the impression it left on the minds of the Labour Ministers. "The results achieved," it was said, "had been of great importance to the destinies of the United Kingdom and of the Overseas Dominions. Matters of vital importance had been discussed and settled in a spirit of freedom, trust and amity. The Conference had emphasized the strong ties of kinship and common ideals of the various nations composing the Empire, and had made for the maintenance of peace."³

With regard to "the danger of breaking away," Mr. Fisher declared that "wherever that feeling may be, it certainly does not rest in the minds of this Government or of this party. . . . I hold that we are a family of nations, all under the United Kingdom legally, and its determinations will affect us all both as regards peace and as regards war. . . . But . . . the safest way to preserve the Empire and every part and every citizen of it is to leave the self-governing Dominions the right and the power to say what they should do in all circumstances." "I hope that it will be understood by all countries who may think that the Mother

¹ *Ibid.*, 1910, p. 249.

² See p. 107 for law as to military service.

³ *Ibid.*, 1911, pp. 6-7.

country can be attacked with impunity, that the people of Australia consider that the rights and liberties upheld by the British Government and British traditions are too sacred for us to allow the old land to be attacked with impunity." ¹ Again: "Perfect confidence in the Mother country has begotten perfect confidence in the Dominions, and I believe that the attachment at the present time of the various possessions of the old country is much stronger for that freedom and equality than it would otherwise have been. While we live apart and work apart in the management of our own affairs, we are prepared to be associated in protecting our respective Dominions throughout the world. . . ." He was all in favour of co-operation in the defence of Australia and of the Empire generally.²

Note also that a Labour Ministry welcomed the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty for a further period of ten years as an additional guarantee of the world's peace. But while the Labour Government was upholding the banner of a sane imperialism, its position at home was not altogether satisfactory. The *referendum* regarding the extension of powers to the Commonwealth resulted in 1911 in the defeat of the Ministry's proposals, who, nothing daunted, undertook to put them again forward in the following year.

Meanwhile the number and serious character of the continual strikes were beginning to alarm thoughtful men. "The outstanding feature is," Mr. Deakin remarked, "that this country which has gone further and done more to avoid and to cope with that industrial unrest, wherever it arises, than any other country in the world, . . . has not yet coped with, but is, on the contrary, confronted with a greater menace of industrial unrest than we have ever before known in the history of Australia. . . . The present Government came into office under cover of a strong advocacy and eulogium of a peaceful constitutional settlement of all industrial disputes . . . and the people of Australia are now entitled to ask: How is it that since they came into office they have adopted a policy which has not prevented, even if, indeed, it has not fomented, industrial disturbances all over the Commonwealth?" ³ In New South Wales in twelve years factories had increased by 50 per cent, the number of employés by 60 per

¹ *Commonwealth Hans*, 1911, pp. 128-131.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4447.

³ *Ibid.*, 1912, p. 77.

cent and wages by 100 per cent ; at the same time there had been a succession of strikes throwing all previous records into the shade.¹

In the same speech Mr. Deakin made his confession of political faith : " If it is only intended to fatten up our industries for later consumption by the Government of the Commonwealth, with the object, throughout this huge continent, of taking control over them, we shall bid farewell not only to the progress but also to the security of the Commonwealth. Let there be no mistake here. This is the real line of division between us. We put forward as a national policy, the development of the industries of Australia ; but we insist that those industries and those resources are to be developed by private enterprise, under the control of laws which shall secure equity and justice in the matter of wages, hours and conditions of employment. Our fundamental difference is not in respect of these wages, hours and conditions ; but in respect to the nationalization of all those industries, instead of their preservation in the hands of our citizens and workers, and their progress by the motive power of independent initiative." ²

Mr. Fisher's contention was that the main cause of strikes was the inability of the workers to get at the federation Court of Conciliation. The opposition was responsible because they had voted " No " at the referendum. The basic principle of Unionism was peace. Union meant a gathering together of men to present their case to their employers, and so to prevent strife and individual injury.³ In curious contrast with this statement of belief was the avowal of Mr. Howe, a Labour extremist. The industrial strife, he maintained, was there all the time. Labour was a people apart from the rest of the community ; he was quite willing to lay the axe at the tree of industrial legislation.⁴

The result of a General Election of 1913 was to give the opposition a majority of one in the House of Representatives ; whilst in the Senate they had very few supporters. They accepted office, however, with the object of riding for a fall ; so as to persuade the Governor-General to put in force the provision of the Commonwealth Act ⁵ which enabled him to grant a double dissolution, in the case of the second rejection by the Senate of a measure passed by the House. The attitude of the Cook Ministry

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, p. 101.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 96-7.

⁵ Sec. 57.

(June, 1913, to September, 1914) was far from conciliatory. It waged war against the principle dear to the heart of Australian Trade Unionism, the principle of day labour ; proposed to abolish the preference given to members of Unions and to restore the right of voting by post. The Labour Party was by no means content with the form of the Constitution ; another referendum (May, 1913) on the extension of the powers of the Commonwealth having been defeated, though by a smaller majority. " We know well," a Labour Senator affirmed, " that in its present form our Constitution is a lame and impotent document, and that it is hampering the representatives of the people in all directions. What other result could be expected seeing that the British system of responsible government has been grafted on to the American system which is founded upon entirely different ideas ? The mongrel Constitution which has resulted is responsible for the defects which are daily experienced in its workings. It is a Constitution which prevents the free expression of the will of the people." ¹

The result of the General Election of 1914 was to give a clear majority to the Labour Party ; so that, though the Cook Ministry was in office at the actual declaration of war, it was the Fisher Government that had, in a short time, to make good its professions of imperial solidarity. In another place the nature of that response will be more fully described. Sufficient here to say that it went far beyond anything that could have been expected. In any case the people of Australia could have been trusted ; but it was a matter for special congratulation that the Labour Prime Minister had been admitted, at that memorable meeting of the Imperial Defence Committee in 1911, into the innermost recesses of world-policy, as it affected British interests, and had kept in loyal memory the responsibilities thus entailed.

From the point of view of this volume it is not necessary to enter into the details of legislation in Australia with regard to industrial matters. Hitherto there has been this broad distinction between Labour ideals in the Commonwealth and in Great Britain, that whereas in the former compulsory arbitration was set on foot with the assent and approval of the workmen, in the latter they are, as yet, opposed to its introduction. Should, however, the Labour Party find themselves installed in office in England and have the appointment of the judges, it is possible that one

¹ *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1914, p. 2253.

might find an alteration in their views on this subject.

Meanwhile it is enough to note that, because the Commonwealth Constitution assigns industrial matters, except as regards certain specified exceptions, to the State legislatures and because in the States the march of labour is impeded by unsympathetic Second Chambers, the Labour Party is in favour of extending the powers of the Commonwealth. Hitherto, however, even when the electors were otherwise favourable to the Labour Party, the attachment to State interests has been too strong for them to sanction such extension of powers ; and referenda in 1911, 1913 and after the war have decided in favour of the existing state of things.

For our purposes the important thing to note is that the existence of a powerful Labour Party in the Commonwealth, so long as it is attached to the British connexion, is a most important link of Union between the democracies of the two hemispheres.

In December, 1907, the Commonwealth and the State of South Australia entered into an agreement for the surrender by the latter of the Northern territory to the former, subject to the approval of the two Parliaments. Such approval was given by the South Australian Parliament in 1907 and by that of the Commonwealth in 1910. From the point of view of a white Australia, the question how far this vast area of over 523,000 square miles affords a suitable field for European immigration is one of extreme importance. With regard to it, there have been very contradictory reports. A scientific expedition in 1911 by four eminent experts pronounced a somewhat favourable opinion. They found the general health of the inhabitants remarkably good. Families in the second generation showed no signs of physical deterioration ; and, though it was alleged by some that it was advisable to send children away on attaining the age of ten to twelve, the commissioners were unable to find evidence of such necessity. There was a satisfactory absence of tropical diseases ; and in the back country the winter climate enabled the settlers to recover from the effects of the damp summer heat.¹

What will be the future of the Northern territory it is difficult to predict. Assuredly it is not a desirable residence for the ordinary British workman ; and if it is to attract European immigration, such immigration will have to come from the people

¹ *Rep. of Dom. Dept., 1911-12, Cd. 6091, p. 77.*

of the southern countries bordering the Mediterranean. So long as its population is scanty it seems to hold out an invitation to Asiatic immigration. It is over this weak link in the chain that the struggle for a white Australia might have, at some future day, to be fought.

But the Commonwealth has not only a tropical or semi-tropical portion in Australia itself, she has also assumed the responsibility for the management of a tropical dependency. Papua, which was at the time a Crown Colony in association with Queensland, was placed under the authority of the Commonwealth in 1906 under the terms of the Papua Act of 1905.

Doubts have been thrown on the capacity of a democracy to govern an Empire : The manner in which the Commonwealth has executed its trust in Papua does not give encouragement to such misgivings. In an interesting *Review of the Australian Administration in Papua from 1907 to 1920* the Lieut.-Governor, J. H. P. Murray, was able to point to the increase in the area under cultivation ; to the mining development and to the expansion in exports, imports and revenue as signal proof of the success of the Commonwealth policy. " The Government," he recognized, " has also a duty towards the native ; that duty arising from the fact that we have come here, annexed their territory and made them British subjects."

The Lieut.-Governor would seem to have solved a problem which we shall have often before us in the second portion of this volume, the problem how the native can be improved in his outlook and position by the goad of taxation, and yet not sacrificed to the selfish interests of the white planter. The sole object of native taxation in Papua being to raise money for native purposes, the money raised by the tax does not go into the general revenue, but is paid into a special account and is earmarked for native education and similar purposes. There was always the double problem ; the problem which arose from the duty of developing the natural resources of the country and the problem which arose from the duty to the native population ; but the Commonwealth has known how to avoid the German mistake (according to an Italian authority) of treating their Colonies as if they were commercial houses. Under the land system the land cannot be leased by a settler direct from the native owner. It is bought by the Government from the native and then leased to the settler ; who is debarred from acquiring a freehold estate. Every sale must be

entirely voluntary and cannot take place until the Lieut.-Governor has convinced himself that the land is not required, and is not likely in the future to be required, by the native owners.

An interesting new movement in administration has been the establishment of an official anthropologist whose business is to study the native characteristics and to advise as to the best methods of dealing with them.

The Commonwealth, having set its face against the introduction of indentured labour from outside, has been obliged to be content with a somewhat slower development; but that development would seem to have been made on sound and healthy lines; and the administration of Papua from the time of Sir J. Macgregor to the present is a matter about which all those concerned have every reason to be proud. In this state of things it was fitting that the mandate for the government of German New Guinea and the adjacent islands under the League of Nations should have become entrusted to the Commonwealth.

NEW ZEALAND

If there is one country wherein the flame of imperial patriotism burns bright it is New Zealand. There are several reasons for this. In the first place there is the fact that New Zealand nationalism is in a more embryonic stage than is the nationalism of Canada or of Australia. Then there is the distrust of the Commonwealth. No one can answer for a remote future; but as things are at present nothing is more certain than that New Zealand will never agree to become a member of an Australian federation. A greater Britain, not a greater Australia, has been her ideal. This state of mind was well illustrated in the notable politician who for thirteen years directed New Zealand's destinies. Mr. Seddon combined extreme Radicalism in home politics with a somewhat aggressive fervour of imperial patriotism. Indeed by Laodiceans and cynics in the old country he was deemed a hopeless Jingo. It must not, however, on that account be supposed that Mr. Seddon had always smooth words for British Governments. No one could speak with a shriller voice when displeased.

Still no colonial statesman realized more clearly or responded more cordially to the new attitude towards the Colonies taken up by Mr. Chamberlain.¹

There was the true *civis Britannicus* ring in the paragraph of

¹ *New Zealand Hans.*, CXXV, p. 635.

the Governor-General's speech of 1905 which ran : " Some time ago a New Zealander under contract for employment in the United States was not allowed to land at San Francisco. On the voyage back he suffered at Honolulu an indignity at the hands of the captain of the steamer. Representations were made through the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United States Government and a satisfactory conclusion resulted and reparation has been made." ¹

In 1906 Mr. Seddon died suddenly on the return voyage from Australia. Just before starting he told the Victorian Premier that he was " leaving for God's own country." Within twenty-four hours he was dead. Seddon had his faults like other men. He was often arrogant, egotistical and rough. It is yet emphatically true that " his ardent devotion to the great cause of the unity of the Empire made him a notable figure in the domain of imperial politics." ²

With the death of Seddon the hold of the Radicals upon the favour of the country began to weaken ; though it was not for some years lost. New Zealand being the most imperially minded of the Dominions, it was natural that here, more than elsewhere, dissatisfaction with the attitude of the home Government at the Imperial Conference of 1907 should find vigorous expression. Mr. Massey, the leader of the opposition, frankly confessed that he was disappointed with the representatives of the imperial Government at that Conference. ³

To imperial patriots of this kind it was small consolation that New Zealand was now recognized as possessing the status of a " Dominion " ; or even that it was placed in the same position as the Dominion of Canada with respect to the important constitutional question of the reservation of Bills for the Royal assent. ⁴ In 1909 New Zealand took the lead in the offer of a *Dreadnought* for the British navy, a subject dealt with elsewhere ; but it is significant of the strength of party influences that this offer was termed by the imperialist leader of the opposition " spasmodic and ephemeral." ⁵ A more convincing pronouncement on the subject was made by a Maori member : " As to the moral effect—and that is what the Prime Minister and the Cabinet had in

¹ *Ibid.*, CXXXII, p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, CXXXVI, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, CXXXIX, p. 35.

⁴ *Ibid.*, CXLIII, p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, CXLVI, p. 156.

mind—it must be recognized that Sir J. Ward made that offer at the right moment, in order to stir throughout the British Dominions the feeling that they should in a practical way evince a desire to assist the home Government in a time of crisis.”¹ It was significant of the temper of New Zealand that the motion was agreed to without a dissentient voice; and that the Act giving effect to it was alternatively named “An Act to make provision for the gift of a ship of war to the King” and “The Naval Defence Act, 1909,” thus identifying New Zealand and imperial interests.²

In a thoughtful speech in September, 1910, Mr. Herries made the useful suggestion that matters to be brought before the Imperial Conference should first be subjected to exhaustive discussion by the different Parliaments. After all the Prime Minister, or whoever represented the Colony, was only a delegate to express the opinion of the Colony he represented.³ “At present we seem to be drifting without any aim at all in imperial matters. It is all very well, so long as there is a sympathetic Ministry in power in the old country, or a sympathetic Ministry in power in each of the Dominions. But the trouble one sees is this: If at any time there comes a Ministry, as there has been in the old country, who look more to the welfare of the individual than to the welfare of the State. . . . It seems to me, now is the time to lay the foundations of a lasting policy with regard to the connexion with the old country. . . . The Premiers of these Dominions should form a sort of imperial Cabinet, and be consulted on all questions of imperial importance as to what the Dominions they represent desired. I believe they would be a good substitute for an imperial Council because I never have believed in a representative body for managing the Empire.”⁴

Again, complaint was made, after the Imperial Conference of 1911, that the Prime Minister had never discussed his proposals on the floor of the House, so as to have gone to London with the weight of the Assembly behind his back, and with the goodwill of New Zealand. There had been too much of the contemptible desire to shine and to stand out before the people of Britain as the architect of a policy.⁵ In the opinion of another member

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

² *The Empire at War*, by Sir C. Lucas, Vol. I, p. 197.

³ *N.Z. Hans.*, CLI, p. 827.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 829.

⁵ *Ibid.*, CLIV, p. 103.

there had "been exhibited far too great a devotion to the Unit and far too slight a devotion to the Empire. . . . I do think that there is a danger of State rights as against imperial rights looming so largely that the Empire will be a thing of the past." ¹

Meanwhile in domestic matters the Liberal Government, though with a less forcible hand, continued the policy of Seddon. It was sought to remedy the defects of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act. Sir J. Ward confessed in June, 1908: "We have got either to put an Act on the statute book to ensure the speedy settlement of strikes upon a fair and equitable basis, in the interests of both employers and employés, or we will have seriously to consider whether it is possible to keep the Conciliation and Arbitration Act upon the statute book at all. We cannot have the system as it now stands." ²

In 1912 the Governor-General's speech announced a standing commission for the purposes of industrial investigation, which should consist of two representatives of the Labour Unions and of one each from the industrial, commercial and landed interests. At the same time the success which had followed State enterprise in New Zealand had induced the Ministry to decide upon the nationalization of the iron industry. ³

When it is added that the Ward Government proposed to give effect to the ideal of a system of education, free from the primary school to the University, it is clear that their policy was not wanting in attractiveness to an advanced democracy.

There was one question, however, on which the opposition more faithfully represented the opinion of the people. It was the standing tradition of the Seddon regime that the public land should not be alienated otherwise than on leases; so that the State should not lose its reversionary rights. The small proprietors, on the other hand, who were beginning to multiply in the Colony, desired to possess the freehold; and their point of view received support from the opposition in Parliament. In 1912 parties in Parliament were evenly divided; the casting vote of the Speaker being the deciding factor. The substitution of Mr. T. Mackenzie for Sir J. Ward as Prime Minister proved of no benefit to the Ministry; and at last in July, 1912, the long Radical regime came to an end.

¹ *N.Z. Hans.*, CLIV, p. 99.

² *Ibid.*, CXLIII, p. 35.

³ *Ibid.*, CLVII, Feb. 12.

In the Governor-General's speech of 27 June, 1913, it was recorded that the volume of trade during the past year had been the largest recorded in the history of the Dominion. The land policy was outlined with no uncertain voice ; it aimed at the breaking up of large estates in the interest of the small freeholder.¹

It is significant that whereas in the country districts the multiplication of freeholders was exerting a steadying influence, in the field of industry the closing months of 1913 were marked by a fierce struggle which seriously menaced the trade and prosperity of the country.²

It should further be noted that largely owing to the policy of Mr. Seddon a distinct Labour Party did not appear in New Zealand till a recent date.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION

We have sketched the history of South Africa in the twentieth century before the establishment of the Union ; it remains to deal very shortly with the years of the Union that preceded the war. The Parliament had a Dutch majority and therefore a Ministry predominantly Dutch governed the country. But already there were serious differences of temper amongst the members of the Government. " The usual function of the Prime Minister," Sir Starr Jameson, the leader of the opposition, declared, was " to throw oil on troubled waters " ;³ and fortunately Jameson's own disposition was of the same kindly character. Botha had all the great qualities inherent in the Boer at his best, without that " slimness " which so often accompanies them. Of similar temper though more of an intellectual, was General Smuts, who recognized that " Parliaments had been fighting over dead issues. Surely the time had come for us to develop the resources of our country and to make South Africa one of the most prosperous parts of the Empire within the next generation." ⁴ " Luckily for them the differences which had existed between the white people of South Africa had been eliminated for ever." ⁵

Of a very different stamp was another protagonist of the political stage, General Hertzog. His endorsement of the education policy of the Orange Free State, that compelled children to receive instruction both in Dutch and in English, was bitterly

¹ *Ibid.*, CLXII, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, CLVIII, p. 1.

³ *Union of South Africa House of Ass. Deb.*, 1910-11, p. 335.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 509-10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1473.

resented by the British population. There was no opposition to the Dutch language, as a language ; but remarks such as that of General Hertzog that "if the English children refused to learn Dutch, they might stuff up their ears with wadding or mud,"¹ were not calculated to make for good feeling. Contrast with this language Botha's words : "The two languages were there ; and people were very sensitive about their language—it was second only to their sensitiveness about their religion, and he hoped they would respect each other's language. They should adopt not a policy of oppression but a constructive policy. If they placed their languages on an equal footing and acted according to the Constitution, they would grow up into a young nation full of joy and prosperity ; all the bitterness would belong to the past. As long as they were divided on the education question they had the unfortunate state of affairs that, while they were quarrelling about details, tens of thousands of children were growing up uneducated."²

As a dispassionate critic of men and measures, Mr. Merriman, a Liberal of a type very rare in the Dominions, occupied a unique position. "The fact is," he said, "we are suffering to-day from a complaint not uncommon with young people—from megalomania, swelled head. When I see all these schemes propounded, I think it is time that some old fossil like myself should give warning. We have got too many posts. We have got too many ministers. More ministers mean more secretaries ; more secretaries mean more assistant-secretaries, and more assistant-secretaries mean more clerks to keep their records and keep them going."³

In December, 1912, General Hertzog resigned. A Dutch Member of Parliament admitted in a letter that Hertzog was unfortunate in his methods, and unwittingly, no doubt, had given to a large section of the population the impression that they were not wanted.⁴ Hertzog himself justified the policy of "distrust," since Botha was "an invertebrate" in questions of principle between his own party and the opposition.⁵ He had been expelled from the Ministry because he had said that imperialism was good for him only so far as it was good for South Africa.

¹ Quoted, *House of Ass. Deb.*, 1910-11, p. 268.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2898.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1912.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1913, p. 1544.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1545.

The policy of conciliation had been ridiculed by the opposition, ridiculed by his own party, and ridiculed by a large proportion of the people outside. The Prime Minister's programme was so broad that it might serve as, "a sunshade to cover both the opposition and the members of his party."¹

"I hold, and hold most strongly," Hertzog said, "that it is a detrimental principle for a Government of a country to go and conduct its business in another country; and I cannot understand how any Government can try to get permission for such a course. It is not only detrimental, I maintain that it is degrading, degrading for the Government and degrading to the people and to this House." "We shall see that the government of South Africa is directed not from, by and in South Africa, but from England."²

Another Free State member told the Prime Minister that he was overstraining the loyalty of the Free State to such an extent that it was perilously near the breaking-point.³ Botha replied: "The constitution of South Africa was as free as that of Great Britain, and the Union stood on an equal footing with Great Britain; and although the Union was a portion of the British Empire, it was a sister state in that Empire, and now the hon. member came here and tried to frighten him with Downing Street and say that Downing Street ruled here. . . . The Union was a portion of the Empire, but there was no reason to seek a quarrel with that Empire. The Empire had treated the South African people in a fair and just manner, and the people were grateful for it and had good reason to be grateful. And now to go and talk about imperialism was not right. In view of the history of this country, and after the unhappy times of only ten years ago, they should be prudent and take care not to wound a portion of the population nor to awake suspicion."⁴

By far the most important questions affecting South Africa, so far as the Empire was concerned, were the questions of the position of the natives and the question of Indian immigration, and these will receive separate treatment; but something must be said with regard to the riots that took place in the goldfields in 1912 and 1913. In 1912 the disorders were of so serious a character as to call for the intervention of imperial troops. The South African military system was at the moment undergoing a

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1545-8.

² *Ibid.*, 1913-14, pp. 691-2.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1454.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1998-9.

change, so that it was impossible to depend upon burgher forces. Lord Gladstone, the Governor-General, explained (July, 1913) that it was absolutely untrue to say that the troops had been sent in the interests of the mine-owners, to put down a strike or interfere with free speech or to fire on the people. The troops were sent for the safety of the whole community, because of urgent danger and because of shortage of Union forces. Had authority not been supported, no hold could have been maintained on the native mine boys. "Reduced to idleness, massed in compounds and brought to starvation by railway stoppage, only too probably with electric light cable cut, they would have broken loose and the horror of the situation can hardly be exaggerated. Then every kraal in South Africa would have heard of the white man's impotence." ¹ The report of a royal commission consisting of two judges acquitted the military and police of all blame. ² An extract from the *Worker* showed the temper of some at least of the extremists: "Once it is war, the things usually called arson, etc., become the principal occupation of armies; and there is no reason in principle, but only in tactics, why they should not be included in the various forms of acute pressure to be exercised in industrial war." ³

During the latter part of 1913, South Africa passed through a period of great industrial, social and economic unrest, and the extension of the strike movement to all industrial trades and occupations throughout the country finally convinced the Ministry of the necessity of declaring martial law in certain districts. By this time there was a South African force available, and "the readiness of the response to the call, which was made on the 9th and 10th days of January, and the rapidity with which the forces were mobilized and concentrated, was most gratifying. . . . The measures taken and the effective display of force by the citizens of the Union happily succeeded in preventing any serious disturbance, and in restoring order without bloodshed." ⁴ The Union government went to the length of arresting and deporting, without trial, certain of the strike leaders. Its action was justified by the results; but its legality was very questionable. The Governor-General expressed his own view very

¹ *Correspondence relating to Disorders on the Witwatersrand*, 1913. Cd. 6941.

² Cd. 7112.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1914, Governor-General's speech, p. 5.

plainly (22 January). "Ministers will make their own statements in justification of their own action to their own Parliament. Imperial troops were not used. The position was, and remains, essentially South African. Ministers had to decide whether they should acquiesce in the claims of a few irresponsible men . . . to plunge the whole of South Africa into confusion for the second time within seven months, heedless of the general interests of the community, including 97,000 farmers, on whom the ultimate, and to a large extent the present, prosperity of South Africa depends; and on allegations of grievances which, if true, fell within the inquiry of the sitting commission, of which Mr. Pountsma (one of the arrested leaders) was a member. . . . I can only express to you my view of the situation. Last year a good deal of criticism necessarily followed the use of imperial troops in connexion with industrial disturbances. The Union Government frankly admitted that it was their duty to deal with such disturbances with their own forces on their own South African responsibility. . . . If those who condemned the use of imperial troops last year now proceed to condemn the Union Government for taking measures thought necessary . . . there will be plain speaking here."

"In so far as my constitutional position is concerned, in my judgement, it was my duty to support Ministers at a time of crisis in taking the action which they considered their responsibility to the country required. . . . Their sole object was to save the Union from disorder and danger. In this they have succeeded." ¹ Lord Gladstone noted with regret that personal affinities between employers and employed were almost non-existent in the country. He explained that it was a very great mistake to suppose that a British strike was put down by Boer farmers. Many Dutch had been among the strikers; and the call to perform military duties had been responded to with a real alacrity by the British as by the Dutch. Men of both races had, in fact, co-operated from first to last without any vestige of friction and with the most cordial good-will. ²

Lord Gladstone's remarks were very much to the point. There is a certain type of British politician who is never so thoroughly happy as when laying down the law about things of which he knows very little. At bottom Dominion self-govern-

¹ *Correspondence relating to the General Strike in South Africa, 1914*, Cd. 7348, pp. 112-14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 207.

ment was as little understood by men like Mr. Keir Hardie as it was by statesmen in the eighteenth century. To such, Mr. (Lord) Harcourt administered in the House of Commons a well-deserved rebuke: "I would say to those who are interested in the imperial connexion, though it is a well-worn platitude, that the Empire is held together by a silken cord. Beware lest you twist that cord into a whip-lash; for the crack of that lash would be the knell of your Empire. We have here created of our own free will these great free Parliaments and institutions which are wideflung throughout the world. They are our constant pride, and only our occasional embarrassment. Treat them with a broad mind and a wide confidence, and they shall win through for all that is the essential basis of freedom and civilization. But it is your toleration and your restraint which can alone proclaim your confidence or your generosity, and which can alone maintain the good fellowship of a united Empire."¹ The opposite doctrine was crudely stated by Keir Hardie: "We ask the House of Commons to say that, when the Parliament of South Africa goes out of its way to violate the very principles of the British constitution, the representative of His Majesty the King should not sanction such action and find endorsement in this House for it."²

Other things, however, were happening in South Africa during these years besides strikes and rioting. All the time the country, as a whole, was steadily progressing. Every year after the Union the receipts from the revenue exceeded the estimates. The difficulties and the setbacks were surface movements, and underneath them was a steady undercurrent of progress and expansion carrying the country forward. Large sums were spent on railways, irrigation, the Land Bank and other reproductive services; and it was reasonable to expect that such outlay would find its return in increased prosperity and revenue. It is true that revenue and expenditure never balanced, and it was necessary to resort to expedients from year to year in order to carry on; but this was a heritage from the past when the profits from the railways were freely drawn upon.³

In any case, it was no feeble South Africa that found itself, in the August of 1914, confronted with war.

¹ *Debates and Questions on Colonial Affairs*, 1914, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³ *South African Union Debates*, 1914, p. 1925.

CHAPTER III

NATIONHOOD

No marvell then though some men . . . envy them. They fret and out of their own weakness are in agony lest those divisions and subdivisions will undoe us. The adversarie again applauds and waits the hour; when they have branch themselves out, saith he, small enough into parties and partitions, then will be our time. Fool! he sees not the firm root, out of which we all grow, though into branches; nor will beware until hee shall see our small divided maniples cutting through at every angle of his ill-united and unwieldy brigade.

MILTON

THE best way to understand the temper of the Dominions at the outbreak of the Great War is to call in mind the language used by leading men in the respective Parliaments. In the Canadian House of Commons, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the leader of an opposition which had no reason to be kindly disposed towards the Government, said: "It is our duty, more pressing upon us than other duties, at once on the first day of this extraordinary session . . . to let Great Britain know, and to let the friends and foes of Great Britain know, that there is in Canada but one mind, and one heart, and that all Canadians stand behind the mother country, conscious and proud that she has engaged in this war not for any selfish motive, for any purpose of aggrandisement, but to maintain untarnished the honour of her name, to fulfil her obligations to her allies, to maintain her treaty obligations, and to save civilization from the unbridled lust of conquest and domination."¹ Mr. Michael Clark, a stalwart Radical from the West, said: "Speaking for myself . . . it is a matter of pride to me, having been born in the old land and having lived for a good many years in this country, to be able to say that in my judgement the measures taken by the Canadian Government have been characterized

¹ *Can. Hans.*, CXVIII, 1914, pp. 8-9.

by energy, wisdom and effectiveness.”¹ Well might Sir G. Foster declare: “We are meeting as a band of Canadians of different races and nationalities and languages; but never in the history of Canada have we met feeling that we were one in the same sense as in this hour of our history. That generosity which sometimes lies more or less concealed in partisan or racial disputes has lost all those ignoble bonds; a feeling of pure patriotism, love of country and of what the flag symbolizes, has come to the front, disfigured by no mean or petty purpose. The last four days of this session of Parliament has vindicated Canadian public life and parliamentary life for all time to come.”²

When, in October, the Labour Ministry in Australia met Parliament, Mr. Fisher, the Prime Minister, said: “I ask the people of Australia . . . to steel themselves to the view that this matter may only be just beginning. But whether we are just beginning, or whether we are in the middle of it, or nearing the end, the policy of this Government will be the same as communicated to the then Prime Minister, when I had the honour of leading the opposition. We shall pledge our last man and our last shilling to see this war brought to a successful close.”³

In New Zealand, Sir J. Ward, the leader of the opposition, said on 4 August: “There need be no question in the minds of anyone in the present crisis, either here or abroad, as to our unity of action. The opposition . . . will co-operate in every way with the Government of the day in any action that it may be necessary to take to preserve the integrity of the Empire.”⁴ And in the following November the Prime Minister, Mr. Massey, could proudly boast that New Zealand had been the first of the Dominions, although one of the smallest, to offer its assistance. Its troops had been the first to take possession of foreign territory. These were matters of which every Member of Parliament and every citizen of the country had reason to be proud.⁵ “Whatever our other differences may be,” he said, eleven months later, “there is no difference so far as the Empire is concerned. The New Zealand Parliament is loyal to the core.”⁶ In this state of

¹ *Can. Hans.*, CXVIII, 1914, p. 96.

² *Ibid.*, p. 98.

³ *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1914-17, p. 174.

⁴ *N.Z. Hans.*, CLXIX, p. 381.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 929.

⁶ *Ibid.*, CCXXIV, p. 977.

things the National Coalition Ministry of August, 1915, represented the temper of the whole people.

It is unnecessary to cite the words of the great Dutch leaders in South Africa, as their acts spoke more eloquently than any words ; and if the short-lived rebellion showed that in the backveld any stick was good enough by which British imperialism could be attacked, the great body of the people, Dutch as well as British, were as staunch as were the other Dominions in their loyalty to the object for which the war was fought.

No attempt will be made here to describe the wonderful doings of the Dominion troops in the different theatres of war ; it is enough for the present purpose to say something of what was done by the different Governments.

CANADA

At the outbreak of war more than 100,000 men in Canada at once enlisted, and, though there was then only the means for training 22,000, some 5,000 more succeeded in boarding the trains with the object of getting to the front.¹ In October it was determined that the number in training should be raised to 30,000, and in November it was further increased to 50,000. But this was only the beginning, and the Governor-General's speech of January, 1916, was able to announce that already 120,000 men had crossed the seas, and that an equal number was being actively trained.² In the six months July-December, 1915, 94,400 men enlisted, and in the first two weeks of January, 1916, more than 15,000 ; 120,000 men had been sent to the front since the opening of the war. The authorized force, which had been increased to 250,000 at the end of October, 1915, was further increased to half a million on the following 1st of January.³

There was, however, another side to the shield. The number willing to enlist was gradually becoming exhausted. The first rush to arms had been, to a considerable extent, on the part of British immigrants who had not yet taken deep root in their new home. In Quebec the Nationalist Party had, from the first, taken the position that participation in a European war was a crime. The ignorance and lethargy of the country people forbade their taking great interest in distant operations ; and some at least of the Roman Catholic clergy, in their distrust of

¹ *Can. Hans.*, CXVIII, p. 95.

² *Ibid.*, 1916, p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

an unbelieving French republic, may have shared the views and prejudices of the Vatican. Perhaps also the manner of approaching them employed by the British section of the people may not have been of a nature to win their sympathies.

In any case, the same problem arose which arose in Great Britain and in Australia, viz. whether, without conscription, the free democracies would have staying power to resist the onslaught of an organized and scientific militarism which could call, at its will, upon the services of each one of its citizens. It took time for the democracies to be convinced (and they were not all convinced); but there was ample compensation, so far as delay tended to practical unanimity. In Canada, unfortunately, as has been seen, the question was complicated by the presence of the virus of racial antagonisms; and loyal champions of the war, like Sir Wilfrid Laurier, found themselves in fierce opposition to a measure which seemed to strike at their cherished beliefs.

At last, after many doubts and hesitations, the Government, in June, 1917, introduced the Military Service Act (No. 75). Sir Wilfrid proposed as an amendment that the principle should be put to a referendum of the people of Canada. Thanks in great measure to the determined attitude of the Liberals from Western Canada, the Government majority remained unshaken. Of the necessity of conscription from the point of view of winning the war there can be little question. Even when it was enacted, the Act, based upon the principle of exemption by tribunals, gave much room for evasion. Mr. F. B. Carvell declared in 1918 that there were thousands and tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, who had tried as assiduously as they could to evade military service. Among the farming classes every device had been resorted to which the ingenuity of man could think of.¹ It was all very well for Sir Wilfrid to say "if you want to have soldiers from Quebec . . . appeal to their imagination, appeal to their racial feeling; give them good officers and they will follow those officers into the very jaws of the German hell."² But, while the quality of the French-Canadian troops was splendid, and there were among them some, like Captain Talbot Papineau, who held that participation in the war was a point of honour, apart from the question of imperial obligations, a certain quantity was required each month to

¹ *Can Hans.*, CXVIII, 1918, p. 960.

² *Ibid.*, p. 945.

make good losses ; and, without conscription, that quantity could not be supplied. So far as the British population was concerned, the Coalition Government, towards the close of 1917, meant a real, however temporary, union ; but such union only caused the divergence of French Canada to stand out in bolder outline.

Unhappily conscription was not the only cause of quarrel. The bilingual question in Ontario created, between 1915 and 1917, no little trouble and heartburning. Under a regulation of the Provincial Government (17), French could not be continued as the language of instruction beyond Form I, except in the case of children unable to speak or understand English ; and in schools where French had been hitherto a subject of study, its teaching might not occupy more than an hour a day, except upon the order of the Chief Inspector.

Although the regulation could be defended on educational lines, it was held by the French to be a deliberate attack on their cherished language.¹ The extreme French claim was that Ontario, just as much as Quebec, should be a bilingual province. "The idea," said a French Canadian member, "of having only English spoken in Ontario is a sham and a Utopia. It may as well be realized immediately that never will the vindication of our rights be silenced, because the French language was spoken in Ontario long before it was settled by a British majority. . . . We finally will get the majority of the province to understand the respect due to the minority." ²

From the standpoint of educational efficiency no doubt the existence of a number of small schools, maintained for the sole purpose of encouraging the French language, was an evil, and the Privy Council held that the regulation in question was not *ultra vires* on the part of the Ontario Government. Nevertheless, one cannot but suspect that changes were sometimes made without sufficient consideration for the feelings of those affected. French Canadians are very sensitive where their much-prized language is concerned ; and, from the time of the governorship of Lord Elgin to that of the visit of the Prince of Wales, they have always responded with enthusiasm when English speakers have addressed them in French. What used to strike

¹ *Ibid.*, 1916, p. 3689.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3825. *The Clash*, 1918, by W. H. Moore, contains a powerful presentment of the French case by an English Canadian.

a British visitor to Montreal more than anything (I am speaking of some fourteen years ago) was the very general ignorance of each other's language displayed by the members of the two races. What in the past has been wanting in the relations between British and French in Canada has been the presence of a spirit of mutual kindness and of a sense of common nationhood, transcending petty differences. There are welcome signs, largely owing to the attitude of Sir Lomer Gouin, the past premier of Quebec, and his successor, M. Taschereau, that an improvement in this respect is taking place in Canada.

Nevertheless, in spite of the obstacles in the way, the effort of Canada in the war was amazing. When it broke out she had a permanent force of 3,000 men, and an active militia of 60,000. When hostilities ceased she had enlisted over 595,400 men, and had sent overseas over 418,000. Canadian casualties numbered 9,989 officers, and 204,397 men of other ranks. They included 2,456 officers and 45,630 men killed in action or who died of wounds; 7,130 officers and 148,669 men were wounded, and 183 officers and 4,913 were presumed dead, being missing. Only 3,575 became prisoners of war; of whom 2,508 were repatriated, escaped or died, whilst prisoners.¹ In very truth, if recognition of nationhood was to depend upon the capacity to make good such claim, Canada had earned such recognition without the shadow of a doubt. But such recognition only opens out the wider question: what part this nation is to play in the Commonwealth of Nations in which she desires to remain a partner?

The War-time Election Act, 1917, was passed with the view of strengthening the hands of the loyalists; but one Radical from the West declared, in May, 1918, that had it never been placed on the statute book the result in Western Canada would have been just the same. "It never was necessary so far as Western Canada was concerned. She has shown her patriotism; she has been loyal."² Similarly Sir T. White, the Finance Minister, was able to boast in the following February that there had been fewer labour disputes in Canada since the war broke out than in any country in the world.³

But although at the General Election of December, 1917, the Government obtained a substantial majority, there being

¹ *The Canada Year Book*, 1918, p. 659.

² *Can. Hans.*, 1918, p. 1439.

³ *Ibid.*, 1919, p. 30.

only twenty-one members of the opposition whose native tongue was English, there was an undercurrent of discontent and distrust throughout the country, which soon found an outlet in the organization of the Farmers' Party, which swept the board at the Ontario provincial election of 1919, and afterwards in the Western Provinces, and which showed its strength in the Dominion elections of December, 1921. The platform of the Farmers' Party contained nothing of which British imperialists had reason to complain. It advocated a partnership between the free British nations without centralization; gradual reduction of the tariff on British imports, with the object of closer union and a better understanding between Canada and the motherland, and of a substantial reduction in the cost of living to the Canadian people. It advocated a lowering of the duty on goods brought from Great Britain to one-half of the rates charged on the general tariff, and further gradual reductions, so that in five years' time there should be complete free trade between Canada and Great Britain. It further advocated (a) a direct tax on unimproved land; (b) a graduated income-tax on personal property and profits of corporations; and (c) a graduated inheritance tax on large estates.¹

Meanwhile the feeling of distrust was reflected even among the majority of the existing Parliament. A dead set against hereditary titles in Canada, due in some measure to special circumstances, caused the Government to swim with the tide. Henceforth, according to the Order-in-Council of 25 March, 1918, no honour can be conferred on a British subject, ordinarily resident in Canada, except with the approval or the advice of the Canadian Prime Minister; and no hereditary title can be conferred in any circumstances. After a prescribed period, appropriate action, either by legislation or otherwise, was promised to provide against titles held by Canadians having an hereditary effect.² The report of a committee of the Canadian House of Commons was described by an Independent Radical, Mr. Michael Clark, as an embodiment at once of democratic cant and illogical nonsense;³ but it required the direct interposition of Sir R. Borden to prevent a motion being passed in yet more sweeping terms directed against titles of any description.

¹ *Ibid.*, 1919, pp. 532-3.

² See Castell Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 556.

³ *Can. Hans.*, 1919, p. 2713.

Another troublesome subject had been, and is, the embargo laid upon Canadian cattle by the British law. As long ago as 1905, Mr. Fisher, the Minister for Agriculture, said that there was no one thing which the motherland could do that would appeal more strongly to the sentiments and opinions of the people of Canada than to remove the stigma which rested upon their cattle, in consequence of British legislation.¹ It was a question upon which the Canadian people were practically a unit.² There was, it may be admitted, some exaggeration and misunderstanding about all this. There was no invidious distinction with regard to Canadian cattle, the same measure being meted out to other countries. The British contention throughout was that the impossibility of isolating Canadian cattle from American caused precautions to be necessary. At the imperial War Conference of 1917,³ it seemed as though the British Government would be prepared to comply with Canadian wishes; but the change would be strongly resented by the British agricultural interest, and the present time, when, for a variety of reasons, British agriculture is under a cloud, seems hardly an auspicious moment to make the change. The subject was referred, in 1921, to a Royal Commission, a familiar device for postponing the decision of a difficult question. This Commission, which did not contain any representative of the British agricultural interest, reported unanimously in favour of the admission of Canadian cattle; but it occasioned little surprise when the British Minister of Agriculture announced, in the beginning of 1922, that it had been decided to maintain the embargo.⁴

Mention has been made of some of the domestic questions which affected the people of Canada during these eventful years; but the important thing in their history was the manner in which the doings in the war developed and brought to a head the sense of nationhood. It was, indeed, singularly appropriate that the statesman who had urgently insisted upon the necessity of the Dominions having a voice in the decision of imperial policy should have been at the helm when the time came for the accomplishment of his ideals.

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 1919, LXXIII, p. 9027.

² *Ibid.*, p. 9022.

³ *Canadian Cattle: Extracts from Discussion at the Imperial Conference*, 26 April, 1917, Cd. 8673, p. 2.

⁴ This paragraph was written before the agitation started by Lord Northcliffe.

There had not been time or opportunity to consult the Dominions before the declaration of war ; but after their stupendous efforts it was unthinkable that the old methods should go on unquestioned. Sir Robert Borden, at least, was determined that if they had had no voice in the making of the war, they should play their part in the making of peace. The first step formally gained was the securing at the Peace Conference of a distinctive representation for each Dominion, which was effected by the co-operation of the British Government. The second was an alteration in constitutional practice, so that the assent of the King to the Treaty should, in respect of the Dominions, be signified by the assent of the Dominion plenipotentiaries, the preamble and other formal parts of the Treaty being drafted accordingly.¹ A yet more startling innovation was the recognition of the Dominions as separate members of the League of Nations,² about which something will be said in the final chapter.

The new situation was well described by Sir R. Borden, on 29 August, 1919: "Equality of nationhood must be recognized, preserving to each Dominion the full autonomous powers which it now holds. . . For each Nation control over its own affairs ; for the whole Empire necessary co-operation according to the will of the people in all matters of common concern."³

It must not, however, be supposed that the new view of Canadian nationhood passed unchallenged. Mr. Fielding maintained that the ratification of the Treaty by the Canadian Parliament was a farce.⁴ "Canada," he said, "is not a nation. Canada cannot be a nation . . . there cannot be two Parliamentary Governments of equal authority in the Empire. One must be subordinate, subject, if you like to use that word—in a certain sense—to the other."⁵ In the following year, however, Mr. Mackenzie King, the leader of the opposition, expressed himself rather differently. "The change that has taken place in Canada's status as a result of the war has not been any change in the nature of our status, but has been, as regards the British Empire and relations with the British Empire, a clearer defining of a status already existing. As regards the world,

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 2nd session 1919, pp. 20-1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³ Quoted by A. B. Keith, *War Government of the British Dominions*, 1921, p. 179.

⁴ *Can. Hans.*, 2nd sess. 1919, p. 47.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

there has been an international recognition of that status such as never existed hitherto . . . and for that international recognition we are, first and last, and shall always be, most indebted to the services of Canada's armies across the seas." ¹

AUSTRALIA

Immediately upon the declaration of war the Commonwealth Government offered to raise, equip and maintain an expeditionary force of 20,000 men for service in Europe with the armies of the Empire. Further units were afterwards offered. At the same time the Australian Navy was immediately placed at the disposal of the Admiralty. Acting in conjunction with the expeditionary forces of New Zealand and the Commonwealth, it rendered good service to the Empire in Samoa and New Guinea. Moreover, by its presence and activity Australasian waters were kept clear of enemy ships, and maritime commerce was continued uninterrupted, thus amply vindicating the policy of an Australian Navy.² The Prime Minister announced in November that the Government was taking every step to provide for the training of an unlimited number of recruits. Financial and other provision was being made to enable contingent after contingent to be sent, as many as might be necessary.³ Sir W. Irvine soon after lamented: "We have continued to live . . . almost, if not quite, at the same rate of extravagant expenditure as in normal times, though we are in the midst of the severest drought in our experience, and of the greatest war in history." ⁴ Mr. Fisher resigned, in October, 1915, to become High Commissioner in London, and Mr. Hughes became Prime Minister. Although by the April of that year over 70,000 men were at the front or in training for it,⁵ it seemed impossible to go on indefinitely under the voluntary system. On 30 August, 1916, the Prime Minister announced the necessity of conscription. The stream of recruits under the voluntary system had fallen to less than one-third of what was necessary. But, as Australia was a country where the people ruled, their voice had to be heard by means of a referendum.⁶ The Prime Minister declared that he and the Government were going into the referendum campaign as if it were the only thing for which they lived. "But I am as assured of Australia as I am of myself. Australia will not fail.

¹ *Ibid.*, 1920, p. 493.

² *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1914-17, p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1619.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2298.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 916.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8402.

The people will have an opportunity of hearing the facts and expressing their opinion on them clearly.”¹ But Mr. Hughes’ confidence proved misplaced. To begin with, with all his great gifts, he had not the gift of obtaining the devotion of his followers. Mr. Tudor resigned to become the leader of a bitter Labour opposition ; and the federal Labour Party announced war to the knife against anything in the nature of conscription. Mr. Hughes was not one to suffer patiently the dictation of outside bodies, not responsible to the electors, which issued peremptory orders to Members of Parliament with regard to their votes, and ruthlessly expelled all those who declined to vote other than their consciences dictated. Accordingly the party war waged fiercer than ever. But other influences besides Labour were brought to bear upon the referendum. The losses in the Australian ranks had harrowed the hearts of the women ; and sensational accounts in the newspapers had added to their distress. The Irish, under the leadership of their priests, were against the Government policy ; and many of the soldiers at the front preferred to remain a chosen remnant, without intermixture with those whom conscription might send forth. In the result, on 28 October, 1916, there was a majority of over 72,000 in a total poll of nearly two and a half millions against conscription.

Only thirteen of the Labour members remained faithful to the Government. The attitude of many of its opponents may be gauged by the statement that in Great Britain the government was wholly in the hands of the rich ; and the social condition of the great mass of the people received little or no attention from the governing classes. These governing classes cared less for the workers than they did for the horses in their stables, or the dogs in their kennels.²

In this state of things a coalition became necessary ; and in February, 1917, a new Ministry was formed with Mr. Hughes as Prime Minister and Mr. (Sir Joseph) Cook, the opposition leader, as Minister for the Navy. The official Labour Party was offered seats in the Cabinet, but refused. “ We, we only,” Mr. Hughes bitterly exclaimed, “ seem unable to close our ranks in the face of a common enemy.” The official Labour Party was no longer master of its own actions. It was a mere pawn in the hands of outside bodies. It did what it was told to do. If a member dared to murmur, he was a marked man.³ Another referendum,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8426

² *Ibid.*, p. 7534.

³ *ibid.*, p. 10,571.

at the close of 1917, again defeated the proposal of conscription. Nevertheless, a General Election held in the same year had given the ministry a substantial majority. Indeed, in the Senate the opposition was almost entirely wiped out. But amongst those who gave the Government general support there was no little dissatisfaction. "If circumstances have not altered," Sir W. Irvine said (25 January, 1918), "if conscription is not to be introduced, although in November it was declared to be vital to our participation in the war, the people will naturally wish to know if the Government have any definite or alternative method of obtaining the needed reinforcements. . . . To my mind the warrant of ministers for retaining their seats on the Treasury bench must depend on whether they can, between now and the next meeting, bring forward some definite and complete scheme which will have a reasonable chance of proving an adequate substitute for conscription. If the Government ask us to endorse the continuance or any variation of that wretched system . . . of hysterical appeals to their sense of shame of persons who have no sense of shame, which, for some months or for some weeks before conscription was declared to be vital, had resulted in the number of recruits dwindling down to a small stream, consisting almost entirely of schoolboys lately arrived at the age of eighteen years, of soldiers who had been patched up and were ready to return to the front and of family men who, having managed to settle their affairs, found themselves able to volunteer, as they all along had intended to do—if we enter again on that wretched system, I say now, and I desire to place it on record, that not only shall we fail in our duty to the Empire, but that Ministers will be in the position of having failed to honour the pledge which they gave to the people." ¹

No little complaint was made of the apparent inconsistency of Mr. Hughes's conduct in retaining office after he had declared the acceptance of conscription to be vital to such continuance. Again and again he had made use of language such as "The Government will not attempt to carry on the government of the country if 'No' is voted." ² Mr. Hughes explained his pledge as meaning "Tudor or me; the National party or the official Labour party." The Governor-General had declined to send for Tudor, as he had only twenty-two supporters in the House against

¹ *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1917-19, p. 3555. ² Quoted *Ibid.*, p. 2925.

fifty-three ministerialists, or to grant him a dissolution.¹ Mr. Hughes considered that his pledge had been sufficiently kept by his resignation, although that had been followed by a return to office. What some, at least, of the soldiers thought was reflected by a member who said: "I am here as evidence that, when reinforcements were required, they were not forthcoming. It is because of this fact and because a majority of the people have broken their pledge to me that I am a member of this House."² In spite, however, of the difficulties in the way, the Australian forces continued their marvellous doings till the time of the Armistice.

In Australia much less was heard of the new conception of nationhood resulting from the war. The practical question was: What was to be the future of the Pacific? and what was to be the character of the mandates given to the Commonwealth and New Zealand? Mr. Hughes had been opposed to the system of mandates and would have preferred that the German Colonies should have become ordinary possessions. He claimed that, if the Monroe doctrine exempted the Americas from the jurisdiction of the League of Nations, the Commonwealth and New Zealand should stand in a similar position with regard to the Pacific.³ The influence, however, of President Wilson was too great for this claim to be made good; though the Dominions succeeded in modifying the provisions with regard to equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League,⁴ so that it did not apply to territories which could "be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory," subject to the safeguards necessary in the interests of the native population.⁵ Mr. Hughes complained bitterly of the ignorance shown in Paris by the representatives of the different Powers of each other's affairs and did not disguise his fear that the German islands north of the Equator might be used as a base for Japanese aggression.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2942.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3288.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12172.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12174.

⁵ These safeguards were freedom of conscience and religion, the prohibitions of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and liquor traffic; the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and their own defence (Article XXII).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12173.

Mr. Hughes had learnt wisdom in the fire of experience. "The whole world lies bleeding and exhausted. . . . There is no way of salvation save by the gospel of work. Those who endeavour to set class against class, and to destroy wealth, are counsellors of destruction. There is hope for this free Australia of ours only if we put aside our differences, strive to emulate the deeds of those who by their valour and sacrifice have given us liberty and safety, and resolve to be worthy of them and of the Cause for which they fought."¹

But the official Labour party was in no mood to listen to such counsels. Apart from political principles, they regarded Mr. Hughes as a traitor and a renegade, and had too often winced under his biting tongue. The nominal recognition of Australia as a nation at the Peace Conference was, in their opinion, more than offset by the recognition of Japan's claims to the islands of the Pacific north of the Equator. It was alleged that Mr. Fisher and Mr. Hughes had in 1915 acquiesced in such an arrangement; and that Mr. Hughes' protest in Paris was an empty criticism of a course to which he had already given his approval.² The Labour party advocated the creation of a buffer State, to consist of the islands north and south of the Equator. There had been no case in history where a white race had been successful in getting the black races wholeheartedly to co-operate in the development of territory. "Are we to develop a white Australia," it was asked, "by the creation of a black man's kingdom at our northern gate?"³ There was no power on earth that would make Australia fight for Japan against America.⁴

A Labour member insisted that "as a matter of fact the Commonwealth has no status in regard to the signing of the Treaty beyond that of a dependency which is necessarily bound by the action of the imperial Government and by the British Parliament. I recognize that the imperial Government has naturally been disposed to flatter Australia with the suggestion that she entered the Peace Conference and became a party to the Peace Treaty as a Nation. But we know that this is a mere compliment to her, a mere attempt—and perhaps not an unnatural

¹ *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1917, p. 12179.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12419. Mr. Catts claimed to have got his facts from the evidence put before the Foreign Relations Committee of the American Senate.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12431.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12435.

one—to pander to the vanity of some of those who pretend to speak at the Conference for the whole of the people of Australia.”¹ None the less, the truth of the matter was doubtless spoken by Senator Millen when he said (12 November, 1918): “The war . . . has made Australia a nation in a sense that it was not before. It has given us a new conception of national life; it has brought us more closely in touch with the great international movements of the world; and, to that extent, it has thrown an added responsibility upon the shoulders of the people. The men who have done this—the men of the Australian imperial force—we honour.”²

In the autumn of 1919 party bitterness was for a moment laid aside over the grave of Mr. Deakin, the most eloquent of the builders of the Commonwealth.

A General Election in the December of 1919 weakened the position of Mr. Hughes; a Country party which refused allegiance to the party whip gaining many seats. As a proof of the persistence of the belief in State rights may be cited the fact that, after there was an agreement between the different parties in Parliament, with regard to an extension of the powers of the Commonwealth, when the matter was submitted to a referendum, the electors once more rejected the proposal. The Government thereupon undertook to introduce legislation to authorize the summoning of a convention, representing the people and Parliaments of the Commonwealth and the States, for the revision of the national Constitution.³

In industrial matters a new departure was made by the Industrial Peace Bill of 1920. During the early portion of the history of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court the Trade Unions had been anxious to go to the Court because they believed that they were sure to get the wages of their members increased. But now the position had wholly changed, and all the big Unions were refusing to resort to arbitration. Under the new Bill a Council, consisting of nine members, was set on foot. The States were divided into regions; regional Chairmen and regional Boards, formed from panels of employers and employes, being set on foot. No doubt this legislation tended to diminish the importance of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court and Mr. Justice Higgins resigned in disgust. But it must be admitted that the former

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12597.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7645.

³ *Ibid.*, 1920, p. 7.

system had not been successful, so far as the attainment of the object of industrial peace was concerned ; and it was reasonable to attempt yet another remedy ; though whether any legislation can meet the real evil which arises from a conflict between moral, social and economic ideals is doubtful.

Attention was called in the second chapter to the value of the Commonwealth Labour party as a link between the democracies of Great Britain and Australia ; but it is necessary to note that, for the time being, new and wholly different ideals are to the fore in the Commonwealth which have nothing in common with British labour as represented by its organized Unions. The claim of a secret Caucus to prescribe the vote, on every subject, of Members of Parliament, and, at the same time, to decide who was to be Prime Minister and who were to form the Ministry was, in any case, a blow to representative government as we understand it. But the crisis of the war brought about a yet more serious state of things, in which the official Labour party became avowedly anti-British and to a very great extent Bolshevik.¹

Fortunately, at the General Election of 1920, the Australian democracy gave no great support to such a Labour party. But, unless and until the sober sense of the working-class community can shake itself free of such leaders and guides, the risk of the opposition coming to power must be recognized as serious by all believers in the British connexion, as well as by those who are old-fashioned enough to dislike with Tennyson

Men loud against all forms of power—
Unfurnished brows, tempestuous tongues—
Expecting all things in an hour—
Brass mouths and iron lungs !

[Lord Bryce's *Modern Democracies* should be consulted on Labour in Australia.]

NEW ZEALAND

It was not surprising for those who knew the temper of New Zealand that here as early as 1915 a Coalition national Cabinet was set on foot and that this Dominion led the way (1916) among the other Dominions in setting on foot compulsory military service.

¹ See an able article on " Australian Labour and Australian Ideals," *Quarterly Review*, No. 468, pp. 9-10. See also Lord Bryce, chapter on Australia in *Modern Democracies*, 1921.

In 1917 the Governor received the title of Governor-General. Mr. Massey recognized the strength of the imperialist movement in Great Britain and uttered a note of warning: "We have more to fear from the rashness and impetuosity of some of the men who have been giving a great deal of attention to this subject than from any desire on the part of the British people to go slowly. We have to look ahead and be very careful about every step we take in connexion with this building up of the Empire, and especially with regard to imperial relations. Any false step, any serious mistake made now would perhaps delay the movement for many years—perhaps destroy it for ever. While I am willing to admit that every individual is entitled to the opinions he holds, I am entitled to make my position clear that I am utterly opposed to any alteration which would allow our finances to be dealt with by a Parliament sitting outside this country." ¹

It was not that the provisional system, which alone was at the time possible, afforded a satisfactory solution of the problem. "I cannot help thinking that nearly seventeen millions of people now in the Overseas Dominions, the kith and kin of the people within the British Isles, are never going to remain satisfied for long, unless the people themselves have the right of representation in proportion to their respective populations upon equal terms with the people of the motherland in a properly constituted Empire—Parliament and Government, to deal with matters affecting the Empire as a whole; and it is only on matters affecting the Empire as a whole that there is any need—or indeed right—for representatives at the heart of the Empire." ² It seemed to him a little later that the signing of the Peace Treaty and the part the Dominions took in the Conference was the most important event in their whole history. They had ceased to be dependencies, and had become partners, with all the duties, responsibilities and privileges that belonged to partnership.³

In one respect New Zealand presents the most satisfactory page in the history of the Empire. Here, as nowhere else, the problem of the contact between the British and the native races has been solved with complete success. Maoris share with Britons the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship. Listen to the language of Dr. Pomare, a member of the Executive Council,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

³ *Ibid.*, CLXXXIV, p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 292.

representing the native races (December 9, 1918) : " When in the Council of Nations the question of the future of the Pacific Islands is discussed, I want our chief to tell the Councillors, as an authoritative voice from the Polynesian race, that never again must any Polynesian be put under the heel of the despicable Hun. Sir, we know of the Samoans, our kin ; we know of the Eastern and Western natives of German Africa ; and we know of the extermination of the Hereros, and that is enough for us. For seventy-eight years we have been, not under the rule of the British, but taking a part in the ruling of ourselves, and we know by experience that the foundations of British sovereignty are based upon the eternal principles of liberty, equity and justice." ¹

New Zealand could therefore accept the mandate for Western Samoa in the proud confidence that no nation had a fuller knowledge of the Polynesian race, or was more able to accept the responsibility.² It was proposed to set on foot for the mandated territory a legislative Council—consisting of not less than four official members and the same number of unofficial members. The West Samoan civil service was to be part and parcel of the New Zealand Civil Service. Sir J. Ward advocated representation of the natives in the New Zealand Parliament, just as the Maoris had been represented for so many years.³

Nor could the strategic importance of Samoa be overlooked. " Take a map of the Pacific and examine it carefully. Look at the Panama Canal, look at the position of New Zealand ; observe how close Samoa is to the line from New Zealand to Panama, and then think how easy it would be, if Samoa was in the hands of an enemy, for that enemy to cut our communications between New Zealand and the rest of the world." ⁴

To the characteristic jeremiads of the Labour members a Maori replied : " I have read somewhere and have often been told that the characteristic of the Britisher is self-depreciation. To listen to the hon. member is to gather that there is no more unfit man to run the business of an Empire than a Britisher. Our experience ought to make us extremely proud that this portion of the Polynesian race have been added . . . to their brothers and cousins here in New Zealand." ⁵ On one point

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 468, CLXXXIII, p. 1033.

² *Ibid.*, CLXXXIV, pp. 504-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 520.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 509.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 522. 37.

alone was Maori opinion in disagreement with that of the majority of the British inhabitants. The Maoris would have wished to try the experiment in one of the last seats of romance in the Pacific of merely bringing up a happy and comfortable people without introducing unduly the element of competition and trade. The planters in the island with the fear of the rhinoceros beetle before their eyes, which, without careful cultivation, would ravage the country, demanded the continuance of the system of Chinese industrial labour which had been employed by the Germans. Both the New Zealand and the British Governments reluctantly agreed; and owing to the difficulties in the way of introducing labourers caused by the dissensions between North and South China, assent was given to the reindenturing of two thousand Chinese coolies.¹

It was thought impossible for the present to have Samoan representatives in the New Zealand Parliament; but in time, doubtless, they will find admission.²

SOUTH AFRICA

“Inter arma leges silent”; and so during the years when her leading statesmen were either waging successful war or assisting at the Council Board of the Empire’s war effort, we need not for present purposes concern ourselves with the internal history of South Africa. That many of its people did not rise to the realization of the new situation created by the war, was shown by the results of the General Election held in March, 1920. The Nationalist was the strongest party in the new Parliament, consisting of forty-five members against forty of the South African party, twenty-five Unionists, and twenty-one Labour members. The reward received by General Smuts for his services on behalf of world issues was that a casual alliance between the Nationalist and Labour members might, at any moment, place him in a minority.

The beliefs held by the Nationalists were ably expressed in the speeches of their leader, General Hertzog. “Did South Africa’s new status,” he asked (September 8, 1919), “mean absolute equality with Britain? . . . What the people wanted to know was not how great was our status but how great was our

¹ See *Chinese Labour in Samoa*, 1920, Cmd. 919.

² See a valuable paper by Sir J. Allen on “The Samoan Mandate,” *United Empire*, Vol. XI, new series, pp. 648-58.

freedom?" He demanded a clear reply: had South Africa the right to decide its own destiny such as England had? The objection of other nations to the Dominions being members of the League of Nations was on the ground that they were not free. He challenged General Smuts to say that South Africa was free to get away from Britain, if it so desired. He was convinced that South Africa's freedom, as it existed before 1914, was done with; but the people would not rest satisfied till all the rights which stood to be sacrificed to-day had been restored.¹

General Smuts in reply deplored the attitude of distrust evinced by the Nationalist members. It was due to the manner in which the idea of secession obsessed them. Secession was an evil thing. Terrible loss of life had been sacrificed upon its altar in South Africa. For South Africa only two courses were open—mutual co-operation or the course of blood and tears traversed in the past, which, if renewed, must lead to a broken, discredited South Africa with the native population outnumbering the whites. "Let us not mope over the past," he concluded, "to-day we have every opportunity to build up our nation, and I am standing here to-day to make the strongest, the most urgent, appeal to this House and the country to live in the present and in the future. Let us get off the ant-heap of grief over the past, and let us concentrate on the great things which the future has in store for us." At the same time General Smuts was the most advanced assertor of full Dominion autonomy. The Union Parliament, he explained, was in fact independent of the British Parliament. "The doctrine that the British Parliament was the sovereign legislative power no longer held good. Without their consent it could not pass any law binding South Africa without a revolution. In future the Dominions would as regards foreign affairs deal through their own representatives; hence all parts of the Empire would be consulted in matters of peace and war."²

On the second reading of the Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act (10 September) General Hertzog expressed surprise that the House had not been asked first of all to accept or reject the mandate. The people of German South-West Africa had been innocently dragged into the war. If the people concerned did not want their guardianship, the Union would become the oppressors.³

¹ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, I, p. 197.

² *Ibid.*, p. 198.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

Two days later there was a significant crossing of swords between the two leaders as to the right of secession. "Has South Africa," General Smuts asked, "the right to secede from the Empire?" General Hertzog interrupting "Yes or No?" Smuts: "My answer is absolutely and decisively 'No.'" According to the written Constitution (clause 19) the legislative power of the Union consisted of a Parliament of the Union, composed of the King, the Assembly and the Senate. It was impossible and unconstitutional for either of these parts to secede from the other. The Assembly could not secede from the King. General Hertzog: "Can it renounce the King?" General Smuts: "No. This is not a question of status; it is a question of Constitution. In terms of the Constitution the King cannot give up the Assembly even at the request of the people." He held that although in ordinary matters the King's veto had become a thing of the past, still as regards secession, it was not only the King's right but according to the Constitution it was his duty to keep himself in force and connected with the Union. Turning to Hertzog he asked: "Supposing the Nationalists got a majority in Parliament and decided to secede from the Empire, could they force the minority?" To which Hertzog could only answer "we shall see then."¹

It was all in vain that General Smuts appealed for "a new beginning in a greater, wider, more solemn South African spirit. By closing up their ranks now as a great white community and by joining all their forces upon making it a greater, stronger, more developed and more prosperous country they could become worthy of the great honour accorded to them by the imperial Government and the world, in recognizing South Africa as a young sister nation among the States of the world." Three fundamental principles must for this purpose be observed: First, a whole-hearted recognition and maintenance of the British connexion; second, a sincere and complete co-operation between the members of the two races; and lastly the promotion of a forward policy in the development of the land and industries.²

Although the results of the General Election were from this point of view far from satisfactory, General Smuts pursued his former course undaunted and consistent. Perhaps there is to be detected a yet more radical note in his discussion of imperial

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 219-20.

problems. He complained of the anomaly of correspondence through the Colonial Office. "Under the new system the Governor-General should be, what he is called, the representative of the King, and nothing else. Whereas the Governor-General, instead of being the representative of the King and the supreme executive power in the Dominion, represents in some undefined way the British Government and the Colonial Office." "The British Government seemed to be conducting just as heretofore the foreign affairs and relations of the Empire. We have taken to ourselves the right of equality, but in practice we are still represented in our foreign relations by the diplomats of the Foreign Office." ¹

A further remark of General Smuts gives one pause. "No resolution should be taken without the unanimous consent of all the nations of the Empire. Let them look to that as a bedrock ; he would never agree to the voice of South Africa being smothered or the opinion of South Africa being coerced by the majority of the voters of the rest of the British Empire, and he was sure that the other Dominions would take up the same position." ² That a majority should not bind a dissentient minority is logical enough, according to the present Constitution of the British Commonwealth, and means that, in case a war ensued from a policy of which it had disapproved, the Dominion in question might refuse its active co-operation ; but that a dissentient member should have the right to paralyse the power of the rest seems a hard doctrine, approaching perilously near to the Polish practice of a *liberum veto*.

Nothing is more interesting than to follow the movements of the mind of a man like General Smuts who combines in so remarkable a degree intellectual subtlety with generosity of soul and width of outlook. "The things," he said, "he stood and fought for twenty years ago, he stood for to-day. But he had changed in one respect, and let him admit it freely. In the old days he thought that the only path by which this ideal could be reached was by a republic in South Africa ; and for that republic he fought ; but he had learnt from the events in which he had taken part since that there was another way for South Africa to become great, free and independent, without taking the road which he

¹ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire.*, I, pp. 546-7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 548.

thought was essential twenty years ago. . . . Let it be clearly understood that, so far as he was concerned, whatever decision was to be taken and whatever final say was to be said, with regard to South African affairs, it would not be said in London or at any Conference, but by the people, the Parliament and the Government of that country. . . . He hoped that South Africa, without any fear, with open eyes, and with faith in the future, would embark on this road, protecting her own rights and continuing her status, determined always to do the best for herself, but never in a selfish way ; so as to co-ordinate her own interests with those of the British Empire and of the world as a whole.”¹

At length in 1921 the South African and Unionist parties, confronted with the demand for secession, mainly owing to the sagacity and broadmindedness of their respective leaders, determined to sink their racial and party differences and to face with a common front the disturbers of South African peace. The result of the General Election, held under these conditions, was, upon the whole, very satisfactory. It is true that the Nationalist party returned to Parliament with undiminished strength ; but the loss of Dutch votes to the South African party which had been prophesied as likely to follow from the fusion did not take place. Moreover the bulk of the British voters of the working classes deserted, for the time being, leaders who had set class above national interest ; even the popular and well-meaning Major Cresswell failing to retain his seat.

As was fair, the Unionists were given a due share of places in the Ministry ; and, upon the whole, the Government seems to be obtaining that success which all who desire the good of South Africa, as a component part of the British Commonwealth, pray that it may continue to obtain. Before the outbreak on the Rand the methods of the Government seemed to be exercising a soothing influence on the bitterness of party strife ; and General Hertzog was found counselling moderation to some of his less temperate colleagues.

[NOTE.—It is too soon to estimate the significance of the outbreak on the Rand in the spring of 1922. That the Bolshevists should seek to destroy the chief gold-producing industry of the world was natural enough, but that intelligent and highly-paid mechanics should be their blind dupes seems singularly strange. Stranger still were the reckless and unprovoked attacks upon peaceful natives.]

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 549.

CHAPTER IV

THE QUESTION OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE

Which intercourse of trade maye rather be called a home bread trafique than a forraigne exchange.

Anon., circ. 1605

THE proceedings of successive colonial Conferences served to show the divergence of views in Great Britain and the Dominions on the manner in which the interests of imperial unity could best be promoted. To British Ministers the question of defence has always seemed of paramount importance ; and the question of improving imperial organization has been mainly considered from this point of view. Mr. Chamberlain himself was only led to enter upon his crusade for Tariff Reform when he had come to recognize that only by trade considerations could the Dominions be induced to draw closer the links of imperial union.

These Dominions, which have made such rapid expansion under a system of protection for home industry ; which resent direct taxation ; and naturally believe that a system which suits them must suit other countries, though their circumstances be wholly different, inevitably looked to a system of mutual preference as the strongest cement of closer union. The faith of Dominion statesmen was embodied in the Resolutions of the Conference of 1902, which were reaffirmed in 1907, in spite of the dissent of the British representatives. These resolutions, while recognizing the impossibility of an imperial *Zollverein*, insisted on the necessity of mutual preferences ; Great Britain to fall into line, so far as exemption from, or reduction of, existing duties was concerned. A further resolution in 1907 somewhat dotted the i's by recommending that the reciprocal preference granted by the British Government, as a member of the South

African Customs Union, should be extended to the Empire generally.

The benefit to British trade, resulting from the grant of a preferential treatment of British imports under the Canadian tariff, has been generally recognized, though no preference could much affect the volume of trade with Canada's great southern neighbour, which, apart from the advantage of nearness, is the natural provider of the raw materials that are of necessity on the free list. Neither let anyone suppose that the adoption of the Dominion point of view is of necessity the sign of a sordid mind or of a too exclusive regard for mere material things. No nobler expression of the faith of a sane imperialist has ever been made than that contained in the speech with which Mr. Deakin opened the discussion of the subject of imperial preference at the Conference of 1907. "A good deal," he said, "appears to us to depend upon what you make the unit of your consideration. I have already admitted that the British tariff should be dealt with, taking the United Kingdom as the unit first, and that the other units should come afterwards. At the same time, these other units, together with the United Kingdom, make up what we speak of as the British Empire. The view that has very strongly impressed us, in relation to all these questions of the tariff and a great variety of other questions, especially such as we have been considering at this Conference, is the future of the larger unit, the Empire, as a whole. After the United Kingdom has studied its individual interests, after Canada and the Commonwealth and South Africa have studied their individual interests within themselves and in their dealings with each other, necessarily the greater question presents itself as to the mutual possibilities which these units possess to-day. Their fortunes are bound up together, their trade and commerce are mostly with each other. You come, then, to the next stage of the question, which is separate from the first, because you have a great political motive for inquiring how far it is possible for these units to assist each other by interchange. . . . We are never blind to the fact that closer relations of this kind might play a most important part in ways far too numerous to mention, not only in bringing us together, but in keeping us together, and making us stronger by union for national business bargains. Certainly we shall then become better equipped for making those bargains which nations, from time to time, enter into, in order to preserve the peace of the world. We proceed on

the supposition (which is much more than a supposition to us) that it is possible in this way to strengthen the Empire as a whole ; and this becomes one of the strongest motives we have for looking hopefully to movements of this kind even while we have to recognize that they have to begin as business operations and cannot succeed if they are conducted, or sought to be conducted, in breach of business principles.

“ So far as I can speak for the people of Australia, this motive—speaking for them as a whole—counts for as much as any promise of direct material advantage to themselves, if you can speak of direct material advantage to us, apart from that of the whole Empire. Personally I do not think you can. United as we are, the benefit of one must be a benefit to all, and of course the benefit of two is better than the benefit of one, and so on. But for the moment, speaking as if the interests could be severed, I believe a motive quite as strong and probably stronger than that of the money gain or advantage of this trade influences the bulk of the people of Australia, through the idea of having more intimate relations with their own countrymen, and being more united with them in peace as well as in war. They look to the operations of trade and to its great agencies, particularly the shipping of the Empire, to uphold the proud position which it occupies to-day. . . . Anything that multiplies the shipping of the Empire, any devices that increase its cable communications and postal facilities, are all extremely valuable means of unity to be sought in themselves quite apart from preferential trade, but when preferential trade helps them it is another argument for preferential trade to whatever extent it encourages them. . . .

“ In the Australian attitude on this question, and I believe the attitude to be the same in all the other Dominions, there really are very considerable motives. Our people and the thoughtful all the world over recognize the immense advantage of the support they gain from each other as parts of this Empire. They cherish that Union, and desire to possess even stronger ties than exist at present. They realize that the modern world is full of critical occasions, especially for a great World Power with enterprising rivals, and are very anxious that any means of making the Empire more distinctly self-dependent, both in peace and war, shall also be sought and used with a view to possible emergencies. So, from quite a variety of what you might consider at first outside considerations, they are powerfully drawn towards the proposal

which is roughly embodied in the regulations now submitted to the Conference. Peace, Education, Progress, our independence and the maintenance of our social conditions, are all bound up with the capacity of the Empire to hold its own even against hostilities. . . . To us it appears that henceforth the individual will become more and more dependent upon the social and national structure in which he finds a place. It makes all the difference whether you are grains of sand or the same grains compacted into solid rock. Anything that encourages the development of imperial organization, which, without limiting the self-governing powers of the several parts or unduly trespassing on the individual liberty of the citizens, shall compact them together in co-operative relations for the discharge of social duties, political obligations, and industrial efforts—every possible increase of that co-operation—marks a higher stage in civilization, giving greater opportunities to the individual and greater strength to the nation to which he belongs. That is a political gospel. The nation and the individual act and react upon each other, and in the British Empire we think we see the greatest future at present open to any people for that interaction, affording the fullest free play to individual energy and enterprise, and, at the same time, by willing consent uniting its peoples together for their great common end of one national destiny.”¹

However whole-hearted was Mr. Deakin’s faith in the system of preference for the mother country, it is doubtful how far he represented the public opinion of his own countrymen. Protectionists in Australia were more concerned with maintaining tariff walls against the whole world than in promoting British interests ; and when, in 1906, some kind of preference was granted it was coupled with a proviso that goods to receive such preference must be manned wholly by white labour, a condition which made its acceptance impossible. It must, however, be recognized that some preference was afterwards given by Australia, to which additions have been made.

The New Zealand tariff was already in 1907 from 10 to 20 per cent in favour of Great Britain against foreign countries on goods, amounting to about one-fifth of the total imports. With regard to South Africa both Cecil Rhodes and Mr. Hofmeyr, leading representatives of the British and Dutch races, had been pioneers in the advocacy of preference. Rhodes’s faith was inscribed in

¹ Cd. 3523, 1907, pp. 237–8.

the Order in Council which he obtained, establishing that no British goods, entering Rhodesia, should ever be charged a higher duty than the then Cape tariff of 9 per cent.

Still, it is to Canada that we must mainly look for light and leading on the subject of preference, though even here the language of Canadian statesmen on this point was not altogether consistent. In 1901, Mr. Fielding said that the true policy of preferential trade was not to make demands upon the imperial Government which were clearly unattainable. The true policy was to give to Great Britain this preference freely and openly, leaving the imperial Government and Parliament to adopt that trade policy which in their judgement was best adapted to the interests of the English people.¹ In England Sir Wilfrid Laurier had gone farther and said: "What we give you by our tariff we give in gratitude for the splendid freedom under which we have prospered. It is a free gift; we ask no compensation. Protection has been the curse of Canada. We would not see you come under baneful influence; for what weakens you must weaken us."² At the same time, throughout his period of power, Sir Wilfrid remained faithful to the policy put forward by the Canadian ministers at the Conference of 1902, that if the British Government was prepared to accept the principle of reciprocal preference, the Canadian preference to Great Britain might be extended. At the time of the South African War a small duty was placed by Great Britain on imported wheat, and, without doubt, the refusal to place Canadian wheat on a better footing than American, with regard to this payment, gave no little offence. The immediate cause of Mr. Chamberlain's resignation was the refusal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to continue this tax with a remission to the Canadian importer. "If the British Government and people do not show," Mr. Fielding said, in 1902, "any appreciation of the value of the preference, then, so far as the British Government and people are concerned, they cannot complain if we see fit to modify or change that preferential tariff."³

Meanwhile the attitude of the Conservatives towards the principle of preference was by no means enthusiastic. In 1902 Mr. (Sir R.) Borden described preference as a method of ruining our own industries, because we have not contributed our proper share

¹ *Can. Hans.*, LIV, p. 1467.

² Quoted *ibid.*, LVII, p. 4714.

³ *Ibid.*, 1902, LVIII, p. 1406.

towards the defence of the Empire";¹ and two years later he declared that Canada had led the way, because there were two warring factions in the Cabinet, and a system of preference to the mother country was agreed upon as a compromise between these two factions.² Meanwhile, in November 1906, Mr. Fielding had come round to a stronger belief in the wisdom of his policy. "We adhere to the principle of British preference because we believe it has been a good thing for Canada. We are satisfied that it has given Canada prominence in the eyes of the Empire and all over the world. . . . We think also that it had a desirable effect in increasing the interest in Great Britain in Canadian products; and, though it is difficult to establish it by particular evidence, our conviction is that the preferential tariff has been the means of encouraging the use and consumption of Canadian goods in Great Britain."³

Such being the prevailing temper, it was a matter for surprise when suddenly, after little preparation beforehand, a policy of reciprocity with the United States was sprung upon the country. It was undoubtedly true that from the beginning of confederation the desire for some kind of reciprocity had been the established policy not of one political party but of all political parties. In the past, however, it had always been Canada which made the advances; and Canada which had been, more or less cavalierly, rejected. Consequently a new generation had grown up, which, in the strength of its budding energies, felt much less the need of American co-operation. This time it was the United States which began the negotiations. President Taft was anxious to promote friendly relations with Canada, and there was a risk that under the new American tariff the preference given by Canada to France might lead to reprisals.⁴ In a striking message to Congress on 26 January, 1911, the President wrote: "One by one the controversies, resulting from the uncertainties

¹ *Ibid.*, LVI, p. 1342.

² *Ibid.*, 1904, LXVI, p. 4751.

³ *Ibid.*, 1906, LVIII, p. 291.

⁴ The United States tariff of 1909, by which the President was enjoined to grant the benefits of the minimum tariff to the products of such countries as did not unduly discriminate in their treatment of American products, raised the question whether the Franco-Canadian treaty did not effect such a discrimination. As the outcome of negotiations Canada agreed to apply the intermediate, instead of the general, tariff to certain named American products (*The Canada Year Book*, 1910, p. xxxi).

which attended the partition of British territory in the American continent at the close of the Revolution, . . . have been eliminated.

“The path having been thus opened for the improvement of commercial relations, a reciprocal trade agreement is the logical sequence of all that has been accomplished in disposing of matters of a diplomatic and controversial character. The identity of interests of two peoples linked together by race, language, political institutions and geographical proximity, offers the foundation. The contribution to the industrial advancement of our own country by the migration across the borders of the thrifty and industrious Canadians of English, Scotch and Irish origin is now repaid by the movement of large numbers of our own sturdy farmers to the north-west of Canada, thus giving their labour, their means and their experience to the development of that section with its agricultural possibilities.

“The guiding motion, in seeking adjustment of trade relations between two countries so situated geographically, should be to give play to productive forces, as far as is practicable, regardless of political boundaries. . . .

“We have reached a stage in our development that calls for a statesmanlike and broad view of our future economic status and its requirements. We have drawn upon our natural resources in such a way as to invite attention to their necessary limit. . . . We have so increased in population and in our consumption of food products and the necessities of life, hitherto supplied largely from our own country, that, unless we materially increase our production, we can see before us a change in our economic position from that of a country selling to the world food and natural products of the farm and forest, to one consuming and importing them. . . . We have, on the north of us, a country contiguous to ours for three thousand miles, with natural resources of the same character as ours, which have not been drawn upon as ours have been, and in the development of which the conditions as to wages, character of the wage-earner, and transportation to the market, differ but little from those prevailing with us. The difference is not greater than that between States of our own country, or between the different provinces of Canada. Ought we not, then, to arrange a commercial agreement with Canada, if we can, by which we shall get direct access to her great supply of natural products, without an obstructing or prohibiting tariff ?

This is no violation of the protective principle . . . because that principle does not call for a tariff between this country and one whose conditions as to production, population and wages are so like ours, and when a common boundary of three thousand miles in itself must make a radical distinction between our commercial treatment of Canada and of any other country.

"The Dominion has greatly prospered. It has an active, aggressive and intelligent people. They are coming to the parting of the ways. They must soon decide whether they are to regard themselves as isolated permanently from our markets by a perpetual wall, or whether we are to be commercial friends . . . shall we not, therefore, before this policy has become too crystallized and fixed for change, meet them in a spirit of real concession, facilitate commerce between the two countries, and thus greatly increase the natural resources available to our people?"¹

It was agreed that the tariff changes should not take the formal shape of a treaty, but that the two Governments would use their utmost efforts to enact them by concurrent legislation at Washington and Ottawa. The negotiators expected the continuance of the arrangement because they were convinced that this new policy "would strengthen the friendly relations then happily prevailing, and promote the commercial interests of both countries."²

The negotiations were crowned with complete success. A considerable list of articles produced in both countries were to be reciprocally free; the free list consisting mainly of food products and goods at the more elementary stage of manufacture.

Some unfair criticism was levelled in England at Mr. (Lord) Bryce, the British ambassador. In fact the negotiations were entirely in the hands of the Canadian ministers, and he merely held a watching brief in the interests of Great Britain. In that capacity he wrote careful and well considered reports with regard to the matter. "As at present advised," he wrote on 22 January, "I am disposed to believe that British interests are not, to any appreciable extent, prejudiced, and I have also the assurance of the Canadian ministers on this point. No opportunity was lost, in the course of the negotiations, of remind-

¹ Cd. 5523, 1911, pp. 12-3.

² *Tariff Relations between the U.S.A. and Canada*, Cd. 5516, 1911.

ing them of the regard which it was right and fitting they should have to imperial interests, and such reminders found on every occasion a frank and cordial response. The arrangement rests in reality on the growing realization of the fact that a high tariff wall between contiguous countries, whose products are economically interchanged, is an injury to both, and opposed to sound fixed principles. The results of such artificial barriers are most obviously objectionable in the case of natural food products, and it is with these the arrangement principally deals. In so far as the arrangement oversteps this basis, it is probably influenced . . . by the traditional policy of the United States, of promoting closer economic relations between the states of the Western Hemisphere. That such a policy is not counteracted by and does not check the rapidly growing sense of national consciousness and international importance in the peoples of these States has, of late, been abundantly proved. No more in Canada than in the republics of Latin America, to which the United States has sought to extend its pan-American propaganda, does there seem a likelihood that a freer interchange of commodities will lead to closer relations of a political kind.”¹

Mr. (Lord) Bryce was a strong free trader, and, as such, would naturally welcome a movement in the direction of freer trade between the United States and Canada; but there was another aspect of the case upon which he was not called upon to enter. Undoubtedly the effect of closer commercial intercourse between Canada and its great southern neighbour must have been to diminish the importance of the British market. Shrewd observers in America were alarmed at the possibility of the success of tariff reform. Very significant was the language of Mr. James Hill, the astute chairman of the Great Northern Railway Company: “It is not what we have gained by the reciprocity treaty that is most important, but what we have prevented. . . . What would have happened if we had not passed the treaty? There would have been a revival of the move for imperial federation, and, if we had refused to trade with our good neighbour, our second best customer, and for our manufactures the best customer we have, we should have been sorry for it in years to come, for the opportunity was before us to make a favourable agreement with Canada, and it would not have been before us again for many years, if we had refused it this time.”²

¹ Cd. 5523, p. 5.

² Quoted *Can. Hans.*, XCIX, p. 10589.

Similarly, President Taft said in New York, 27 April: "I have said that this is a critical time in the solution of the question of reciprocity. It is critical, because unless it is now decided favourably to reciprocity, it is exceedingly probable that no such opportunity will ever again come to the United States. The forces which are at work in England and in Canada to separate her by a Chinese wall from the United States, and to make her part of an imperial commercial band, reaching from England around the world to England again, by a system of preferential tariffs, will derive an impetus from the rejection of the treaty, and if we would have reciprocity with all the advantages that I have described and that I earnestly and sincerely believe will follow its adoption, we must take it now or give it up for ever."¹

But this argument was a two-edged sword, and the same considerations which made Americans approve the agreement caused Canadians to inquire more carefully, whether by accepting it they would not put in jeopardy their British loyalties. No doubt, the agitation against ratification which grew in volume and in force as the months went on, had a double impelling power. Upon the one hand the powerful manufacturing interests of the Eastern cities were seriously concerned, lest the measure of reciprocity proposed should be the first step towards that full commercial union which might mean the death blow to many Canadian industries. Upon the other hand, the voice of Macdonald from his grave still spoke to the people of Ontario; and the solemn warnings of Blake still rang in their ears. Many a family, not outwardly concerned with party politics, responded to Mr. Sifton's stirring words when he said: "What has been the history of our relations with the United States? For the last thirty or forty years we have been ignored and buffeted by them, and during all that time we have taken our way secure, firm, serene, under the strong arm of the British Empire. Now we come to the point where we are of some use; we are just beginning to be of some use. Up to nearly the present time we have been more or less of a nuisance to the Empire; now we are beginning to get to the point where we add something to the prestige of the British Empire, to the point when, if necessary, we could send some men, some ships or some money; when we can be of some use to the Empire which has given us our liberties and all the traditions of our citizenship. When we get to that point what

¹ Quoted by Castell Hopkins, *op. cit.*, 1911, p. 74.

happens? The United States beckons from Washington; and we are asked, the first time anybody beckons, to turn from the path that leads to the capital of the Empire, and to turn to the path that leads to Washington. I say, so far as I am concerned—not for me!”¹

The boast of Mr. Champ Clark that the States were about to annex Canada might be ill-mannered bluster; but he was the leader of the democratic party in the House of Representatives; and undoubtedly votes were given in the American Congress in favour of the agreement on political grounds. Such behaviour justified Canadian suspicions, and, though the Dominion had probably reached the stage of national development which forbade absorption by its southern neighbour, still the full effects of peaceful economic penetration upon political conditions have never yet been shown on the stage of history, because in Europe the working out of the German system received its abrupt quietus by the breaking out of the Great War.

Granting, however, that there were political risks attendant on the triumph of reciprocity, it is by no means necessary to accuse Canadian ministers of want of imperial patriotism. The earnest words with which Sir Wilfrid Laurier explained his view of the position have been already quoted² in another connexion, and his colleagues no doubt honestly shared his views. The French Canadian, Mr. Lemieux, regarded reciprocity as a link between the mother country and the great republic. “In the past,” he said, “our loyalty has borne its trials, even with the mother country. While we were still suffering from the effects of the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty, statesmen high in station in England gave us to understand that they would see us part from the old connexion without regret, but we did not believe that those were the feelings of the people of England, and so we held on. We have fairly won our way into the British brotherhood, and we will not hear with patience that any trade arrangements, however favourable, will turn us from the course we have freely chosen for ourselves within the greatest Empire that has been.”³

Still, in spite of all this, Mr. (Sir R.) Borden, the leader of the opposition, probably voiced the instinctive sentiments of many a quiet Canadian, not interested in the disputes of party politics, when he said: “Our fathers endured many hardships and made

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 1911, XCIX, p. 408.

² See p. 24.

³ Quoted by Castell Hopkins, *op cit.*, 1911, p. 83.

wonderful sacrifices in planting their homes in this then western wilderness. In times of peril both races have poured out their blood without stint in defence of their common country. In the work of upbuilding a strong nation and a great civilization under the British flag, on the northern half of this continent, they have laboured side by side with mutual sympathy and with high purpose. The heaviest burdens have been lifted, the greatest obstacles have been overcome, the most difficult part of the task has been accomplished. I trust that the Canadian people will not lightly relinquish the task to which their energies and the energies of their fathers have been consecrated for many years. I trust that the standard will not be thrown aside and the retreat sounded, when the battle is more than half won. The self-denials, the sacrifices, the patriotism demanded of us to-day, in order that this nation may maintain and carry out the ideals and the purposes for which it was called into existence are as nothing to those which were required of our fathers who founded this Confederation. Loyalty to their memory and to the ideals which they consecrated demands that we should continue, with firm and unabated hope, upon the path which we entered nearly fifty years ago.”¹ Electors of this type may well have silently agreed with Rudyard Kipling: “It is her own Soul that Canada risks to-day. Once that Soul is pawned for any consideration, Canada must inevitably conform to the commercial, legal, financial, social and ethical standards which will be imposed upon her by the sheer admitted weight of the United States.”

In any case the opposition in Parliament and the country was so strong as to force a dissolution; and then the verdict of the constituencies was clear enough. Before the dissolution the Liberals had been in a majority of forty-seven, after it nearly the same numbers represented the majority of their opponents. Henceforth, for the remaining years of his life, the great statesman who more than any one had known how to combine the triple threads of racial, Canadian and Imperial patriotism, was relegated to the cold shades of opposition.

In Quebec, as we have seen elsewhere, the victory was won on a wholly different issue, but, taking Canada as a whole, we may say that the vote was a solemn renewal of confidence in the British connexion; though no doubt, among many, more selfish interests were at work.

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 1911, XCIX.

In other ways the advantage of the preference to British imports had been, to some extent, diminished. An intermediate tariff was established in 1907; and under a commercial treaty with France, signed 19 September, 1907, France attained the benefits of it; Belgium, Holland, and Italy, in 1910, being placed on a similar footing, so far as certain specified goods were concerned.

As regards Germany, after the termination of the treaty of 1865, German goods could only enter Canada under the general tariff. Germany resented the preferential treatment accorded to Great Britain, and retaliated by imposing high duties on imports from Canada. In return, in 1903, Canada subjected German imports to a surtax of one-third over and above the duties specified in the general tariff. This surtax remained in force till 1910; when it was removed, in return for Germany conceding the conventional tariff rates on Canadian imports.¹

In considering the whole question of preference from the imperial standpoint, it is impossible to deny that much harm was done by the dragging of imperial questions into the mud of British party controversy. Nor with all our admiration and respect for Mr. Chamberlain, need we always approve his methods of argument. Had he openly avowed that the changes he advocated might result in some present loss, but that the loss was worth incurring, if it meant, in the future, closer trade relations between Great Britain and the mighty nations which, in the course of another fifty years, will have developed in Canada and Australia, he would have stood on a stronger foundation than in lending the strength of his eloquence to the exposition of what many believed to be exploded economic fallacies. He could never get behind the fact that the main exports of the Dominions consist of food stuffs and of the raw materials for manufacture; both of which place grave obstacles in the way of a scientific tariff. Granted that a rise in wages made good a slight increase in the price of bread, the Radical party would be sure to call in aid the spectre of the starving forties, so as to excite the indignation of the British masses against a tax upon foreign corn; however changed might be the actual conditions of the world. Accordingly, at a subsequent date, the Unionist leaders found it necessary to repudiate any policy that should increase the cost of the food of the people. With regard to raw

¹ *The Canada Year Book*, 1910, p. xxx.

materials, Mr. Chamberlain himself hesitated before the proposal of a tax upon articles, such as wool, that form the basis of British industries.

The one direction in which it has proved possible to follow in the wake of Dominion opinion is in giving some preference in the case of articles that are already the subject of taxation. This relief was given in the Budget of 1919; thereby shocking a few free trade purists, without, it would seem, striking the imagination of the overseas nations. These communities would no doubt prefer to deal with their kinsmen, but there is always the risk that they may gradually be driven to embark upon the policy of making separate bargains with foreign countries which have the powerful lever of a tariff in coming to terms. It is idle to suppose that, as things now are, Great Britain can prevent any Dominion from acting as seems best for itself. Even the security of the most favoured country treatment must, in the future, depend upon good will and not on legal enactment. In this state of things, though we must recognize that the difficulties in the way of a British *Zollverein* seem insurmountable, it would be fatuous in the extreme to suppose, with regard to imperial trade, that all things are going for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

Nevertheless something has been done. The appointment of a Royal Commission, at the instance of Sir W. Laurier at the Imperial Conference of 1911, to travel round the Empire and take stock of its varied resources, occasioned valuable reports, and the appointment of new British Trade Commissioners was of some benefit to British trade. The Commonwealth tariff of 1921, increased the amount of preference given to British goods; but in the extraordinary situation brought about as the aftermath of the war it seems as though, unless the British manufacturer and workman can join together in friendly association to restore the loss caused by the inevitable waste and wreckage of the last seven years, no measures from outside can do much to secure for Great Britain new markets or to safeguard her former ones.

CHAPTER V

DEFENCE

I feel convinced that if the Colonies were governed as they ought to be, they would gladly and willingly come to the aid of the Mother Country in any just and necessary war.

SIR W. MOLESWORTH

THE principle of diversity in Union, which is the characteristic of the British Commonwealth of nations, has been especially exemplified where *a priori* one would expect its intrusion to be most dangerous, viz., in the subject of naval and military defence. We have seen how disinclined were the self-governing colonies to adopt Mr. Brodrick's scheme of a military force in each colony, earmarked for purposes of imperial defence. We have seen also how Canada stood aloof from any contribution to the imperial navy,¹ and how, though Australia continued such contribution, she continued it reluctantly and under protest. By 1907, however, the British Admiralty had learnt wisdom and was willing to co-operate with Australia in any scheme of local defence that she could undertake. Mr. Deakin explained that the Australian attitude was due to no motion of economy or to a desire to shirk imperial obligations.² The proposal was that the contribution under the Naval agreement should cease to be credited to the imperial exchequer; and, instead, that it should be appropriated to the maintenance of a thousand seamen for service in Australian waters and to the construction, equipment and maintenance of submarines or destroyers or to similar local defences.³ In the Commonwealth parliament Mr. Deakin said on 13 December, 1907: "At the very

¹ See, however, Mr. Brodeur's statement at the 1907 Conference, Cd. 3523, pp. 139-41.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 474-6.

³ *Correspondence relating to the Naval Defence of Australia and New Zealand*, Cd. 4325, 1908.

outset of the recent Conference the Prime Minister of Great Britain met us with the frank avowal that the British Government preferred no claim to money in relation to naval defence, and went on to add the extremely pregnant statement that the control of naval defence and foreign affairs must always go together. If honourable members appreciate the force of that axiom, they will see that it implies much both now and in the future. It implies that, for the present, seeing we have no voice in foreign affairs, we are not obliged to take any part in imperial naval defence. It implies also with equal clearness that, when we do take a part in naval defence, we shall be entitled to a share in the direction of foreign affairs.”¹

Mr. Deakin added : “ So far as one can judge, almost under any conceivable conditions, the Government of the Commonwealth will feel that its safety was best secured by placing those ships under the control of the highest naval expert in those seas . . . but the Government’s responsibility is to their people, and the Government must be answerable only to them directly. To part with the control altogether would be to part with the Australian character of this local flotilla, which is one of the elements that we hope to use for the development of the maritime spirit in this part of the world.”² Constitutionally, Mr. Deakin explained, the Commonwealth government could not shift their responsibility upon the shoulders of the Admiralty even in time of war.³

At the same time, New Zealand, in increasing its subsidy to £100,000, emphasized the necessity of the navy, in whatever part of the world it might be, being under one control ; so that the most effective results for the defence of all portions of the Empire might be secured.⁴

At the same time, Sir Wilfrid Laurier was not at this time prepared to make any promise with regard to naval defence.⁵

We have seen, in the case of the Canadian-American Reciprocity Proposals of 1911, the manner in which a question, upon the face of it of purely local concern, might react upon imperial policy generally. Yet more striking was the evidence, given by the disputes in Canada over the subject of naval defence. In 1909 the subject came to the fore ; illustrating in a vivid manner the different points of view of the different Dominions.

¹ Quoted *ibid.*, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵ Cd. 3523, p. 542.

Recognizing the reality of the German menace, New Zealand offered by telegram, as we have already seen, to bear the cost of the immediate building and arming of a first-class battleship of the latest type. The Labour Government in Australia, on the other hand, remained constant to the view that the permanent naval supremacy of the Empire would be best attained by encouragement of naval development in Australia, so that the people of the Commonwealth might become a people efficient at sea, and thereby better able to assist the United Kingdom with men, as well as ships, to act in concert with the other sea forces of the Empire.¹ The Commonwealth Government therefore proposed to set on foot a small naval force, constituting a torpedo flotilla. There was, however, a strong feeling in the States that these proposals did not go far enough; and New South Wales and Victoria proposed the separate gift of a *Dreadnought*, should the Commonwealth Government not make such an offer. Eventually, however, on a change of Ministry, this offer was made by the Federal Government. Australia and New Zealand were both communities to whom the necessity of sea power was familiar, and were, moreover, obsessed by the fear of an aggressive Japan.

In Canada the only conceivable enemy was a neighbour too powerful to allow the possibility of competition with it in the field of armaments, and the Prime Minister belonged in thought to that school of Gladstonian Liberals which found so few disciples amongst Dominion statesmen. At the same time neither Sir W. Laurier nor the Canadian Parliament wished to shirk their imperial responsibilities and a ready assent was given to resolutions recognizing the necessity of a Canadian Naval Service and Canadian responsibility for co-operation in the defence of the Empire.²

In five short years the sincerity of these professions was to be put to a terrible test; and with the most splendid results. But, so far as naval co-operation was concerned, it was equally demonstrated, that without long and laborious preparations, enthusiasm and effort at the last moment are wholly unavailing.

The British Government wisely determined to strike while the iron was hot and to hold a subsidiary imperial Conference

¹ Cd. 4948, 1909, p. 4.

² *Correspondence and Papers relating to a Conference with Representatives of the Self-governing Dominions*, Cd. 4948, 1909, pp. 5-6.

on the one question of defence. Mr. Asquith explained in the House of Commons on 26 August the results of this Conference. It was recognized that in building up a fleet a number of conditions should be conformed to. The fleet must be of a certain size, in order to offer a permanent career to the officers and men engaged in the Service; the *personnel* should be trained and disciplined, under regulations similar to those established in the Royal Navy, in order to allow of both interchange and union between the British and Dominion Services; and, with the same object, the standard of vessels and armaments should be uniform.

A remodelling of the squadrons maintained in Far Eastern waters was considered on the basis of establishing a Pacific fleet, to consist of three units in the East Indies, Australia, and China Seas, each comprising, with some variations, a large armoured cruiser of the new *Indomitable* type, three second class cruisers of the *Bristol* type, six destroyers of the *River* class and three submarines of "C" class. The ships given by New Zealand and Australia were to be large armoured cruisers, instead of battleships, and to be maintained, the one on the China, the other on the Australian station.

With regard to Australia the suggested arrangement was that, with some temporary assistance from imperial funds, the Commonwealth Government should provide and maintain the Australian unit of the Pacific fleet. "As regards Canada it was considered that her double seaboard rendered the provision of a fleet unit of the same kind unsuitable, for the present. It was proposed, according to the amount of money that might be available, that Canada should make a start with cruisers of the *Bristol* class and destroyers of an improved *River* class, a part to be stationed on the Atlantic seaboard and a part on the Pacific."¹

In considering the Canadian naval proposals that were the outcome of the Resolutions set out above, the real question at issue was, how far was the necessity for dealing with the German menace one of immediate urgency? It is quite possible to hold the view that a great nation, like Canada, could not permanently consent to make its contribution to an imperial navy in the shape of a money payment, and yet to realize that the measure proposed by Sir W. Laurier was practically valueless, so far as the immediate future was concerned. In his speech in the Canadian House

¹ Cd. 4948, 1909, pp. 18-20.

of Commons in criticizing the Government proposals Mr. (Sir R.) Borden explained what he held to be the proper line of action. "The Government of this country are able to ascertain and to know, if they take the proper action for that purpose, whether the conditions which face the Empire at this time in respect of naval defence are grave. If we were in power, we would endeavour to find that out, to get a plain unvarnished answer to that question, and, if the answer to that question, based upon the assurance of the mother country and the report of the naval experts of the Admiralty, were such—and I think it would be such—as to demand instant and effective action by this country, then I would appeal to Parliament for immediate and effective aid; and, if Parliament did not give immediate and effective aid, I would appeal from Parliament to the people of this country."¹ Again: "I say to my right hon. friend the Prime Minister, so far as my words have any weight with him: Go on with your naval service; proceed slowly, cautiously and surely. Lay your proposals before the people and give them the necessary opportunity to be heard; but do not forget that we are confronted with an emergency which may rend the Empire asunder before the proposed service is worthy of the name. In the face of such a situation immediate, vigorous and earnest action is necessary."² Unfortunately the British Cabinet at home were, almost certainly, divided in their views as to the danger from Germany, a division represented in the differing opinions of Radical newspapers and politicians. Sir W. Laurier himself was so little impressed by the danger that he said in 1913, when the situation had assuredly not become easier: "They said there was a German peril. How could there be a German peril? He would deny *in toto* any suggestion that Germany was building a large navy for the purpose of attacking England. Between Germany and England there was never a day of quarrel. . . . The German navy had been brought about because that country had built up a great sea commerce and was bound to have a navy to defend it, and Canada, having a commerce of her own, must build a navy to defend it."³

Speaking in 1914, Sir Wilfrid said: "Emergency! Who speaks to-day of emergency? . . . The atmosphere is pure, the sky is clear. My right honourable friend I think heard the words of the

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 1910, XCIV.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1761.

³ Castell Hopkins, *op. cit.*, 1913, p. 288.

Lord Chancellor pronounced in this country last year, that the relations between Germany and Great Britain were cordial."¹ We all know from Lord Haldane that leaders cannot be expected to lead ; but it is a little puzzling to imagine why that eminent statesman, fresh from his Berlin experiences, where he had learnt what was expected from Great Britain as a neutral Power, should have gratuitously taken upon himself the rôle in Canada of the prophet Zedekiah in the Book of Kings.

When such was the attitude of the Canadian Liberal leader, one may imagine the line of some of his followers. "If any war occurred between Germany and England," said one in March, 1913, "it would be caused by the cheap politicians in Great Britain and the cheaper politicians in Canada,"² and another affirmed a little later that Great Britain and Germany had become the great peacemakers of Europe and of the world.³

Holding such views Sir Wilfrid could not be expected to offer *Dreadnoughts*. Indeed a distinguished follower, Mr. Mackenzie King, the present Prime Minister, declared that for Canada deliberately to place *Dreadnoughts* in European waters was to invite antagonism. Within its narrow limits the Canadian Measure of 1910 was an honest, *bonâ fide* attempt to make a beginning in the direction of accepting imperial obligations ; though its enactment did not add greatly to the naval strength of the Empire ; two protected cruisers, the *Niobe* and *Rainbow*, purchased from the British Government, for the training in Canadian waters of officers and men, being its main outcome before the fall of the Laurier Government.

In 1911 a naval agreement was arrived at which recognized and controlled the separate *status* of the Dominion navies. Under it, while the exclusive control of the Dominion Governments was expressly recognized, effective measures were taken to secure the homogeneous character of the different portions of the imperial navy ; whilst, in time of war, after that the naval service of a Dominion had been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by the Dominion authorities, the ships were to form an integral part of the British fleet and to remain under the control of the British Admiralty during the continuance of the war.⁴

It was in virtue of this agreement that, at the outbreak of the Great War, the Australian naval forces, consisting of a

¹ *Can. Hans.*, CXIII, pp. 16-7.

² *Ibid.*, CVIII, p. 3216.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4560.

⁴ Cd. 5746-2, 1911.

Dreadnought, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, were placed under the control of the Admiralty.

We have seen how on another issue the Liberal Government was defeated in the Canadian constituencies ; Mr. (Sir Robert) Borden had now the opportunity of giving effect to the policy which he had before outlined. His first step after visiting England was to elicit from the British Admiralty a memorandum relating to the requirements of the naval defence of the Empire. After an elaborate and striking exposition of the measures taken by Germany to catch Great Britain up in the race for naval supremacy the memorandum concluded : " Larger margins of superiority at home would, among other things, restore a greater freedom to the movements of the British Squadron, in every sea, and directly promote the security of the Dominions.

" Anything which increases our margin in the newest ships diminishes the strain and augments our security and our chances of being left unmolested.

" Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present juncture Great Britain will not in any circumstances fail in her duty to the Overseas Dominions of the Crown.

" She has before now successfully made headway alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations, and she has not lost her capacity by a wise policy and strenuous exertions to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire.

" The Admiralty are assured that His Majesty's Government will not hesitate to ask the House of Commons for whatever provision the circumstances of each year may require. But the aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in ships or money. Any action on the part of Canada to increase the power and mobility of the imperial navy and thus widen the margin of our common safety would be recognized everywhere as a most significant witness to the united strength of the imperial navy, and to the renewed resolve of the Overseas Dominions to take their part in maintaining its integrity.

" The Prime Minister of the Dominion having inquired in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective, we have no hesitation in answering, after a prolonged consideration of all the circumstances, that it is desirable that such aid should include the provision of a certain number of the largest ships of war which science can build or money supply." ¹

¹ Cd. 6513, 1912. See also *Can. Hans.*, CVII, pp. 679-84.

Twelve years ago, Mr. (Sir Robert) Borden explained, the British Navy and the British flag were predominant in every ocean of the world and along the shore of every continent. To-day they were predominant nowhere, except in the North Sea. Nineteen British warships in the Mediterranean now took the place of fifty-five in 1902. Three took the place of fourteen on the North American and West Indies Station, and three that of sixteen on that of the Cape of Good Hope. In all parts of the world the comparative results were the same.

That withdrawal had been necessary ; but was none the less unfortunate. But effective aid from Canada might enable, so far as the Atlantic and Pacific were concerned, this situation to be in great measure righted. That aid, he proposed, should take the form of the cost of three battleships, to be, when launched, the most powerful in the world.

He deprecated the hazardous and costly experiment of Canada attempting at once to build battleships.

In the conclusion of this great speech, after noticing the constitutional problem, the solution of which the present action of Canada would make more urgent, the speaker went on :

“The next ten or twenty years will be pregnant with great results for this Empire ; and it is of infinite importance that questions of purely domestic concern, however urgent, should not prevent any of us from ‘ rising to the heights of this great argument.’ But to-day, while the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon, we cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until any impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster. Almost unaided the Motherland, not for herself alone, but for us as well, is sustaining the burden of a vital imperial duty and confronting an overmastering necessity of national existence. We bring the best assistance that we may in the urgency of the moment thus to her aid, in token of our determination to protect and ensure the safety and integrity of this Empire, and of our resolve to defend on sea, as well as on land, our flag, our honour and our heritage.”¹

The amendment moved by Sir Wilfrid was very far from a direct repudiation of imperial obligations. It acknowledged that the withdrawal, noted in the Admiralty memorandum, “ renders it necessary that Canada, without further delay, should enter

¹ *Ibid.*, CVII, p. 692.

actively upon a permanent policy of naval defence"; but any measure which did not involve a permanent policy of participation by ships owned, manned, and maintained by Canada, and contemplating their construction, as soon as possible, in Canada, was not an adequate or satisfactory expression of the aspirations of the Canadian people in regard to naval defence, and was not an assumption by Canada of her fair share in the maintenance of the naval strength of the Empire.

"This House regrets to learn the intention of the Government indefinitely to postpone the carrying out by Canada of a permanent naval policy. It is the opinion of this House that measures should be taken at the present session to give effect, actively and speedily, to the permanent naval policy embodied in the Naval Service Act of 1910. . . . To increase the power and mobility of the Imperial Navy by the addition by Canada under the above Act of two fleet units to be stationed on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada is the policy best calculated to afford relief to the United Kingdom, in respect of the burden of imperial naval defence, and in the words of the Admiralty memorandum to "restore greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons in every sea, and directly promote the security of the Dominions." ¹

Sir Wilfrid recognized the necessity that wherever, in the distant seas or the distant countries, a British ship had been removed, that ship should be replaced by a ship, built, maintained, equipped and manned by the young nation concerned.² Excellent doctrine; but not so easy to put in practice.

In fact, however, had this amendment met with success, the result could only have been the failure of the Government proposals, without anything further being done in the way of building up a Canadian navy.

The majority of the Canadian people probably approved of Mr. (Sir R.) Borden's action; but there was no such overwhelming enthusiasm as might compel a hostile Senate to fall into line. The defective character of the Canadian Senate is the commonplace of every discussion on the Canadian constitution; and Sir J. Macdonald had used his constitutional powers [with the zeal and cunning of a political party organizer. But his ingenuity had not gone the length of appointing young men to the Senate; so that his successor, as time went on, was able to hoist the Conservative party with their own petard. On the Conservatives coming to

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1028.

² *Ibid.*

power in 1911 there was a large majority of Liberal senators who were determined to give the Naval bill its quietus. It must be remembered, moreover, that 1913 was a year of financial depression in Canada, not the most convenient moment in which to embark upon a new and costly policy. Again, Canadian Liberals resented the direct frankness with which Mr. Winston Churchill in a letter of 24 January, 1913, pointed out the difficulties in the way of Canada building a separate navy containing battleships.¹ It should further be noted that even the passage of the bill in the House of Commons had not been effected without the establishment of new rules for proceedings in Committee, whilst an undoubted weak point in the Ministry's armour was that it started its life with several French members who were opposed to a policy of imperial naval co-operation.

Be this as it may, when the moment of trial arrived, on the outbreak of war, Canada, so far as naval defence was concerned, was helpless but for the protection of the British fleet.

Very different was the Australian position. By July, 1913, the first fleet unit was almost complete and a building programme had been outlined for the next three years which would increase its power and efficiency, by providing a second *Dreadnought* and subsidiary vessels. Naval bases and dockyards were being proceeded with. Recruiting had been very successful, nearly 2,000 recruits being raised in less than two years. In the following October the unit was complete ; and Australia had shown by deeds her intention "to take *her* full share in the development of the family estate and assume active responsibility for the preservation of the imperial patrimony." The Labour party claimed that they had been the first to put forward a definite scheme of local naval defence.² In December, 1913, Mr. Fisher maintained that the Commonwealth was the only Dominion that had carried out the decision arrived at by the subsidiary Conference of 1909. It had built its fleet unit, so far as its finances allowed ; and intended to continue to do its duty in that regard. The development of thought at home and elsewhere had been on the lines of the policy originally adopted by the Commonwealth. Canada had also fallen into line. The Pacific fleet ought, he thought, to be provided by Australia, New Zealand and Canada.³

"We are glad," he had said in the previous August, "as a

¹ Castell Hopkins, *op. cit.*, 1913, p. 134.

² *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1913, p. 130.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 7717-8.

Government to have been associated with the establishment of the Australian navy, owned, manned and controlled by the Australian Government and people, and, at the same time, glad to be associated with the mother country in all that concerns her welfare and in her protection, if necessary, against the aggression of foreign foes."¹

New Zealand, as we have seen, had been in favour of the policy of a money contribution. The cruise of the *New Zealand* around the Empire showed the determination of the British in the Pacific "to keep the flag which means so much to us flying all over the world." In the future "New Zealand, Australia and all the other Dominions impinging on the Pacific must put their heads together and devise some scheme to ensure the safety of the Pacific and then put their hands in their pockets to finance it." But "in the meantime we depend on the British navy."²

Some dissatisfaction had been created in New Zealand by the necessity, owing to the exigencies of the German menace, to alter the arrangement under which the battleship *New Zealand* was to serve on the China station. Its presence was required in the North Sea, and an armoured cruiser, the *Defence*, was despatched in its stead to the China station. It was sought to conciliate New Zealand public opinion by sending the *New Zealand* for a three months' visit to the Colony, before taking up its duties in the home waters.

Still, the existing arrangement was far from satisfactory from the point of view of New Zealand. "Where," asked Mr. Massey in 1913, "are the British cruisers, where are the river destroyers, where are the submarines?" (which had been promised under the 1909 agreement). "They simply do not exist. What is the position to-day of naval protection from the point of view of New Zealand? . . . We have not that protection to which we are entitled, and it was on account of the fact that the arrangement made in 1909 had not been given effect to that the new negotiations . . . were entered into."³ New Zealand, owing to its conformation and geographical position, was bound to be the home of a great maritime people.

Accordingly the Naval Defence Bill which came up for its

¹ *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1913, p. 1587.

² Speech of Minister of Defence, Feb. 3, 1913.

³ *N.Z. Hans.*, CLXIV, p. 165.

second reading on 30 December, 1913, altered, to a considerable extent, the policy of New Zealand with regard to naval matters. Col. (Sir James) Allen explained that the Admiralty was now of opinion that the submarine and the torpedo boat destroyer did not lend themselves to effective employment in New Zealand waters and harbours. New Zealand had seen an arrangement made for the Pacific fleet and New Zealand had seen that abandoned. She had seen New Zealand men engaged by British officers to be trained for the British Navy and yet New Zealand had no say in it whatever. She had seen the Australian naval reserves controlled and managed by British officers, and New Zealand had no say in it whatever. Self-respect forbade the continuance of such a state of things.¹

"I cannot conceive any more important object," Col. (Sir J.) Allen insisted, "that we can strive for, any more useful contribution to imperial defence than the training of our own New Zealand personnel." The proposal in the Bill was that the mother country should lend one ship for training purposes; and that, if necessary, other ships should be acquired later on. "New Zealand officers and men would have a sphere of action and a career open to them in the great imperial navy."²

Col. (Sir J.) Allen threw out the suggestion of a sub-committee of imperial defence, to regulate the naval control of the Pacific, consisting of representatives from Australia, New Zealand, and, eventually, of Canada.

In the special circumstances of the case it has been impossible for South Africa to help much in the cause of imperial naval defence. The contribution of £85,000 made before the union has been maintained, as General Smuts explained, because it was in existence, though he recognized that it was entirely unworthy of South Africa. South Africa, he insisted, had the greatest interest in its naval defence. It was not necessary to have a sentimental regard for the British Navy to recognize the priceless services it had rendered to the country.³

Apart from the money contribution, three companies of the Naval Reserve were established at the Cape, and it was proposed to increase this body by four companies.

General Hertzog felt about the money contribution what the people of Athens felt towards their contribution to the upkeep

¹ *Ibid.*, CLVII, p. 467.

² *Ibid.*, p. 468.

³ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, I, pp. 751-2.

of Sparta's fleet ;¹ and another Nationalist Member demanded a South African fleet so as not to be beholden to a "foreign" fleet for their defence.²

Military Defence.

Here and there in this volume some criticism has been ventured against the imperial statesmanship of Lord Haldane. It is the more pleasant to deal with a question on which his leading gave a direction to Dominion policy which proved to be of no little importance in the winning of the war. In a speech of remarkable tact, as well as of ability, at the 1907 Conference he suggested that the general staff (which had recently been created in Great Britain) should receive, as far as possible, an imperial character.³ Trained in a great common school, recruited, it might be, from the most varying parts of the Empire, but educated in military science according to common principles, the General Staff officer, whether he was Canadian, British, or Australian, or New Zealander, would be at the disposition of the local Government or of the local commander-in-chief. "These home forces of the various self-governing Dominions of the Crown should be organized, if not to a common pattern—because rigidity of pattern we recognize as impossible with the varying circumstances of the various countries—yet with a common end in view and with this common conception."⁴

The resolution, as finally adopted, welcomed and cordially approved Mr. Haldane's general statement and undertook so far as possible to give effect to his recommendations.⁵

The ground having been thus well prepared, when the subsidiary Conference on naval and military defence was held in 1909, it was possible to report that since the last Conference of 1907 progress had no doubt been made in all the self-governing Dominions in regard to the provision of military forces for local defence ; increased attention was being paid to military training and education, and the importance of similarity of armament and organization had been recognized, whilst the foundations had been laid of an imperial general staff which, it was hoped, would direct the military policy of the Empire upon accepted principles.

In one direction, however, little or no progress had been made.

¹ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, I, p. 748.

² *Ibid.*, p. 753.

⁴ *Ibid.*

³ Cd. 3523, p. 96.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. v-vi.

In the Overseas Dominions no organization had yet been devised for rendering assistance to other parts of the Empire in an emergency. The time had now arrived when this important question should be considered.¹ The representatives of the Dominions expressed their concurrence in the proposition that "each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire," and a sub-committee of experts was formed to deal in detail with the suggestions of the War Office Memorandum.² The result was, in the words of the Prime Minister, "a plan for so organizing the forces of the Crown wherever they are, that, while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, should the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency, their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous imperial army."³

In May and June, 1910, a visit of Sir John French to Canada did not a little in the direction of improving the Canadian military system. He found that the volunteer system had not had a fair trial. No doubt the continuous demand for labour and the movement from place to place of so large a proportion of the population made its working very difficult. Sir J. French considered that a first line of defence, consisting of 100,000, would be adequate. He noted a deficiency in Field Artillery, and advised that the troops should be organized in divisions, with a proper proportion of units. A conspicuous drawback to efficiency was the inadequacy in number of trained staff officers. Still, the adoption of his suggestions would merely mean a development on the lines of the existing organization.⁴

Things had certainly improved since Lord Dundonald had emphatically warned the people of Canada that, though they might be indebted for the integrity of their territory and, indeed, for their national existence, to the forbearance of others, they were, as regards their preparation for and their state of readiness successfully to resist aggression, living in a fool's paradise.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier could claim in 1909 that in five or six years Canada had trebled its expenditure on the militia.⁵

¹ Cd. 4948, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³ Prime Minister's statement in House of Commons, August 26, 1909, *ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴ *Report of the Dominions Department of the C.O. for 1910-11*, Cd. 5582, 1911.

⁵ *Can. Hans.*, XC, p. 3508.

And yet, in spite of the fact that the development of branches of the imperial general staff had been steadily continued and that appointments had been made by the Government of Canada, as well as by that of the Commonwealth, of officers to serve in the Dominion section of the imperial general staff,¹ Major-General Otter, on his retirement from the post of Inspector-General of the Canadian Militia, placed on record his conviction that there was no doubt as to the many weaknesses of the system and the utter impossibility of ensuring without immediate remedy anything like a completely organized, or even tentative, scheme of protection. Perhaps the greatest handicap was the fact that neither the public nor the members of the force itself took the Militia seriously. Otherwise the provision of money by the former for the necessary arms, equipment and buildings would be easily obtained, and concurrently the want of discipline and qualifications of the latter would immediately be made good.² Sir Ian Hamilton, who inspected the Canadian Militia in 1913, reported a serious shortage in the number of officers and men trained compared with the number required. The training of the infantry in country districts was insufficient. Still, the material was excellent, and efficiency might be obtained by extending the period of training to sixteen days. He laid stress on the importance of an increase in the training staff and on the necessity of decentralization.³

Although in the Great War Canada proved her equality with any other portion of the Empire in all that relates to strength in war, there can be no question that in the times of peace the Commonwealth of Australia was in advance of her. Nor is the reason hard to find out. In the background of many a Canadian's thought there was the confidence, to which expression was actually given by the Minister of Defence in 1906, that Canada was safe from foreign aggression, owing to the bulwark of the Monroe Doctrine : ⁴ whereas Australia fully recognized that it was a white oasis in a coloured desert, and that the recognition of this fact entailed responsibilities. At the 1907 Conference Mr. Deakin reported that the cadet movement was working very successfully. It was hoped to have some 30,000 under training in the next year.

¹ *Report of the Dominions Department of the C.O. for 1911-12*, Cd. 6091, p. 17.

² *Ibid.* for 1913-14, p. 11.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Can. Hans.*, LXXIV, 1906, p. 74.

The passing through of some 16,000 cadets every year would have a great effect on the future military efficiency of the population. Rifle shooting was a national pastime, and there was some kind of drill in every school.

All this, however, was not enough for the Australian temper, and in 1909 a system of universal training was made compulsory. The Act was passed during the Deakin ministry, but it shows the distance travelled from British modes of thought when we find that this sweeping change was welcomed and improved, following the advice of Lord Kitchener,¹ by a Labour Government. A few timid souls believed that the intention of the law was to arm the masses against the propertied classes; but such thoughts were assuredly not in the minds of Mr. Fisher and Mr. Hughes. Lord Kitchener had visited Australia in 1909 and had recommended that the forces under the new system should be organized on a territorial basis. He suggested 214 areas, to be again distributed amongst 21 groups, each group constituting the territory from which a mixed brigade would be drawn. There was the same deficiency as in Canada in respect of a trained staff, and he proposed the establishment of a Staff Corps, consisting of 350 officers. In 1913 Major-General Kirkpatrick reported a steady and satisfactory progress in Australian military training.²

New Zealand was at least as determined and enthusiastic in matters of defence as was Australia, and the Governor's speech of 27 July, 1911, announced that, under the new system of universal training, youths between the age of 14 and 21 had been registered, and were being medically examined for service in the Senior Cadets and Territorial forces of the dominion. The results of this registration had been satisfactory, and the spirit in which this call on the patriotism and sense of the people had been met was highly commendable.³

Before the establishment of the union there were difficulties in the way of a common system of defence for South Africa. At the Conference of 1907, Dr. Smartt, speaking for Cape Colony, was in favour of the different colonies disbanding their permanent forces, and re-enrolling them on the understanding that they would be under obligations not only to serve anywhere in South Africa, but, in an emergency and with the consent of the Governments concerned, anywhere the Empire might require.⁴ Mr.

¹ Cd. 5582.

² Cd. 7507.

³ *N.Z. Hans.*, CLIV, p. 3.

⁴ Cd. 3523, p. 112.

Moor, speaking for the little colony of Natal, was able to claim that his colony stood in the vanguard with regard to defence. It possessed a compulsory system as regarded its militia, and also a very capable cadet system in connexion with the public schools.¹

It was unfortunate that the one experienced soldier amongst the representatives, General Botha, found himself obliged to confess that the Transvaal was without any means of defence of its own, and would be in a hazardous position were the British troops to be removed. He had discussed the matter with Dr. Jameson and Mr. Moor, and his idea was that, if a general federation of South Africa was as yet unattainable, they should, at any rate, attempt to federate on the question of defence. If they succeeded in doing this it would be a very effective way of aiding the Empire.²

No country was less likely than was South Africa to be remiss in attending to matters of defence; and, when once the Union was in being, the South African Defence Bill of 1911 recognized the liability of every citizen to assist in the defence of the country. South Africa, in taking up the position of a self-governing Dominion, was ready and willing to assume full responsibility for her own defence, a responsibility which had hitherto, to a large extent, been shared by the imperial Government. The Union was prepared to insure itself against the danger of war by setting up a proper and efficient organization for defence. At the same time, to train the whole population would create a greater force than was reasonably required, would impose too heavy a financial burden, and would probably not lead to efficiency. A discretion was therefore left to the Government in the decision of the number to be called up.³

General Smuts, on 26 March, 1912, could proudly claim that "South Africa was doing a great deal for its own defence and was going to do a great deal more in the immediate future. It was coming to the assistance of the British taxpayer in a most effective fashion." Money spent in the development of South Africa might be of more real help and value to the British Navy and Empire than the same money, or more, sent out as a contribution. He was opposed to sending a formal notification to Great Britain that the time had come when British troops might be removed from South Africa. He was convinced that the British Government was anxiously awaiting the moment when their

¹ Cd. 3523, p. 113.

² *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³ Cd. 6091, 1912.

house would be in order, and it would be possible to do away with the burden of maintaining a large force in South Africa.¹

Trust begets trust; and the manner in which the British Government put implicit confidence in a Ministry, the principal members of which some ten years before had been its active enemies, is only less remarkable than the manner in which that confidence was, in overflowing measure, repaid.

Such then, roughly speaking, was the naval and military situation when the strength of its link was to be tested by the outbreak of war in 1914. "In this curious Empire of ours," Mr. Hughes had said in 1910, "comprising a congeries of separate individual nations, each pursuing its own destiny in ways that seem more and more marvellous to outsiders as time goes on, we have thought it possible—and this is one of the most amazing features of the situation—to create an Australian Navy which shall be under Commonwealth control, and yet shall be an integral part of the British Fleet in time of disturbances or when emergency shall arise";² and it is this paradoxical state of things that prevailed throughout the whole system of imperial defence. Upon the whole, we may say that the system was justified by its results.

In this state of things it is curious to find the British Admiralty after the war harking back to its old ideal of a single navy for the Empire. No doubt the strategic arguments in its favour were as strong as ever; but it should have been recognized that, if such a solution was impossible before the war, it would be a hundred-fold more impossible after it. Even a strongly imperialist Canadian Government found themselves obliged to reply: "The proposals set forth in the Admiralty Minute for a single navy at all times under a central naval authority are not considered practicable. . . . The experience gained in the war has shown that in time of war a Dominion navy . . . can operate with the highest efficiency as part of a United Empire, under one direction and command, established after the outbreak of war."

At the same time, "as naval forces come to be developed on a considerable scale, it may be necessary to consider the establishment for war purposes of some supreme naval authority upon which each of the Dominions would be adequately represented."³

¹ *Union of S.A. Debates*, 1912, pp. 1420–22.

² *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1910, pp. 6250–51.

³ Memorandum of Canadian Ministers, 15 August, 1920, *Can. Hans.*, 1920, p. 3605.

The attempt, by means of Lord Jellicoe's mission, to set up a definite system by which each portion of the Empire should contribute to its naval defence, in proportion to its wealth and population, seems to have been ill-timed. Men in the Dominions, like other simple folk, believed that the war had been waged to end war ; and, suffering under the war strain, they were startled by proposals which would add to their liabilities. It would have been better policy to wait till the question of disarmament had been dealt with. If it be said that, whatever the total sum required, the proportional contributions might still remain the same (74 per cent for Great Britain and so on for the different Dominions), the answer is that Lord Jellicoe could only be an authority on the naval aspect of the case. The proportional contribution was a matter for statesmen to decide in conference. We are all agreed that without safety throughout the Seven Seas the British Commonwealth of Nations would only exist on sufferance, but what that Commonwealth (like the rest of the world) needs most at the present moment is a breathing time, accompanied by a serious effort to recover the moral and economic ravages of the war. Australia and New Zealand, situated at the probable danger spot of the next war (*dii avertant omen*), might be ready to respond to any call made upon them ; but with the other portions of the Commonwealth the case was different ; and here, if anywhere, the old adage holds good, " the more haste the less speed."

In this spirit the Prime Ministers at the imperial meeting of 1921 resolved : " That while recognizing the necessity of co-operation among the various portions of the Empire to provide such naval defence as may prove to be essential for security, and whole holding that equality with the naval strength of any other Power is a minimum standard for that purpose, this Conference is of opinion that the method and expense of such co-operation are matters for the final determination of the several Parliaments concerned ; and that any recommendations thereon should be deferred until after the coming Conference on disarmament."

[NOTE.—On the subject of this chapter see *The Empire at War*, Vol. I, by Sir Charles Lucas, chapters x and xi.]

CHAPTER VI

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN AS IT AFFECTED THE DOMINIONS BETWEEN 1900 AND 1914

The great secret of negotiation is to bring out prominently the common advantage to both parties of any proposal.

DE CALLIÈRES

DURING the growing time of the Dominions it was inevitable that the management of the foreign policy of the Empire should remain in the hands of Great Britain, which stood in the position of trustee and guardian of the dependent communities. But, just as in the case of a minor who is approaching full age, a wise trustee will take opportunities to explain to him clearly his financial position, so British statesmen would have shown greater wisdom had they more fully taken Dominion Ministers into their confidence with regard to imperial obligations. In reading the history it comes home to one that what was at fault was not so much the substance of the policy as the manner in which it was carried out. Assuredly the two definite agreements made at the beginning of the twentieth century were as much to the interests of the Dominions as they were to those of Great Britain. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 did not indeed on the surface directly concern them; but, in fact, that alliance has enabled a white Australia to be maintained and developed without menace from the one great Pacific Power that might have seriously challenged it. The best evidence of the wisdom of the alliance from the Dominion standpoint is to be found in the manner in which its renewal was supported by Australasian Prime Ministers at the meeting of 1921. That Canada where the shoe did not so directly pinch took a different line does not affect the argument.

Again, whilst Newfoundland was the only self-governing colony that directly benefited by the Anglo-French agreement of 1904,

the whole Empire indirectly profited by the cessation on the part of France of that policy of pin-pricks which Bismarck had so ingeniously encouraged. It is true that the agreement did not solve the difficulty with regard to the New Hebrides, and that the solution, afterwards arrived at, behind the backs of Australasian statesmen, did not meet with their approval. But troublesome as the questions arising out of that settlement may sometimes seem, they are as nothing compared with what they would have been, had Great Britain in these seas been confronted with an aggressive and hostile France.

At the Conference of 1907 Mr. Deakin gave eloquent expression to the dissatisfaction felt in Australia with the British treatment of this question. It is unnecessary to agree with everything said by him in order to recognize the strength of his grievance. It seems undoubtedly true that the action of the Commonwealth Government in enforcing a high tariff against the white settlers, in regard to bananas and maize, contributed greatly to the decrease in the proportionate numbers of the British population in the New Hebrides between 1898 and 1905;¹ the French settlers being helped by drawbacks and subsidies, and having an assured market for their produce in New Caledonia.

In accordance with their general policy the Australian Government had for some years clamoured for the annexation by Great Britain of the New Hebrides; but the British Government was not prepared to adopt this course. As early as 1903 the Commonwealth had informed the Colonial Office that if annexation were out of the question, the establishment of a joint Protectorate would be the least objectionable alternative. "A permanent joint Protectorate, representative of both countries, founded upon conditions giving security for investment and settlement, preventing any preference being given to settlers of a particular nationality, and establishing a government capable of protecting the natives, securing religious liberty and fostering civilization in the group, would certainly be preferable to the

¹ *Report on the Trade of the New Hebrides*, by Capt. E. Rason, R.N., Cd. 2714, 1905, pp. 5 and 8-9, and *Correspondence relating to the Convention with France, dated October 20, 1906, respecting the New Hebrides*, Cd. 3288, 1907, Appendix p. 78. At a later date, however, the Commonwealth refunded half the duties on maize and granted a bonus of £4 per ton on coffee imported into Australia (*Report by Interstate Commission of Australia on British and Australian Trade in the South Pacific*, 1918, p. 104).

state of things that now obtains. The harbours of the group, while open to commerce, would not, in that event, become the bases of hostile action in the Pacific." ¹

The question of establishing a Lands Claim tribunal in the islands gave occasion for the discussion of the difficulties which had arisen, owing to the absence of jurisdiction over the natives. The way was thus opened for the institution of a joint Anglo-French Protectorate. The proposal was reasonable enough; but it seems strange that, while France was represented by men well versed in the subject, no attempt was made by the British Government to make use of the special knowledge possessed by Australian and New Zealand public men. The convention was, therefore, altogether settled in London; and although the Commonwealth Government was informed that no final decision would be taken before considering their views with regard to it, they were also informed that it must be confirmed or rejected practically as it stood. ²

The Commonwealth ministers had first learned from the newspapers that a draft convention was being drawn up. "The Conference lasted for almost a month; yet, during the whole of that time, not only no information was furnished as to the lines on which it was proceeding, but there was then no official intimation to this Government that it was being held, and after its rising some six days elapsed before the first official telegram was received dealing with the matter." ³ With regard to the actual proposals, Mr. Deakin stoutly denied that Australian public opinion or the Government had ever expressed the desire that, in case of a joint control, such control should be as limited as possible. On the contrary, what had been desired was permanency and uniformity, not tentative measures and divided control. What should have been aimed at was the establishment of uniform conditions, so as to secure perfect equality of treatment of all persons, whether French or English. ⁴ But a system of separate tribunals, administering different laws, would not tend in this direction.

In this state of things it is not difficult to imagine the treatment accorded to the convention and the home Government by Mr. Deakin at the Conference of 1907. Mr. Deakin, in spite of his amiable qualities, was not averse to wielding the rod; and

¹ Cd. 3288, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 10 and 14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

among the strong points of Lord Elgin were not the gifts of a ready speaker. Doubtless the incident was of use in serving to remind the Olympians of Downing Street that in dealing with Foreign Powers there were other interests to consider besides the European interests of Great Britain. Nevertheless the subsequent delay in appointing the British representative in the New Hebrides showed that the lesson had not been altogether taken to heart ; ¹ and rumours without foundation were subsequently heard that the British Government intended to hand the islands over to the French. ²

Although circumstances with regard to the settlement of the Alaska boundary question led to some dissatisfaction in Canada, ³ it cannot with fairness be maintained that during these years Great Britain entered into negotiations regardless of Canadian interests. When in 1898 a joint commission had been set on foot for the decision of questions still outstanding between Great Britain and the United States, out of the six British representatives appointed, only one, Lord Herschell, represented Great Britain. That this commission came to nothing was in no way the fault of British statesmen. The abandonment of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (which secured to Great Britain joint control over the proposed Nicaraguan Canal) in 1901, ought, according to some Canadian critics, to have been accompanied by some *quid pro quo* respecting the Alaska boundary question ; but sober-minded Canadians would be the last to deny the all-importance of the most friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States on American soil.

The trouble over the fisheries question between Newfoundland and the United States has been dealt with elsewhere ; ⁴ but the arbitration convention, by which it was ended, settled once and for all in a manner most satisfactory to British America a difficult question ; and, though the prohibition under the agreement of 1911 of seal fishing for a period of fifteen years involved the temporary extinction of an important industry, belonging to British Columbia, the necessity for such prohibition, which applied to Japan and Russia as well as to the British possessions and the United States, was generally recognized.

¹ *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1908, p. 10700. See also *Ibid.*, 1910, pp. 1269-70, and *Ibid.*, 1912, p. 385.

² *Ibid.* 1913, pp., 3468-73.

³ See pp. 25-27.

⁴ See pp. 14, 15.

The legacy from the past sometimes caused friction in Canada, where British and American interests were in question ; but, with the determination prevailing in the United States not to enter into entangling relations with European Powers, there could have been no simple solution of those difficulties.

Apart, however, from Japan, France and the United States there was another Power, British relations with which reacted strongly upon Dominion interests. And it was here that the absence of frankness on the part of British statesmen caused no little mischief. In any case, where the critic occupies a wholly irresponsible position, criticism is bound to be exaggerated and shrill ; and we may dismiss as unreasonable the Australian contention that the Pacific Ocean was foredoomed to be a British preserve which the stupidity and carelessness of British statesmanship neglected to occupy. Nevertheless, a New Zealand writer of singular moderation and good judgement, Mr. G. H. Scholefield, has, it seems, conclusively made good the point that there was lamentable procrastination and secrecy in putting forward to Australian Ministers the facts with regard to the German occupation of North New Guinea.¹ The story does not concern us here ; but it serves to justify the bitterness created in New Zealand by the next move in German expansion in the Pacific. It must be admitted that Germany had had, for many years, trading interests in Samoa greater than those of any other European Power ; and that the action of New Zealand in proposing annexation gave Germany some excuse for her high-handed action in 1885. In any case the tripartite government of Germany, the United States and Great Britain proved a lamentable failure ; and Lord Salisbury was probably wise when, in 1899, in return for concessions in Africa and for Tonga and the Solomon Islands he agreed to renounce British rights in the group to Germany and the United States.² What seems inexcusable was that the negotiations were carried on without the knowledge of New Zealand ; the Samoans being of the same race as the Maoris who formed so interesting and valuable a section of the New Zealand population. Imperial patriotism was at fever heat during the South African war ; but even in these circumstances Mr. Seddon declared that the colonies of Australia felt keenly the placing in the Pacific—the central

¹ *The Pacific, its Past and Future*, 1919, pp. 126–143.

² Cd. 7, 1899.

group of the Pacific—fortified positions of Foreign Powers that might in the future be used as bases of attack on them and their commerce.

The surrender of Samoa, Mr. Seddon affirmed, had disheartened the natives in the islands, disappointed the people of Australasia, and lowered the prestige of Great Britain in this part of the globe.¹

The speedy occupation of German Samoa by New Zealand troops at the beginning of the Great War was a just compensation for past disappointments.

Germany had for some years recognized the natural riches of the Pacific islands and had determined to get a fair—perhaps unfair—share of their trade ; occupying with this object certain points of vantage. But it does not seem probable that she ever contemplated military or naval measures in these distant seas. She may have thought that, in time, she would obtain the reversion of the Dutch islands ; but it is almost incredible that she should have desired them as the starting point for hostile proceedings against Australia. German statesmen had enough trouble with their own social democrats at home, without hankering after the conquest of an aggressive and independent democracy, which would either have to be held down by force, or else would afford an object lesson that the people of Germany would inevitably lay to heart. That peaceful penetration, by means of subsidies to shipping companies and other insidious methods of securing a trade monopoly, was actively carried on, is notorious. While the Germans regarded Samoa as their “show” colony, they never seem to have considered very seriously the education or development of the natives. The bulk of the trade of Samoa was in the hands of a single dominant company (the Deutsche Handels und Plantagen Gesellschaft [the D.H.P.G.], and so all-important was considered the development of German enterprise that German Governors admitted openly that their representations to the home Government carried little weight compared with those of the chief agent of this company through its head office in Hamburg.² The German authorities were no doubt less scrupulous than are at the present time the English in jealously safeguarding the

¹ Scholefield, *op. cit.*, pp. 177–8.

² *Report on the Trade of West Samoa*, by R. W. Dalton, Cmd. 200, 1918, p. 19.

native rights in their lands ; and the introduction of indentured labour from outside was a matter of course where the native temper was expressed by the saying : " To-morrow is also a day." German organization and discipline spelt misery to careless and easy-going people. But, granted all this, it by no means follows that Germany had other ends in view than those which were written large in her every proceeding. Indeed, the absence of serious resistance, when the German islands were attacked, serves to prove that, in this quarter of the world at least, the mailed fist was not behind the velvet glove.

Very different is the situation presented when we turn to another part of the world and deal with German expansion in Central Africa.

And here it cannot be said that the German attitude was one of just resentment of unfair treatment. Great Britain was naturally not prepared to strip herself of portions of her own imperial wardrobe, in favour of the *débutante* in the world court, or to allow encroachments upon her friends ; but, short of this, she was ready to assist Germany's efforts. From 1884, when Germany first entered upon the scene as a Colonial Power, British statesmen, after a momentary hesitation, had sought to facilitate her work ; and Lord Salisbury, herein, had followed the lead of his Liberal predecessors. That Great Britain did not seek to establish monopolies in her own favour, because of the possession of certain staple raw products, was strikingly shown by the arguments used during the war by German writers to prove the need of an expansion of German Africa. " Our system of protection," wrote Emil Zimmerman, " was only possible because the Anglo-Saxons put at our disposal their piles of cheap production across the sea.

" But they did more. They gave admission to our merchants, trade-agents, commercial establishments everywhere in their broad domains, and looked kindly at them, as long as they were modest, and thereby they assisted materially to open markets for our industrial products. . . . Our rise depended essentially on the English policy of the open door. We were sojourners in England's house, paying guests of the Anglo-Saxons. The secret of our success, apart from our organization and the training of our working-classes, lies in the fact that England and the countries which are the great producers of raw materials granted us an open door, allowed us to draw on their vast reservoirs of

raw materials.”¹ “Now England,” the writer assumes, “will not let us draw on her stores again.” According to him, the meaning of the War was that England meant to get rid of Germany because she had become great and a troublesome intruder. But, according to his own showing, there would have been a much simpler and less dangerous way of going to work than was afforded by attacking Germany where she was most strong.

We know from the best authority that Germany, while still at peace, had formed the purpose of creating a great German middle Africa. Dr. Solf, when Colonial Secretary, affirmed in 1917 that :

“In the time before the war, clearly recognizing the importance of *continuous colonial territories* for the safety of the German nation, we had made far-reaching preparations, in order that by peaceful understanding and agreement we might shape our colonial possessions in a way corresponding to the most urgent colonial necessities ; . . . For a long time it has been an open secret, even in England, that even before the war we had plans for *making a united whole* of our African possessions by means of peaceful arrangements.”²

What, then, were these “peaceful arrangements” by which Germany hoped to make good her place in the African sun? They were the strong arm of an aggressive diplomacy and the more insidious method of economic penetration.

When in 1911, owing to action of Great Britain and of Italy, she found herself thwarted in her policy regarding France and Morocco, Germany secured from France compensation in the shape of a block of land which, if it did not break, at least threatened, the backbone of French Equatorial Africa.³ The negotiator of the treaty, Kiderlen-Waechter, according to Emil Zimmerman “had the wisdom to recognize the necessity for German colonial interests to push the frontier of the Kamerun as far as the great river of Central Africa. German African policy thus found itself in the presence of a great objective that could be attained, if the Colonial Office showed energy and the Treasury forethought.”⁴

¹ *The German Empire of Central Africa*, English translation with an Introduction by Edwyn Bevan, p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, Introduction, pp. li.-ii.

³ Treaty of 4 November, 1911, *State Papers*, CIV, 657.

⁴ Quoted in *La Provocation Allemande aux Colonies*, par Pierre-Alype, p. 86, 2nd ed., 1916.

The Germans, indeed, sought to go further and to transfer to themselves the right of pre-emption over the Belgian Congo, possessed by France. But in this they were not successful, though they succeeded in securing that any change in the territorial status brought about by the action of either of the contracting parties would come within the net of the Berlin Act; so that the Congo, in the event of its ceasing to be a Belgian possession, would become a matter of international concern.¹

But German diplomacy had other game to hunt beside the weakening of the French Congo, and the reversion of the Belgian Congo. A more likely quarry seemed to be Portuguese Africa. Unhappily it must be admitted that the selfish and stationary methods of the Portuguese, in their colonial administration, left much room for criticisms; and Protection was never less justified by its fruits than in these dark places. In July, 1875, Portugal had undertaken not to cede or to sell to any third Power the territory on the south-east of Africa allotted to her as the result of arbitration, without first giving Great Britain the opportunity to acquire such territory; and in 1891, this undertaking had been extended to the whole of the Portuguese possessions south of the Zambesi. A secret treaty was made by Germany with Great Britain in 1898, by which an arrangement was arrived at for the division of the Portuguese colonies between the two Powers, in the event of Portugal being in favour of their alienation. According to Prince von Bülow, this agreement held forth the promise of abundant fruits, if the Germans would wait patiently for the moment of its realization, which must come sooner or later.² The brutal comments of German newspapers, which spoke of dividing the estate during the lifetime of the patient, caused much perturbation in Portugal, and gave rise to official contradictions, which however, by no means denied the truth of the agreement, as a merely hypothetical arrangement between Great Britain and Germany.

But, though this agreement may have been not directed against Portugal, it undoubtedly served to whet German appetites. Frequent articles in the press and the establishment of a League in South-West Africa, the aim of which was the

¹ *The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act*, by A. B. Keith, 1919, pp. 166-7

² *Imperial Germany*, English translation, 1916, p. 96.

annexation of Angola, kept alive the fears of Portugal. A categorical denial of any plan for the partition of the Portuguese colonies was accordingly issued by the Portuguese Government with the assent of that of Germany.

In this state of things negotiations were entered upon between Great Britain and Germany, with a view to making more definite the agreement of 1898.

According to Lord Haldane, Great Britain "offered to help her (Germany) towards the attainment of 'a place in the sun.'" The negotiations which took place in London after his return from Berlin in 1913, were evidence of the sincerity of the British Government. These negotiations culminated in an agreement upon the terms of a detailed treaty under which numerous territorial questions were settled to the satisfaction of both Powers. No wrong was intended to other Powers; in proof of which Lord Haldane could call in aid the request of Sir Edward Grey that the draft treaty should forthwith be published, after its signing. "All we did . . . was to propose exchanges with Germany of territory that was ours for territory that was hers; to undertake not to compete for the purchase of certain other territory that might come into the market, in consideration of a corresponding undertaking on her part, and to agree about zones within which each nation should distribute its financial energies and give financial assistance to undertakings" ¹ . . . No doubt the securing of a route for the Cape to Cairo Railway from the north of Lake Tanganyika to Lake Albert Edward would have been a substantial *quid pro quo*. Still it was a dangerous game to play, and it is noticeable that no one from the Union of South Africa or Rhodesia seems to have been consulted on the matter.

A more explicit account of these negotiations had been given by Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador: "The object of negotiations," he wrote, "between us and England which had commenced before my arrival, was to amend and improve our agreement of 1898, as it had proved unsatisfactory on several points as regards geographical delimitation. Thanks to the accommodating attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in making the new agreement fully accord with our wishes and interests. The whole of Angola, up to the 20th degree of latitude, was assigned to us, so that we stretched up to

¹ *Before the War*, 1920, p. 145.

the Congo State from the South ; we also acquired the valuable islands of San Thomé and Principe, which are north of the equator and therefore really in the French sphere of influence, a fact which caused my French colleague to enter strong but unavailing protests.

"Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique ; the Licango forming the boundary.

"The British Government showed the greatest consideration for our interests and wishes. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate his good will towards us, but he also wished to assist our colonial development as a whole, as England wished to divert the German development from the North Sea and Western Europe to the ocean and to Africa. 'We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development,' a member of the Cabinet said to me." ¹ Excellent as were the motives of Sir E. Grey, it is manifest with what edged tools he was playing. The very language of a trained diplomatist like Lichnowsky shows the difficulty of distinguishing between economic and political considerations. In this connexion note his further words : "With regard also to the practical realization of its real though unexpressed intention—the later actual partition of the Portuguese colonies—the treaty in its new form showed marked improvements and advantages as compared with the old one. Cases had been specified which empowered us to take steps to guard our interests in the districts assigned to us. These were drafted in such wide terms that it was really left to us to decide when 'vital' interests arose, so that, with Portugal entirely dependent on England, it was only necessary to cultivate further good relations with England in order to carry out our joint intentions at a later date with English assent." ²

Prince Lichnowsky further made the amazing statement that "the British Government originally intended to include the Congo State in the Agreement, which would have given us the right of pre-emption and enabled us to penetrate it economically. We refused this offer, alleging consideration for Belgian susceptibilities." ³ It is incredible that Sir E. Grey should have thus, behind their backs, been willing to

¹ *My Mission to London*, 1912-4, by Prince Lichnowsky, English translation, 1918, pp. 14-6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*

sacrifice Belgian and French interests. Probably Dr. Keith is right when he suggests that "the Prince has confused the willingness of the United Kingdom to see German enterprise establish itself in the Congo—where, in point of fact, it made, in 1911-13, a desperate, and not at all unsuccessful, effort to oust British trade—with its readiness to abjure for its subjects in the areas of influence marked out for Germany any commercial enterprise, such as railway concessions, etc." ¹

Whatever its details, the treaty was definitely settled, and it was only the folly or jealousy of the German Foreign Office, in refusing Sir E. Grey's condition that it should forthwith be published, that prevented its coming into force. (Sir E. Grey was no believer in secret diplomacy when it could be avoided and wished to play the international game with the treaty, along with the secret treaty of 1898, and the treaty with Portugal of 1899, upon the table.)

With regard to the whole transaction certain reflections at once occur to the mind. We all applauded when the Prince of Wales in his visit to the West Indies declared that British subjects were not for sale; but was any method contemplated of consulting the natives in this proposed deal?

Again, was any attempt made to bring to the knowledge of the South African Union Government or of the directors of the British South Africa Company what was being done? But if not—and this is where the subject more directly concerns us—the British Government was acting in violation of the pledges given at the Imperial Conference of 1911.

It is easy to be wise after the event, and we do not know how far the advantages, claimed for a huge German Africa during the War, were contemplated in the years of peace. According to these, a great German middle Africa, stretching from ocean to ocean, was necessary not merely to supply German manufacturers with the raw products required for their working; but because the possession of the sea-coasts would furnish naval bases, able to cut in two the British road to the East, in the event of war; and because there might be formed, from the population of the interior, a large native army, able to hold in check Germany's neighbours, should the occasion arise.² The effective use made of the Askaris in East Africa

¹ *Op. cit.*, Note at p. 168.

² E. Zimmerman, *op. cit.* Various authorities quoted in Introduction.

shows what might have been the result, had the system been worked upon a wider stage.

But though Germany might have behind the weapon of force, should the necessity arise, her main instrument in this quarter, as elsewhere, was peaceful economic penetration. And here it would seem that she deserved her successes.

A brilliant French writer, M. Pierre-Alype, has devoted a suggestive chapter to what he calls "La politique des chemins de fer."¹ He shows how when Germany undertook the building of a railway that should connect the Indian and Atlantic oceans, she laid the foundations of a work that would lead her by a direct road to political expansion. Starting from an inferior position in 1908, by 1914 Germany possessed no less than two-thirds of the railways serving Central Africa. The building of a line of railway from Dar-es-Salaam on the Indian Ocean to Lake Tanganyika was accomplished early in 1914. In order to avoid the competition of the line running inland from Benguela, on the Atlantic coast, German financiers furnished the funds for its extension with a view to commanding its policy.

Mr. R. Williams has thrown abundant light on this matter. In 1917 he explained to the Royal Colonial Institute how the Tanganyika company, of which he was the guiding hand, had received the monopoly of prospecting rights for minerals over an area of sixty thousand square miles in the Katanga district of the Congo Free State, adjoining Northern Rhodesia, and how their enterprise had been rewarded by the discovery of a great copper belt extending for some two hundred and fifty miles.

In order to develop this area a railway was essential, and the shortest route to the sea was along the same great divide between the Congo and Zambesi rivers as that on which the minerals had been discovered. It led from Katanga in a straight line due west to the old Portuguese town of Benguela. This route, with Lobito Bay as its terminus, would shorten the journey to England by some three thousand miles. The wresting of this proposed railway from British hands was one of the main objects of Prince Lichnowsky's diplomacy; and, without waiting for the signing of the treaty, Germany at once endeavoured to obtain the whole control of the Benguela Railway.²

British complacency with German demands was assuredly not

¹ *La Provocation Allemande aux Colonies*, 2ième éd., 1916, pp. 88-103.

² *United Empire*, new series, vol. LIII, pp. 446-457.

due to any necessity to requite past favours. On the contrary, the attitude of Germany to British demands had been consistently hostile. When in 1894 an agreement had been entered into between Great Britain and the Congo Free State, under which, in the interests of the Cape to Cairo railway, the former secured an indefinite lease of a strip of territory 25 kilometres in breadth, extending from Lake Tanganyika to Lake Albert Edward, and, for the most part, running close to the German frontier, Germany protested on the ground that, inasmuch as an indefinite lease was the same as a cession, her political position would be thereby weakened, and her direct trade communication with the Congo State interrupted. The objection appears to have been groundless, so far as international law was concerned,¹ but it prevailed because neither Belgium nor Great Britain were, at the time, willing to offend Germany. The contrast is striking between the jealousy shown by Germany towards the Cape to Cairo undertaking and the friendliness shown by British statesmen to the preliminary work of the Germans in the spanning of the East and the West by a transcontinental railway.

If we consider the matter carefully, it seems pretty clear, to put it brutally, that British Ministers, to secure the peace of the world, were willing to submit to some sort of blackmail, and, considering all that has happened since, he would be a bold man who should condemn them. Fortunately, however, for the interests of the British Commonwealth in South Africa, the short-sighted arrogance of the German governing authorities decided that blackmailing should be attempted in another direction ; so as to separate completely Great Britain and France. But, when once honour was concerned, there was no fear of British flinching ; and, attacked from this quarter, Sir E. Grey could be trusted to stand firm as a rock.

But all this by no means alters the fact that decisions of great import to the future of South Africa seem to have been taken without communication with or reports sent to the portions of the Commonwealth closely concerned.

The discussion of the Declaration of London, at the Imperial Conference of 1911, had opened out the wider question of the decision of important international subjects by the British Government behind the backs of the Dominions. With the rights or wrongs of that Declaration we need not here concern ourselves ;

¹ *International Law*, by W. E. Hall, 5th ed., 1904, Note on pp. 89-90.

though it is a curious confirmation of the truth of Oxenstierna's memorable saying that, whereas within a few years the economic blockade of Germany was to be mainly enforced by the application of the doctrine of the continuous voyage, Sir E. Grey was instructed by his expert advisers to say that "the doctrine of continuous voyage would, in practice, be of very little use to us in time of war."¹ The question with which we are concerned is merely the fact that the Declaration of London had been agreed upon without previous consultation with the Dominions. "Hitherto," Mr. Fisher said, "the Dominions have not, so far as my knowledge goes, been consulted prior to negotiations being entered into by the mother country with other countries, as regards treaties or anything that led up to a treaty, or a declaration of this kind. I hold strongly the view . . . that that is a weak link in the chain of our common interests. Since we are now a family of nations, has not the time arrived for the Overseas dominions to be informed and, whenever possible, consulted, as to the best means of promoting the interests of all concerned?"²

Sir Edward Grey's defence was that the Declaration arose out of the last Hague Conference; so that the real trouble was that the Dominions had not been consulted with regard to that Conference. He agreed, and the Government agreed entirely, that the Dominions ought to be consulted; and that they ought to be consulted, before the next Hague Conference took place, about the whole programme of that next Conference; and then, of course, they would be consulted automatically, with regard to everything that arose out of it.

The resolution, as finally passed, welcomed the proposals of the Imperial Government, viz., that the Dominions should be afforded an opportunity of consultation, when framing the instructions to be given to British delegates at future meetings of the Hague Conference; and that conventions affecting the Dominions, provisionally assented to at that Conference, should be circulated among the Dominion Governments for their consideration before any convention was signed; and that a similar procedure, when time and opportunity and the subject matter permitted, should be, as far as possible, used when preparing instructions for the negotiation of other international agreements affecting the Dominions.³

We have already seen how little attention seems to have been

¹ Cd. 5745, p. 110.

² *Ibid.*, p. 98.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

paid to this resolution in the negotiations with Germany of 1912 and 1913; still it would be wrong to close this chapter with a querulous note. In spite of occasional mistakes, Great Britain had been upon the whole not an indifferent or careless trustee; and now that the Dominions will share in the management of their own foreign relations there is nothing in the past for which Great Britain need feel compunction or shame. In fact, the most serious obligations, confronting the new nations, are those they entered upon with eyes open and with deliberate choice at the Peace Conference. The responsibilities incurred are much more onerous than any to which Great Britain would have dreamed of committing its daughter States.

CHAPTER VII

PARTNERSHIP OR SEPARATION

True love in this differs from gold or clay,
That to divide is not to take away.

SHELLEY

WE have seen how the constant trend of events has been towards a more and more complete independence on the part of the great Dominions. The Dominion status, as it is evolving itself, may be described as one of absolute independence, tempered by loyalty to a common Crown and by the determination to work in co-operation with Great Britain, in the fulfilment of the imperial trust. Logically enough, it is the statesman who has most emphatically emphasized the complete internal independence of the separate Dominions who has also most eloquently set forth the importance of the Crown as a factor for ensuring the permanence of union. "You cannot make a republic in this country," General Smuts said in London, on 15 May, 1917; "you cannot make a republic of the British Commonwealth of Nations, because, if you have to elect a President not only in these islands but all over the British Empire, who will be the ruler and representative of all these peoples, you are facing an absolutely insoluble problem. Now you know the theory of our constitution is that the King is not merely your King, but he is the King of all of us. He represents every part of the whole Commonwealth of Nations. If his place is to be taken by somebody else, then that somebody will have to be elected by a process which, I think, will pass the wit of man to devise. Therefore let us be thankful for the mercies we have. We have a kingship here which is really not very different from a hereditary republic, and I am sure that more and more in the future the trend will be in that direction, and I shall not be surprised to see the time when our royal princes, instead of getting their consorts among the prince-

lings of central Europe, will go to the Dominions and the outlying portions of the Empire."¹

We may go further and admit that, if the Dominions develop, as, unless some unforeseen catastrophe happens, they must develop, and if the British Commonwealth holds together under a common crown, it may be necessary for the King to pay periodic visits to his different capitals. So far as the physical problem is concerned, it may be solved by improvements in the art of flying ; but the constitutional difficulties attendant on the same authority giving formal sanction to the decisions of separate and independent Parliaments which may possibly come in conflict, will still remain. Indeed it may safely be asserted that a recognition of the necessity of practical Dominion independence and of the maintenance of the connexion by means of the Crown requires recognition of the further fact that some more efficient means must be devised by which the Commonwealth can act as one in matters wherein division would afford the sorry spectacle of the King in different portions of his Empire giving self-contradictory decisions.

This, however, is a matter for further consideration, our present subject is the importance of the Crown as a link of union. The best commentary on this text has been the visit of the Prince of Wales to Canada and Australasia in 1919 and 1920. Special circumstances were, indeed, present to give that visit an importance more directly personal than it could otherwise have been. It is the fate of princes that of necessity they look upon the world around them through the trappings of convention and ceremony. The companions of even a Prince Hal in real life recognize certain limits within which they must play their parts. It was a strange privilege of the Prince of Wales that, after a residence at Oxford, wherein he did his level best to remove the barriers that separated him from other undergraduates, he found himself in the Great War confronted with an emergency which was no respecter of persons. Although he could not, as he would have preferred, serve the ordinary life of an officer in the trenches, still his time in France enabled him to realize, as few in his position have before realized,

¹ *Speeches*. Similarly, as long ago as 1907, Mr. Borden said : " The power, influence and prestige of the Crown as a tie between the different portions of the Empire has increased, just as the power, influence and prestige of the Privy Council of Great Britain and the Parliament of Great Britain have decreased so far as imperial relations are concerned " (*Can. Hans.*, LXXIX, p. 2901).

the *lacrymæ rerum* which give the meaning, as well as the pathos, to human experience. The human sympathy, which seems the special characteristic of the Prince of Wales, is the direct result of what he has gone through. He has thus been able to make a special appeal to those in the Dominions—and they are the bulk of the population—whose lives have been made different by the events of the war. Lastly, enjoying the gift of youth, he is a fitting messenger to nations still young. All are agreed as to the success of the tours.¹ It only remains that its lessons shall be laid to heart. How different might have been the subsequent history of Ireland had, some sixty years ago, a royal residence been set up in that country, to take the place of the unmeaning, and often mischievous, vice-regal Court, and an eager and impulsive people been given a personal link with the British Crown, instead of being merely attached by the repellent chains of an alien Parliament and Executive.

Be this as it may, hitherto in the Dominions the link with the Crown has been represented by the Governor. And here there are not wanting signs of a movement in a direction opposed to the permanence of the British connexion. Why, it is sometimes said, cannot nations like Canada and Australia choose their Governor-General from men of their own stock, or at least have them chosen from such people? "A laudable," in the words of Sir W. Laurier,² "but, to my mind, misguided expression of national pride. . . . Any change in the system would not, I am sure, be productive of good results, but perhaps would jeopardize some thing which we hold dear." A native Dominion Governor-General would almost certainly be a politician (unless indeed, under the special conditions of to-day, he was an ex-soldier); and, as a politician, would be held in some suspicion by those belonging to the opposite party. Unless the whole British system of responsible government is to be placed upon the scrap heap, it would be impossible to have an elected Governor-General; and one merely the nominee of the actual Prime Minister would lose in prestige and position. It is, of course, quite reasonable that powerful Governments should not have men foisted on them of whom they disapprove; and it is

¹ "Significant indeed, is it not," a Canadian M.P. said in 1919, "that so full a response should be given by such a democratic people to such a democratic prince, himself the product of the most democratic Empire the world has ever seen?" (*Can. Hans.*, 2nd session, 1919, p. 4.)

² *Can. Hans.*, XCVIII, p. 8738.

obviously essential that names should be submitted privately ; so that objection may be taken without the creation of a public scandal. Again, the Governor-General might well be appointed by the British Prime Minister without the intervention of the Colonial Office ; or the recommendation to the Crown might be made by the Dominion Government, as proposed by General Smuts. But, on the simple question whether or not the Governor-General should be a native of the Dominion, in this its growing time has it nothing to gain from the presence in its midst of men of culture and of vision whose aim it is to understand the new conditions in which they find themselves ? ¹ Take, as an example of an ideal Governor-General, the late Lord Grey. Sir Wilfrid bore witness that from the moment he landed in Canada it was a matter of history that he gave his whole heart, his whole soul and his whole life to Canada ; and that Canada became the all-absorbing object of his thoughts.²

A Canadian lady beautifully wrote : " When Lord Grey came to Canada, we were on a great wave of financial prosperity with its attendant evils of rapidly acquired fortunes, unaccompanied by any educated sense of responsibility. . . . His Governor-Generalship was a most happy combination of the office and the man. . . . One might as well have tried by a wave of the hand to shut out the breeze of Heaven from blowing over our prairie provinces, as tried to curb Lord Grey's eager spirit from breathing his ideals into the Canadian people. Every speech he made, whether before important bodies of men, to university students or to gatherings of children in convent or school houses, pointed in the same way to the imperial cause that lay at their door, waiting for their help, to bring it nearer its goal."³

If the British and Dominion peoples are to hold together, what better emissary for that purpose can be imagined than a tactful and genial representative of the Crown, deeply conscious of his mission ? The holder of the office may sometimes chafe at the

¹ From this point of view the difficulty would by no means be met by the suggestion of an able writer in *The Round Table* (No. 43, p. 553), that, if the Dominions desire to have the appointment of their own Governors-General in their own hands, it might be possible to separate the formal and social functions of that office from the quasi ambassadorial functions, and to appoint a British official for the latter, holding an analogous position to that of the Dominion representatives in London.

² *Can. Hans.*, XCVIII, p. 8738.

³ Quoted in *Albert, 4th Earl Grey*, by H. Begbie, 1917, pp. 124-25.

platitudes to the utterance of which his position confines him ;¹ but the wing of inspiration may lift the apparent platitude to a higher air ; and the Governor-General can play a most important part in the management of foreign relations. The part played by Lord Grey in improving relations between Great Britain and the United States is a matter of common knowledge.

With regard to the Duke of Connaught, Sir W. Laurier testified to his "devotion to duty, his high sense of honour, his simple affable manner, and his simple democratic ways."²

Occasionally, as is inevitable, some utterance of a Governor-General has given offence to certain sections of the population. Thus Mr. Bourassa accused Lord Minto of being the representative of Mr. Chamberlain rather than of the eminent sovereign who had earned the love of all his subjects.³ But the general opinion would seem to be reflected by a Canadian newspaper, when it said : "It is to be presumed that a British statesman of sufficient standing to qualify him for the Governorship of the first Colony of the Empire would have a mind of his own with regard to public questions ; and we would far rather that he should speak his mind than he should waste our time and his own by telling us how exceedingly green our grass is and how much better we are than other people he has ever had the good fortune to meet."⁴

The British Governor-General must still under changed conditions steer carefully, like Lord Elgin in the fifties of the nineteenth century, between the Scylla of too much interference and the Charybdis of being a mere *roi fainéant* ; but what is certain is that the middle course can be, and generally is, attained.

It is to be hoped that the selection of Lord Byng of Vimy as Governor-General of Canada, in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Canadian people, may, for the time, give a quietus to the claim that Canada should choose her own Governor.

We in England know more about the work of Governors-General of Canada ; but in Australia the results have been, for the most part, equally satisfactory. Especially is the case of Lord Northcote worthy of mention. Succeeding Lord Tennyson, whose

¹ Statement of Lord Grey : "For nearly five years I have, quite conscious of my constitutional limitations, walked on the tight rope of platitudinous generalities." Castell Hopkins, *op. cit.*, 1909, p. 67.

² *Can. Hans.*, 1917, p. 17.

³ Castell Hopkins, *op. cit.*, 1903, p. 249.

⁴ *Montreal Star*, 2 May, 1905.

tenure was very short owing to ill-health, he had, in the words of Mr. Deakin, "a most varied experience in our earlier politics, facing them in turbulent times which must have elicited the spark of partisanship if any existed in the holder of his high office. Yet at his departure every party in the Commonwealth united in bearing the same testimony, that they had been unable to discover in him, on any occasion, an indication of his personal leanings in Australian public affairs."¹

In South Africa the fact that the Governor-General combines the duties of High Commissioner makes it the more necessary from the standpoint of native interest that he should be directly appointed by the Crown, and, of a certainty, removed from South African prejudices.

Moreover, apart from the good accruing to the Dominions by the continuance of the present system, there is the advantage for Great Britain from the fact of the presence here of public men of standing and repute who have had first-hand knowledge of Dominion conditions, and can intuitively apprehend the angle from which the Dominion mind will approach some imperial question.

But, if we may, most of us, agree that it would be a bad day for the imperial connexion were the Governors-General of the great Dominions to cease to come out from the Mother Country, it by no means follows that the same rule holds good with regard to the Governors of the six Australian States. The continuance of the present system was based, not on the needs of the British Empire, but on the particular character of the Australian federation. It is part and parcel of the same modes of thought that claim that the States should have direct access to the British Government, and be represented at imperial conferences. No doubt the British Governors are often very able men, with special gifts which are of great use to the people committed to their charge. At the same time they inevitably occupy an anomalous position, and one of no little difficulty, especially where, as in the case of the Governor of the State of Victoria, the Governor-General and the State Governor are side by side in the same city. Their conduct has sometimes given rise to friction. Thus when experts like Sir G. Clarke (Lord Sydenham) and Admiral Bedford gave their opinion on questions of defence they were accused of interfering in matters of local politics. The chief trouble

¹ *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1911, p. 959.

has been over the subject of dissolving Parliament.¹ But there seems little reason why the constitutional practice in Great Britain should not now be generally adopted. A harmless remark at a public dinner in Adelaide by the Governor, Admiral Bosanquet, was rudely resented by the Labour State Prime Minister, as an expression of opinion regarding the transport workers' strike in 1910. From time to time there has been made the demand from one or two of the States that the selection of their Governors should be vested in their own hands; all that need be said from the imperial point of view is that, if such a change were made, it would not of necessity involve any danger to the British connexion, any more than the appointment by the Canadian Governor-General in Council of the Provincial Lieut.-Governors was open to objection from the imperial standpoint.

Another possible bond of union has in its results proved very disappointing. In the discussion over the Commonwealth Bill in London great stress was laid by Mr. Chamberlain on the importance of the Privy Council as an indispensable link in the chain of the imperial connexion; but Australian statesmen, even those most zealous for the imperial idea, failed to see eye to eye with him on this point. Their view, as later expressed by Mr. Deakin at the Conference of 1907, was that what in the shape of a Court of Appeal was good enough for the people of Great Britain was quite good enough for the Colonies, and what was not good enough for the people of Great Britain was not good enough for Colonial litigants.² The objection, then, was not so much to a Court of Appeal, that was almost exclusively British in its composition, though this motive operated, as to a Court which seemed to put the Colonial litigant in a position of inferiority to that of the British. Mr. Chamberlain, at the time of the introduction of the Commonwealth Bill, had strongly supported the principle of a single imperial Court of Appeal and there was a general consensus of opinion in the debate in its favour.

At a conference on the subject, however, held in 1901, the Australian proposal for the establishment of such a Court failed to win the approval of a majority of the Colonial delegates;³ and there were serious difficulties in the way connected with

¹ The whole subject is exhaustively discussed in *Imperial Unity*, by A. B. Keith, 1916, pp. 84-112.

² Cd. 3523, p. 202.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

the subject of Indian appeals and the status of Judicial members of the Privy Council. In this state of things the home Government cannot be blamed for not advancing beyond the legislation of 1895 which had allowed the inclusion in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of judges from the Colonies ; although a more serious attempt should have been made to secure their presence by a system of proper remuneration.

The same division of opinion which had hitherto blocked the way characterized the proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1911.¹ Sir Wilfrid Laurier played his accustomed part of deprecating change. (There was the further consideration that the Privy Council had done yeoman service on behalf of the rights of the Provinces, whose point of view had to be considered.) New Zealand was mainly interested in securing at the hearing of appeals the presence of a New Zealand judge, who should understand the complications of the native land tenure, a desire that was promptly gratified under the existing system. South Africa was little, if at all, affected by the question ; and the passing of Mr. Deakin had damped even Australian enthusiasm. The British Government, however, undertook to take a first step towards combining the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council into a supreme Court of Appeal by adding to the number of the judges composing them. An addition of two judges to the Lords of Appeal would enable six law lords to devote their whole time to the two Courts.² As the judges would be, for the most part, the same for all kinds of appeal, a considerable degree of uniformity would be secured in the decisions of the two courts. Moreover, it was agreed that judgements in the Privy Council should be given separately by the different members of the Court (as in the House of Lords) instead of retaining the practice by which a single judgement was given, implying unanimity. On second thoughts, however, the Dominions no longer supported this change. A more practical measure of reform was the raising of the number of Dominion judges from five to seven.³

An interesting suggestion was put forward in 1912 by Lord Haldane, unofficially, when he was Lord Chancellor. He proposed that all appeals, whether from Great Britain or the Dominions, should lie to the King in Council ; but that the Court should have power to sit in different divisions, and in different portions

¹ Cd. 5745.

² 3 and 4 George V., C. 21.

³ *Ibid.*

of the Empire. Such a system would, no doubt, meet many of the objections that are raised against the working of the present system, but it must be confessed that it does not seem to have been welcomed with much enthusiasm in any one of the Dominions ; whilst speaking for Quebec Mr. Lemieux maintained that the legal *sanctum sanctorum* gained in sanctity because of its distance.¹

The subject was further discussed at the Imperial War Conference of 1918, and Mr. Rowell recorded his belief that there was a growing opinion in Canada that the Supreme Court should be the final authority ; though he admitted that this view was probably not shared by the majority of the Bar. The moral of the whole business is that reforms are difficult to effect when they have not behind them a strong and united public opinion.²

It is impossible, unfortunately, at the present time, to consider the Colonial Office a link of union between Great Britain and the Dominions ; but this is not owing to anything done or left undone by the British Secretaries of State. It is sometimes maintained that the holding of the office by lesser men since the time of Mr. Chamberlain has had a mischievous effect ; but Dominion statesmen have again and again emphasized that they had no quarrel with the men at the helm. It was the system that was at fault. The simple truth is that, considering themselves as equal, they resent the interposition between them and the Crown and the Crown's Prime Minister of a subordinate Minister, whatever his qualifications. There may have been a momentary fluttering in the Dominion dovecotes at the appointment of Mr. Winston Churchill as Secretary of State, partly because he was credited with the desire of always wanting his own way, and partly because men with long memories remembered his not too respectful attitude at the Conference of 1907. But all this amounted to very little. The important point is that the Colonial Office is connected with the idea of subordination ; and no visits of British officials to the Dominions, however desirable in other ways, and no interchange of personnel, can affect this fundamental issue.

Of far greater worth as a bond of union has been the system of Conferences, as started in 1887. The first two Colonial Conferences were of a somewhat incidental and casual character ;

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 1914, CXVII, p. 1954.

² For the working of the system, see Keith, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-88.

and the fatal mistake made in 1902 of not publishing a full report of the proceedings robbed that meeting of much of its value. "Hitherto," Mr. Deakin insisted in 1907, "at the Antipodes these conferences had failed of anything like their full effects. Their results, however valued by politicians, had made little or no impression upon the people; and the impression made upon the people was what, in the long run, determined very largely the attention paid even by public men." There was no necessity for secrecy because the Conference was not in the nature of a Cabinet, having not a tittle of executive power.¹ Anything that the members of the Conference recommended must be authorized by those whom they represented, i.e. their Governments, Parliaments, and ultimately, the electors; and it was these that needed information and conviction if success was to be attained.²

The full reports of the proceedings of the Conferences of 1907 and 1911 did something, at any rate, to meet Mr. Deakin's wishes; though it remains doubtful how far the general public can be induced to plunge into the depths of a Blue Book. (Special circumstances inevitably prevented the publication in full of the proceedings of the Imperial Conferences held during the war.)

But, granted the necessity of full publicity, there was still the question how continuity could be secured in the case of Conferences meeting only periodically. Before leaving office in 1905 Mr. Lyttelton put forward an elaborate scheme of an Imperial Council and an auxiliary permanent committee, representing all the states concerned, to which the Imperial Council might refer questions for examination and report.³ The Australian, Cape Colony and Natal Governments were in favour of the plan; but the Canadian considered that such a permanent body might conceivably interfere with the working of responsible government.⁴

In deference to the views expressed by Canada, Mr. Lyttelton deferred the question for the consideration of the next Conference; and, when that Conference met, Lord Elgin, the new Colonial Secretary, did not feel himself called upon to adopt the proposal of his predecessor. Australia and New Zealand put forward schemes on the lines of that of Mr. Lyttelton; but, with Canada barring the way, no great change could be

¹ Cd. 3523, pp. 8-9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

³ Cd. 2785.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

made. Canada was willing, indeed, that the title of the Conference should henceforth be the Imperial Conference; and, although the proposal for a secretariat to be appointed by, and responsible to, the Conference was defeated, an undertaking by Lord Elgin to set on foot a Dominions department of the Colonial Office, so as to provide for the continuity of the work of the Conference between its meetings,¹ was forthwith acted upon and has given excellent results. Mr. Deakin, recognizing the difficulty of having a secretariat responsible to Ministers scattered throughout the world, had been willing that it should be under the control of the British Prime Minister; but that eminent person was firm that it would be impossible thus to add to his duties. A proposal by Mr. Harcourt in 1911² for the establishment of a standing committee of the Imperial Conference met with no more favour from the Canadian Government. Sir Wilfrid Laurier "would view with serious apprehension the interference of anybody whatever between the Government here and the Governments in the respective Dominions."³ "We meet here as Prime Ministers," said General Botha, "sentiment and mutual interest bring us together. Now it is sought to create committees. In creating these committees we might take a false step which might lead rather to breaking down, than building up, the Empire. Therefore I say we must hasten slowly. We meet here and come together, not only to pass resolutions on small and minor things, but to discuss the more important work relating to the British Empire."⁴

On the practical side Sir Edward (Lord) Morris had already pointed out that the material before the Conference was not of such a nature or bulk as to need the help of an auxiliary committee.⁵

The work of these Conferences roughly divided itself into two main heads; abstract discussions on certain general resolutions, the object of which was the education of public opinion, and the framing of definite concrete proposals with regard to questions requiring practical settlement. As examples of the first we may take the long discussion on preferential trade that took place at the meeting of 1907. Mr. Deakin and the other Dominion statemen must have known very well that, after the recent

¹ Cd. 3523, 1907, p. 70.

² Cd. 5745, p. 181.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁴ Cd. 5746-I, pp. 112-14.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

decision of the British electorate on the subject of Tariff Reform, it was hopeless to expect the conversion of British Ministers; but it was thought that, by a full ventilation of the subject, progress might be made in the education of British public opinion. Similarly, when Sir Joseph Ward brought forward his plan for an Imperial Council, mentioned elsewhere, he cannot have expected that it would lead to immediate results. Sowing the seed for future harvest must be recognized as an important function of the Imperial Conference.

But that Conference has by no means neglected practical questions. It might, indeed, appear from the regularity with which the same subjects recur at the different meetings that little or no progress has been achieved. At the same time some of the questions dealt with have been of extraordinary difficulty and complexity; and, in some directions, at any rate, a satisfactory settlement has been reached. Thus after consideration at the 1907 and 1911 Conferences the subject of imperial naturalization has received, as we shall see later, a satisfactory settlement.

No subject has given rise to more discussion and difficulty than that of the navigation laws of the various Dominions. A subsidiary Shipping Conference in 1907 established two principles: (1) that ships registered in Australia or New Zealand, and ships engaged in the coasting trade of those Dominions, should be governed by Australian or New Zealand laws; and (2) that other ships should be governed by imperial laws.¹ But the Dominions, in their desire to enforce their own rules, caused considerable alarm to the British Government. It was not desirable that a British or foreign ship, engaged in an oversea voyage, which had complied fully with all the requirements of the imperial act at one British port, should have to comply with some additional requirements on the same subject matter at another. It was important that there should be no doubt as to what the prevailing British standard at any moment was. A hopeless confusion of authority would result from the exercise by the Dominions of such a power.² If the standards adopted in a Dominion were considered unreasonable by a foreign Govern-

¹ See *Correspondence Relating to Proposed Legislation of Australia and New Zealand on the Subject of Navigation*, 1908, Cd. 3891, and *Further Correspondence*, 1908, Cd. 4355.

² Cd. 3523, p. 21.

ment, they would almost certainly retaliate, not only against the ships belonging to that Dominion, but against all British ships using their ports; and it would probably be impossible, in practice, to induce them to restrict this discrimination merely to vessels registered in the Dominion in question; e.g. in the case of the survey of steamers, it would be quite possible for a foreign Government to require a different kind of equipment, possibly of some patented kind, to that already provided, and British ships presented a wider front to this kind of attack than any others.¹

At the 1911 Conference the subject was again discussed. "Broadly speaking," Mr. Buxton explained, "the code of law that rules the ship is the code of the country of registration that follows the ship round the world. This general principle is modified in its application to the various parts of the British Empire by two other principles: (1) That they have full power to regulate their own coastal trade, even though the ships engaging in it are registered in the United Kingdom or foreign countries; (2) As regards ships other than their own registered ships and other than ships engaged in the coasting trade, their legislative powers are restricted to their territorial limits, and therefore inoperative on the high seas. There is an exception with regard to certain powers expressly conferred on Australia by Sec. 5 of the Australian Constitution Act, which deals with so-called "round voyages," which begin and terminate within the Commonwealth."²

What is required is that the different portions of the Empire should agree upon a common policy, so far as the general question is concerned, leaving to each separate portion its freedom to deal with its own local situation as it may think fit.

The appointment of an imperial shipping committee was a move in the direction of greater uniformity in shipping matters throughout the Empire. At the meeting of Prime Ministers in 1921 the British, New Zealand and Indian Governments were in favour of the establishment of a permanent committee under royal charter (a) to perform such duty as might be entrusted to them under laws in regard to inter-imperial shipping, applicable to the whole or important parts of the Empire; (b) to inquire into complaints in regard to ocean freights and conditions in inter-imperial trade or questions of a similar nature referred to them by any of the Governments of the Empire; (c) to exercise

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

² Cd. 5745, p. 412.

conciliation between the interests concerned in inter-imperial shipping ; (d) to promote co-ordination in regard to harbours and other facilities necessary for inter-imperial shipping.

The representatives of Canada, however, did not agree to this wider resolution, and the representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Union of South Africa reserved the matter for further consideration.

The position as regards rebates was discussed and strong representations were made by Dominion Ministers in regard to it, but no resolution was passed ; it being understood that the matter was at the time under consideration by the imperial shipping committee.

On the subject of emigration Mr. Burns in 1911 was able to show to what an extent it had of late years been diverted from proceeding to foreign countries, to the benefit of the British Empire. In 1906 the British Dominions and the British Empire took 54 per cent of the total emigration ; in 1910 they took 68 per cent ; while for 1911 the proportion would be considerably higher, some 77 to 80 per cent. Ten thousand more people went in the first four months of 1911 to Australia and New Zealand than in a similar period in 1910.¹

For the time being, then, the problem seemed solved. But the exceptional circumstances produced by the war and a more active recognition of the pressing need of immigrants for the maintenance of a white Australia have given a new importance to the question of Empire migration. The Oversea Settlement Committee has already done useful work, but there is need for systematic co-operation if the population of the Empire is to be distributed according to the requirements of its several parts.²

A remarkable instance of the manner in which difficulties can be surmounted was afforded by the decision arrived at by the 1911 Conference on the subject of naturalization. Mr. Churchill's handling of the matter was both conciliatory and efficient. The resolutions passed, and the Act of 1914 in which they were embodied, established an imperial nationality for which

¹ Cd. 5745, p. 199.

² See "Migration Within the Empire," by Lieut.-Col. L. S. Amery, M.P., *United Empire* (new Series), Vol. XIII, pp. 207-16 ; to whom, doubtless, is mainly due the measure passed by Parliament in 1922, by which, in co-operation with the Dominions, an organized and regular system of State-aided emigration will be established.

a five years' residence is necessary ; each Dominion being left free to grant local nationality on its own terms.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier had been strongly in favour of the principle that naturalization in one portion of the Empire should entail naturalization throughout it ; but he saw the force of the British objections and yielded his assent to the proposed compromise.

Again, in the case of the payment of double income tax within the Empire, no doubt it was the pressure brought at successive meetings of the Imperial Conference that led to the Chancellor of the Exchequer making a change at a time when such a change was most inconvenient. In the Budget of 1920 relief was given by the reduction of the rate of the United Kingdom income tax up to one-half of the rate of tax charged upon the taxable income in the Dominions ; and the balance of relief, if any, was returned to the Dominion concerned ; a solution of the problem that had been suggested by General Botha in 1911.¹

When the Conference has failed to make headway, it has sometimes been due more to apathy in the Dominions than to neglect in Great Britain of its wishes. Thus very little has come from the periodic resolutions in favour of an All-red Route between England, Australia and New Zealand, via Canada. A resolution to this effect was passed at the 1907 Conference, and a committee was forthwith set on foot by the Board of Trade, to find some practical means of putting the resolution into operation. This committee took a great deal of evidence. It found that a service across Canada and by the Pacific would have to depend entirely upon passengers and mails. This would involve a considerable loss on the Pacific side. The President of the Board of Trade was instructed, on behalf of the British Government, to say that they were prepared, within reasonable limits, to meet Canada, New Zealand and Australia to make up the deficiency. At the same time they could not undertake the promotion of the scheme, and Canada undertook to communicate with the other Dominions. And yet, in 1911, some two or three years after, nothing had been done in the matter.² In this state of things, it was not surprising that the scheme was still in embryo at the time of the outbreak of war ; the consequences of which have thrown so many schemes of improvement into the background of a very dim and remote future.

With regard to telegraphic communication, a State-owned

¹ Cd. 5745, p. 360.

² *Ibid.*, p. 352.

Pacific cable came into working in 1902 under the joint management of Great Britain, Canada and Australia,¹ as a result of the Conference held at Ottawa in 1894, and was successful in reducing rates to Australia.

In the course of the discussion at the 1911 Conference on the resolution "that in view of the social and commercial advantages which would result from increased facilities for inter-communication between her dependencies and Great Britain, it is desirable that all possible means be taken to secure a reduction in cable rates throughout the Empire," the Australian representatives expressed themselves strongly in favour of the nationalization of the Atlantic cables. Dr. Findlay, on behalf of New Zealand, pointed out, in agreement with Mr. Fisher, that the question had a national aspect which transcended any question of commercial profit. Whether it could be achieved now or achieved later he felt sure that the feeling in Australia and New Zealand, and he believed also in South Africa, was strongly in the direction of nationalizing means of communication, such as a cable service. In these communities men recognized that the cheapening of cable rates was essential to promote immediately and permanently imperial unity.²

Mr. Samuel, unfortunately, found himself under the necessity of pointing out the financial pitfalls in his way; and finally a harmless resolution was adopted unanimously: "That in the event of considerable reductions in the Atlantic cable rates not being effected in the near future it is desirable that the laying of a State-owned cable between the United Kingdom and Canada be considered by a subsidiary Conference."³

In the same spirit the Prime Ministers at the 1921 Conference urged the extension of the system of wireless telegraphy between the different parts of the Empire. It was in great measure due to the subject being brought before the Imperial Conference that a *id.* postage system came into force throughout the Empire. Australia for a time continued to exact a higher rate; but, at the 1911 Conference, Mr. Samuel was able to remind the members that the Commonwealth had now fallen into line. No bond of union is so important as a cheap postage system; and therefore one of the most regrettable of the results of the war has been the inevitable reaction that has taken place in this movement. No

¹ See *The Imperial Conference*, by R. Jebb, 1911, Vol. I, pp. 243-75.

² Cd. 5745, p. 299.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

less deplorable is the increase that has become necessary in the charge for transmitting newspapers.

But, if the Imperial Conference has done good service in the cause of imperial unity, it has also laid emphasis upon the points upon which diversity is inevitable. Sir W. Laurier's resolution, at the 1911 Conference, that His Majesty's Government be requested to open negotiations with the several foreign Governments having treaties which apply to the Overseas Dominions, with a view to securing liberty for any of those Dominions which may so desire to withdraw from the operation of the treaty, without impairing the treaty in respect of the rest of the Empire, was merely the logical consequence of the action of Lord Salisbury's Government in denouncing the German and Belgian treaties, which stood in the way of Canada giving a preference to British imports.

"The gist of the objection," Sir Wilfrid said, "which is made here is that, if this is allowed, it would destroy for good and all the principle of commercial unity. I do not know at the present time what principle of commercial unity exists, in view of the different tariffs of the mother country and the Dominions. . . . Now, when we recognize this primary fact that there is not absolute commercial unity but commercial diversity at this moment in the British Empire, in so far as fiscal legislation is concerned, it is not difficult to follow the consequences of the Government in the United Kingdom making a treaty which suits its own views and its own requirements, but which will not suit the requirements of Australia, or of South Africa, or of New Zealand, or of Newfoundland or Canada. Therefore the principle is no longer at issue; it has been conceded long ago, and it has been recognized that there should be that trade diversity or commercial diversity, not only of fiscal legislation, but, the corollary of fiscal legislation, commercial treaties."¹ With regard to new treaties the principle was already at work; and, in fact, to take one instance, Australia and New Zealand had not agreed to the British treaty with Japan. All that was asked was to apply the same principle to already existing treaties. The British Government could not refuse its assent; though the consequences were not always pleasant. Thus Italy refused to allow the Commonwealth to withdraw separately from the operation of the treaty with Great Britain; such a course would

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

have involved the denunciation of the treaty by Great Britain.¹

Another direction in which the meetings of these Conferences have shown themselves useful has been by acting as a safety valve for the expression of dissatisfaction with the conduct of the British Government. We have seen how in 1907 Mr. Deakin called them to task for their conduct with regard to the New Hebrides ; and no doubt the complaints poured into the ears of his colleagues by Sir R. Bond, with regard to the Newfoundland fisheries question, greatly relieved his feelings. Similarly, in 1911, the situation would have been much worse had the annoyance felt by the Australian representatives over the management of the question of the Declaration of London been left to rankle, instead of finding open expression in plain-spoken criticism. Moreover, with the knowledge of these quadrennial meetings before their eyes, British Ministers would naturally be inclined to walk more warily.

Even when the Imperial Conference has not greatly modified the policy of the Dominion Governments, it has undoubtedly helped towards a wider and more enlightened way of approaching questions. Take the very difficult and thorny question of the relations between the Dominions and their Asiatic fellow subjects, which, so far as it relates to South Africa, will be dealt with elsewhere. At the 1907 Conference the subject was practically ignored ; but at that of 1911 it called forth a moving and powerful speech from Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India. " However close the connexion," he said, " and however perfect the understanding between the mother country and the self-governing Dominions, we are not a United Empire unless that understanding spreads, to some considerable extent, also to that vast part of the Empire, of which, of course, India is the most prominent division, but which also includes all the Crown Colonies which are inhabited by the various native races. . . . It is a distinct misfortune and a derogation from the unity of the Empire, if the mother country continually finds itself implicated in difficulties between various parts of the Empire." He strongly emphasized the necessity of " an accommodating and friendly spirit towards India." ² Further force was given to the appeal by the very able memorandum submitted by the India Office on the position of British Indians in the Dominions. " It does not appear," it said, " to have been thoroughly considered that each

¹ Cd. 5745, 1911, p. 337.

² *Ibid.*, p. 399.

Dominion owes responsibility to the rest of the Empire for ensuring that its domestic policy shall not unnecessarily create embarrassment in the administration of India. It is difficult for statesmen, who have seen Indians only as manual labourers and petty traders, to realize the importance to the Empire as a whole of a country with some three hundred million inhabitants, possessing ancient civilizations of a very high order, which has furnished, and furnishes, some of the finest military material in the world to the imperial forces, and which offers the fullest opportunities to financial and commercial enterprise. It is difficult to convey to those, who do not know India, the intense and natural resentment felt by veterans of the Indian Army who have seen active service and won medals under the British flag, and who have been treated by their British officers with the consideration and courtesy to which their character entitles them, when (as has actually happened) they find themselves described as 'coolies,' and treated with contemptuous severity in parts of the Empire." The gravity of the friction between India and the Dominions lay in this, that on that question alone were united the seditious agitators and the loyal representatives of moderate Indian opinion.¹ In Canada a British Indian subject was required to possess more money (£40) than a Japanese alien, because the immigration of the latter was restricted by the undertaking of the Japanese Government. (The Indian Government had refused to enact similar legislation.)

Still, even in 1911, some progress had been made. Mr. Batchelor, a Labour Australian minister, was able to claim that a better feeling was abroad with regard to the treatment of Asiatics. In two or three cases resolutions had been carried removing disabilities which Asiatics were formerly under.² Such progress, however, was very slow; and it will at once be recognized how great a revolution was effected when the Dominion representatives were willing to sit side by side with representatives of India at the Imperial War Conference of 1917. Mr. Lemieux, a French-Canadian ex-minister, protested at a later date against engaging "ourselves for the future as regards association with the people of India. . . . It is quite clear that the representatives of Canada, sitting with the representatives of India at the Peace Conference, would sooner or later be faced with the problem

¹ *Papers laid before Imperial Conference, 1911*, Cd. 5746-I, p. 277.
Cd. 5745, p. 408.

whether Indians should be allowed to settle in our country.”¹

There is all the difference in the world, however, between admitting the principle that a nation should decide for itself its own immigration policy and recognizing that in the working out of such policy each part of the Empire has responsibilities toward the Empire as a whole. In the “Notes on Emigration from India,” submitted to the 1917 Conference, it was urged that to attain a settlement of grievances it was necessary to recognize that they were in a great measure matters of sentiment. Indians, in their outlook upon the Empire, were swayed by two ideas. They were proud of the fact that they were British subjects, and their country an integral portion of the Empire. They desired to claim their imperial privileges, and did not understand why on the ground of race they were unfairly excluded from large tracts of the Empire and worse treated in some matters than Asiatics who did not belong to the Empire. They were, at the same time, proud of their Indian nationality, of their ancient civilization, and of the great intellectual traditions which they had inherited. They were deeply moved by treatment which imputed to them ignorance, or implied denial of their titles to respect. They had made sacrifices for the Empire ; they had proved their loyalty, their courage and their fortitude, and they asked that this should be recognized. “ Thus, sentiment and imagination enter largely into the controversy.”²

The recommendations adopted fully recognized this aspect of the case. A reciprocal treatment in India and the Dominions of immigrants for purposes of labour and settlement would do something to remove the indignity attached to the present system, whilst the important proposal was made, with which the Dominions have found themselves able to comply, that, where there were rules of exclusion, reciprocal arrangements should be made for granting full facilities for the admission of tourists, students and the like, and for temporary business visits. It is to be hoped that by these means a more serious and enlightened public opinion will develop amongst the Dominion peoples in regard to Asiatics, whether or not British subjects, and that the day has passed when members of a race remarkable for its chivalry and its capacity to absorb the good while rejecting the attendant perils of Western civilization, could be lightly set down as yellow dwarfs.

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 1919, p. 1070.

² Cd. 8566, p. 161.

At the 1918 Conference the recommendations of the India Office with regard to reciprocity of treatment were adopted, Sir P. (Lord) Sinha contributing a powerful memorandum on the general question. In this he quoted a passage from the Aga Khan's book, *India in Transition*, wherein he said: "I do not lose a sense of proportion when I say that one of the deeper causes, if not of discontent or disaffection, at any rate of the distrust of England and of Englishmen, that appeared upon the surface in India of recent years was the strained relations between Indians and their white fellow subjects in East Africa. A rankling sense of injustice was aroused by the reservation of the best lands for Europeans, and by a succession of ordinances and regulations based on an assumption of race inferiority."¹ On this latter subject something will be said in another portion of this volume. It is sufficient here to note that the occurrence of this trouble in a Colony more directly dependent on Great Britain, and not in a Dominion working its own independent will, suggests the extreme difficulty and complexity of the problems involved. Still, whether in Colony or Dominion, there is one clue to the labyrinth, a clue, which, in the Dominions, in the past, and in East Africa (apparently) still at the present moment, has been or is wholly neglected—the clue which recognizes that sentiment and imagination are all-powerful forces in the moulding of events, and that, in most cases, how we behave is as important as what we do. When one remembers that Mr. Gandhi was once a moderate, and that it was his experience in South Africa which made him an extremist, one realizes the dangers to the whole body of the Commonwealth that may be brought about by a single member.

At the imperial meeting of Prime Ministers in 1921, the Conference, while reaffirming the resolution of the Imperial War Conference of 1918 that each community of the British Commonwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction of immigration from any of the other communities, recognized that there was an incongruity between the position of India, as an equal member of the British Empire, and the existence of disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the Empire. The Conference, accordingly, was of opinion that "in the interests of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth," it was desirable

¹ Cd. 9177, p. 248.

that the rights of such Indians to citizenship should be recognized. It is significant that the representatives of South Africa were unable to accept this resolution "in view of the exceptional circumstances of the greater part of the Union."

With regard to the usefulness of the Imperial Conference, Mr. Deakin, in 1911, bore witness to its value "in the making, maintaining and re-making this Empire,"¹ and General Botha emphasized its importance in promoting "love and co-operation."² Mr. Fisher called attention to another aspect of the matter. "Hitherto we have been negotiating with the Government of the United Kingdom at the portals of the household. You have thought it wise to take the representatives of the Dominions into the inner counsels of the nation, and have frankly discussed with them the affairs of the Empire as they affect each and all of us. Time alone will discover what that means."³

But it was one thing to admit Dominion representatives into the *arcana imperii* and explain to them the mysteries of world politics, and quite another to clothe them with responsibility for moulding imperial policy. At that same Conference Mr. Asquith had declared that the authority of the Imperial Government could not be shared in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration and maintenance of peace or the declaration of war, and that the co-existence side by side with the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of a new body, such as that proposed by Sir J. Ward, would be absolutely fatal to the British system of responsible government.⁴

The Imperial Conference was, in fact, a meeting of independent Governments, to discuss matters which they had in common, and in such matters to evolve, so far as possible, a common policy. The mere fact that, when imperial policy was in question, the venue had to be changed to the Imperial Defence Committee was eloquent to show that not on these lines could imperial unity find its ultimate expression. And yet, the demand for imperial unity was by no means dead. For years men had noted the casual and haphazard system under which the British self-governing Empire kept together. The Imperial Federation League had, indeed, come to an untimely end, through premature temerity; but stronger, more patient, hands were prepared to take up the dropped torch. In the making of the South African Union a

¹ *Commonwealth Hans.*, 1911, p. 112.

² *Ibid.*

³ Cd. 5745, p. 438.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

small body of able and earnest young men had done yeoman service. That difficult job achieved—and the adoption by Boer and Briton of a common constitution might well have seemed an impossibility—the further question occurred: Why should not similar success crown the attempt to deal with the strange amorphous fabric of the self-governing Empire? From this aspiration arose the *Round Table* movement, with all its consequences. It is amusing to find this body described as “a Tory jingo association of the acutest form.”¹ Here in England, at least, whatever our political beliefs, we all know (in Sir R. Borden’s words) that the work of the *Round Table* movement has been “most earnest, unselfish and devoted”; and that it has deserved the thanks of all serious men in concentrating public opinion upon problems of great common concern.² Assuredly no better work in its way has ever been done than the patient, laborious inquiry into the problem of the Commonwealth, carried on by groups of disinterested investigators throughout Great Britain and the Dominions. It was perhaps inevitable that the movement was largely confined to the universities and did not much come within the ken of the working-classes. The inquirers entered on their task with no *parti pris*, and, in fact, many of the members of the groups were hostile to the solution which seemed finally to emerge from the flood of criticism. That conclusion was put forward by Mr. Lionel Curtis, the protagonist of the whole movement, in 1917, in his singularly powerful and inspiring volume, *The Problem of the Commonwealth*.³ Mr. Curtis accepted Dominion nationalism as fully and universally as had his critic, Mr. Jebb; and, from the existence of such nationalism, it followed that each portion of the British Commonwealth should have the free disposal of its own affairs, and that collective action should be scrupulously reserved to such matters as were clearly and undeniably of common concern. Thus, because the form and character of a tariff depend upon local conditions, an imperial tariff was ruled out of the question. Accordingly, the only subjects remaining for treatment in co-operation were the questions of foreign policy, of defence, military and naval, and of finance, so far as defence involved finance. Along with these, the

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 1913, p. 4500, speech of Mr. Lemieux.

² *Ibid.*, 1917, p. 1531.

³ It is unnecessary to deal with Sir J. Ward’s proposals for an Imperial Council at the 1911 Conference, because, not being sufficiently thought out, they lent themselves an easy prey to Mr. Asquith’s dialectic.

government of dependencies was added, as a task in which the Dominions should take their share. It is true that Mr. Asquith, in 1911, had talked as though "a common trusteeship of the interests and fortunes of fellow subjects who have not yet attained, and may never attain, the full stature of self-government" was already in existence;¹ but, in fact, the situation was widely different.

It is unnecessary at the present time to examine in detail the general scheme; because, for the time being at any rate, it stands outside the range of practical politics. *Dis aliter visum*; and, though we may have our doubts of the omniscience and infallibility of the mighty Demos to whom we bend in worship, still we must recognize, with Mr. Balfour, that democracy, if not an easy form of government, is the only form of government now open to us. The main objection in the Dominions was, and is, that it would be impossible to confer, either directly or indirectly, taxing power on a Parliament not sitting within a Dominion's own borders. Assuredly, if the goal to be aimed at was a desirable one, it would hardly have been reached by defter or more cautious provisions.²

¹ Cd. 5745, p. 22.

² In the closing chapter of his brilliant volume on *The Evolution of Parliament* (1920), Professor Pollard suggests that a reformed House of Lords might "meet in some degree the desire for a more adequate representation at Westminster of our overseas Dominions" (p. 369). The second chambers of the Empire would be formed into one, the sphere of which would be expanded; and, instead of each realm having two chambers, performing similar functions, the imperial second chamber would specialize on imperial questions and the first chamber on domestic questions" (p. 372). "The Imperial Council would frame estimates of the expenditure needed for imperial purposes; it would suggest the distribution of the burden; and from a body, in which all the realms were properly represented, it would not be unreasonable to expect an equitable allocation" (p. 374).

Such a condition of things leads straight towards two sets of executives: "A single executive for imperial purposes, responsible to the single Imperial Chamber, and a series of domestic executives for each self-governing realm, responsible to their respective domestic legislatures" (p. 376). Further, Professor Pollard suggests that the members of the Imperial Chamber should be the nominees of the domestic executives of the different Dominions (including Great Britain and Ireland); while the Imperial Cabinet should be immediately responsible to it. Meanwhile "foreign affairs, imperial defence, issues of war and peace belong obviously to imperial government" (p. 377). Professor Pollard recognizes that "the

But even though the discussion be for the present wholly academic it is still worthy of inquiry whether such a form of federation, as has been put forward, could be worked successfully, given the present conditions of the component parts.

Granted that the problem how to secure for the British Empire a common foreign policy, without reducing the Dominions to the position of cyphers, has by no means yet found its solution. (The necessity for common organization for purposes of defence seems of much less urgency ; and found a very tolerable practical solution in the experiences of the Great War.) Still, the question remains, would a Parliament, containing representatives from wholly different nations, work easily and without friction ? We may like or dislike party government ; but most of us must recognize that in normal times the British system of responsible government means party government ; and, without the existence of parties, the whole system would break down. But where there are representatives from different nations, sitting in the same chamber, will party government be possible ? The moral of the melancholy story of the breakdown of Parliamentary government, so far as Ireland was concerned, surely is that the Irish members cared more for their nationality than for the questions affecting their fellow citizens, and so stood aloof, suspicious and suspect, from the rough and tumble of the British party game. Dominion representatives, thank Heaven ! would not come to an Imperial

evil to be avoided is the conflict of jurisdictions, and two independent sets of executives and legislatures, one dealing with imperial and the other with domestic affairs, would be certain to come into conflict unless there were means of regulating their relations with one another. Here again finance would be the determining factor ; and the chambers, which controlled supply and the domestic executives, must also control, directly or indirectly, the Imperial Chamber of the Imperial Cabinet " (p. 376).

Any suggestion of Professor Pollard, on a constitutional and political question, deserves the most respectful consideration ; but it is puzzling to imagine how such a scheme could have commended itself as practicable to one who has shown himself so ruthless a critic of cut and dried plans of imperial federation. In these democratic days we are always brought back to the point : What will the people of the Dominions think about your proposal ? But here we have matters of imperial concern deliberately assigned to a second chamber ; to a second chamber, moreover, which is not elective ; that chamber, I presume, to sit in London, and to have as its outcome an Imperial Cabinet, which will not be in direct touch with the Dominion legislatures. Whatever else is doubtful, it is, I think, abundantly clear that the Dominion democracies would deal with such a proposal *pollice verso*.

Parliament in this temper of suspicion and distrust ; still, they would not forget that they were Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders or South Africans, and would probably be found voting on any question with their fellow-countrymen, rather than falling into the line of party cleavage. But were this temper to prevail, and Canadians or Australians find themselves out-voted, nothing could be of more sinister augury for the future of imperial unity, and the last state might be much worse than the first.¹

Dismissing, then, the proposal for an Imperial Parliament and an Imperial Executive responsible to such Parliament, let us consider the various steps that have been made in the direction of giving the Dominions a greater voice in the decisions of questions of policy. No one man has done more yeoman service in this direction than the late Prime Minister of Canada, Sir Robert Borden. As long ago as 1910, on the first reading of Sir W. Laurier's bill for naval defence, he recognized the necessity, if the Dominions were to take their part in the permanent defence of the Empire, that they should possess some control and some voice in the policy of which war might be the outcome.² Again, in introducing his own Bill, in December, 1912, he affirmed that responsibility for the Empire's defence upon the high seas necessarily carried with it responsibility for and control of foreign policy. Both the British Government and the leaders of the opposition had explicitly accepted the principle that the great Dominions, sharing in the defence of the Empire, must also share in responsibility for a control of foreign policy.³

A provisional arrangement was made under which there would be representation of Canada at the Committee of Imperial Defence.⁴

The needs of the war precipitated decisions on the nature of the imperial partnership, as it precipitated matters in other directions. During that war there were two cabinets advising the Crown, one

¹ In answer to this argument, it may be said : How about Scotland ? But the union was brought about before the Scottish people had developed political consciousness, under the system of Parliamentary government. Moreover, the economic and material advantages of the union were so great, and such wisdom was shown in safeguarding the Scottish legal and ecclesiastical systems, that the change was made under the most favourable auspices.

² *Can. Hans.*, XCIII, p. 1743.

³ *Ibid.*, CVII, pp. 676 and 678.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 692.

an Imperial War Cabinet advising the Crown in respect of matters of common Empire concern, the other a British War Cabinet. "The idea," Sir Robert explained, "so impressed itself upon the people of the United Kingdom and upon their statesmen that at a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet a definite offer was made to the overseas Dominions that this experiment should be continued in the future; that it should develop into a usage and a convention; and that annually, at least, and, if necessity should arise, oftener, there should assemble in London an Imperial Cabinet to deal with matters of common concern to the Empire." "This proposal," he maintained, "does not sacrifice the autonomy which is possessed by each of the Dominions. The ministers from overseas go there as the heads of their own Governments. They are responsible to their own Parliaments, as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom goes there responsible to his Parliament. . . . They meet there for the purpose of consultation, co-operation and united action; but that action can only be taken with the sanction and authority of the representatives of the various nations of the Empire, assembled in their own Parliaments." ¹ Sir Robert had already written to Mr. Lloyd George: "The step you have taken is a notable advance in the development of constitutional relations, and I am confident that the usage thus initiated will gradually but surely develop into a recognized convention." ²

Meanwhile, in England, a yet more daring advocate of change was profoundly impressing British public opinion. In his great speech of May 15, 1917, at the Parliamentary dinner given to him, General Smuts, after laying stress upon the fact that the British Empire was much more than a state: it was a system of states; not only a static system, a stationary system, but a dynamic system, growing, evolving all the time, towards new destinies, went on: "The question is, How are you going to provide for the future government of this group of nations? It is an entirely new problem. If you want to see how great it is, you must take the United States in comparison. There you find what is essential—one nation, not perhaps in the fullest sense, but more and more growing into one; one big state, consisting of subordinate parts, but whatever the nomenclature of the United States constitution, you have one national state, over one big contiguous area. That is the problem presented by the United States, and for which they discovered this federal solution, which means subordinate govern-

¹ *Ibid.*, 1917, pp. 1528-9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1530.

ments for the subordinate parts, but one national federal government for the whole.

"Compare with that state of facts this enormous system comprised in the British Empire of nations all over the world, some independent, living under diverse conditions, and all growing towards greater nations than they are at present. You can see at once that the solution which has been found practicable in the case of the United States, probably never will work under our system. Your whole idea and basis is entirely different. You do not want to standardize the nations of the British Empire ; you want to develop them into greater nationhood. . . . I think that this is the fundamental fact which we have to bear in mind—that the British Empire, or the British Commonwealth of nations, does not stand for unity, standardization or assimilation, or denationalization ; but it stands for a fuller, a richer, and more various life among all the nations that compose it. And even nations who have fought against you, like my own, must feel that they and their interests, their language, their religious and all their cultural interests are as safe and as secure under the British flag as those of the children of your household and your own blood. It is only in proportion as that is realized that you will fulfil the true mission which you have undertaken."

But if any form of federation was impossible, what were to be the connecting links for this multiform scattered Empire ? The first was the Crown, which has been dealt with elsewhere ; the second was better machinery for common consultation. " So far we have relied upon the Imperial Conference which meets every four years, and which, however useful for the work it has done hitherto, has not, in my opinion, been a complete success. It will be necessary to devise better means for achieving our ends. A certain precedent has been laid down of calling the Prime Ministers and representatives from the Empire of India to the Imperial Cabinet. . . . What you want is to call together the most important statesmen of the Empire from time to time—say once a year, or as often as may be found necessary—to discuss matters which concern all parts of the Empire in common, and in order that causes of friction and misunderstanding may be removed. A common policy should be laid down to determine the true orientation of our imperial policy.

"Take foreign policy, for instance . . . I think it is highly desirable that at least once a year the most important leaders of

the Empire should be called together to discuss these matters, and to determine a common policy, which would then be carried out in detail by the various executive Governments of the Commonwealth nations. This Imperial Council or Cabinet will not themselves exercise executive functions, but they will lay down the policy which will be carried out by the Governments of the various parts of the Empire. A system like that, though it looks small, must in the end lead to very important results and very great changes. . . . Of course no one will ever dispute the primacy of the Imperial Government in these matters. Whatever changes and developments come about, we shall always look upon the British Government as the senior partner in this concern. When this Council is not sitting, the Imperial Government will conduct the foreign affairs of the Empire. But it will always be subject to the principles and policy which have been laid down in these common conferences from time to time, and which, I think, will be a simpler and probably, in the long run, a saner and safe policy for the Empire as a whole.

"I am sure that the after effects of a change like this, although it looks a simple change, are going to be very important, not only for this community of nations, but for the world as a whole. Far too much stress is laid upon instruments of government. People are inclined to forget that the world is getting more democratic, and that forces which find expression in public opinion are going to be far more powerful in the future than they have been in the past. You will find that you will have built up a spirit of comradeship and a common feeling of patriotism, and that the instrument of government will not be the thing that matters so much as the spirit that actuates the whole system of all its parts. That seems to me to be your mission. You talk about an imperial mission. It seems to me this British Empire has only one mission, and that is a mission for greater liberty and freedom and self-development. Yours is the only system that has ever worked in history where a large number of nations have been living in unity. Talk about the League of Nations—you are the only league of nations that has ever existed; and if the line that I am sketching here is correct, you are going to be an even greater league of nations in the future."

With this temper prevailing, it was resolved at the Imperial War Conference of 1917 that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire was too important

and intricate a subject to be dealt with during the war, but should form the subject of a special imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities. . .

"Any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based on a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an imperial Commonwealth and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several governments may determine."¹ General Smuts indeed uttered a note of warning: "Too much if I may say so, of the old ideas still clings to the new organism which is growing: I think that, although in practice there is great freedom, yet in actual theory the status of the Dominions is of a subject character . . . and in many ways . . . that theory still permeates practice to some extent. . . . The status of the Dominions and equal nations of the Empire will have to be recognized to a very large extent. The Governments of the Dominions as equal Governments of the King in the British Commonwealth will have to be considered far more fully than is done to-day, at any rate in the theory of the constitution, if not in practice." On the constructive side he thought that it would not pass the wit of man to devise ways of continuous consultation, not intermittent, not every four years, as had been the practice hitherto, but continuous consultation.²

The resolutions of the Imperial War Cabinet in the following year sought to put the procedure upon a more systematic footing. The Prime Ministers of the Dominions, as members of the Imperial War Cabinet, should have the right of direct communication with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and *vice versa*. Such communications, however, should be confined to questions of cabinet importance, the Prime Ministers themselves being the judges of such questions.

A provision intended for the exigencies of the war was clearly capable of further extension. It was that the Prime Minister of each Dominion should have the right to nominate a cabinet minister, to represent him at meetings of the Imperial War

¹ Cd. 8566, 1917.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 47-8.

Cabinet, to be held regularly between the plenary war sessions.¹

The real solution, Mr. Massey suggested, "was a resident in London";² and Mr. Hughes emphasized the fact that imperial relations had reached a stage at which, in the course of daily administration, the Dominion government were conferring, negotiating and transacting business with the Imperial Government not inter-departmentally but inter-governmentally.³

In the glow of a common enthusiasm, aroused by the war, it had apparently been supposed in 1917 that it might be possible to evolve a brand-new constitution for the Empire in 1921 or a little later; but in the disillusion that afterwards ensued, with minds unsettled and with nerves on edge, it was obvious that such a task was impossible; and so, at the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Empire in 1921, it was decided that "having regard to the constitutional developments since 1917, no advantage is to be gained by holding a constitutional Conference." In other respects the Prime Ministers adhered to the resolutions of previous Conferences. They still recognized the necessity of "continuous consultation"; though they added the significant words which "can only be secured by a substantial improvement in communication between the component parts of the Empire."

At first it looked as though the meeting would be, from the point of view of those who had summoned it, a failure. Those critics who had fallen foul of the name "Imperial Cabinet" seemed to be abundantly justified. A Cabinet, in the strict usage of the term, cannot exist, unless the majority can bind the minority, and unless it possesses executive powers. During the war, when the whole energies of the Empire were directed upon a common objective, the Imperial War Cabinet had justified its title, but could such results be expected in the disintegrating times of peace? In any case the Conference began under unfavourable auspices. *Quod minime veris*, the first discordant note was struck by a Canadian Conservative. The main subject for the Conference was the question whether or not the Anglo-Japanese alliance should be renewed. It was common ground that, in any case, the terms of the treaty would require modification, so as to adapt themselves to the obligations incurred by membership of the League of Nations. But, apart from this, there was room for a difference of opinion. Upon the one hand, the aspect of world-politics had completely changed since the

¹ Cd. 9177, p. 165.

² *Ibid.*, p. 159.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

alliance had been set on foot mainly to protect the two Powers against an aggressive Russia ; and the necessity for the closest possible relations between Great Britain and the United States had become more and more apparent. On the other hand, Japan was a valuable and valued ally, which had given good proof of its loyalty during the Great War ; an estranged and suspicious Japan might make much more difficult the task of the Commonwealth in maintaining a white Australia ; and lastly, with regard to the United States, Great Britain might, with its three hundred million Asiatic subjects, play the rôle, in bringing Japan and America to more friendly relations, that was played by France in improving the relations between Great Britain and Russia.

It must be recognized, then, that there was, at the time, room for a difference of opinion. What was unfortunate was that statesmen, who had to settle a difficult question from the point of view of the interests of the Empire as a whole, without waiting to listen to the arguments put forward at the Conference, should proclaim *urbi et orbi* their own individual convictions. It is, perhaps, not uncharitable to suggest that Mr. Meighen, the head of a weakened administration, confronted by an opposition consisting of Liberals, the new farmers (Progressive) party and organized Labour, sought to sound a trumpet that should find a response in his own country, especially in his native West. In any case the rout of the Conservatives at the General Election of December 1921, showed the futility of such expectations.

The Canadian representative having thus proclaimed his objections to the renewal of the alliance, the Commonwealth and New Zealand representatives who, as the Prime Ministers of countries situated in the storm centre of Pacific questions, were especially interested in the decision, naturally expressed their views, in favour for the time being of the continuance of the alliance.

In this conflict of opinion the Lord Chancellor most fortunately decided that notifications of the alliance to the League of Nations had not constituted a denunciation of the Agreement. Consequently it remained in force until denounced ; and would not come to an end till twelve months after the date of such denunciation. It therefore was not necessary forthwith to come to a decision.

Moreover the whole aspect of affairs was changed by the invitation of the President of the United States to a Conference on arma-

ments and the Far Eastern question to be held in Washington in the autumn of 1921; and the transformation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance into the pact between Great Britain, Japan, the United States and France can be welcomed by all.

At the Conference of Prime Ministers, in 1921, "the discussions" we are told "which covered the whole area of foreign policy and extended over many days, proved most fruitful." Thus, with regard to the Upper Silesian question, "the main lines of British policy, in connexion with the solution of this problem, received the unanimous approval of the Conference." The conviction was happily present that "the whole weight of the Empire should be concentrated behind a united understanding and common action in foreign affairs." "It was unanimously felt that the policy of the British Empire could not be adequately representative of democratic opinion throughout its peoples, unless representatives of the Dominions and of India were frequently associated with those of the United Kingdom, in considering and determining the course to be pursued. All members of the Conference expressed a vivid sense of the value of this year's meeting in that respect, and a desire that similar meetings should be held as frequently as possible." That, in spite of an unfortunate beginning, the Conference "still more firmly established the free co-operation of the peoples of the Commonwealth" was doubtless in great measure due to the good sense and tact of the British Prime Minister.

We have seen the directions in which the work of the War served to strengthen centripetal tendencies; but the battlefields of Flanders and of the East had revealed the Dominions to themselves as powerful nations, and that revelation brought with it serious consequences. The status of the Dominions at the Peace Conference came immediately into question, and was the subject of earnest discussion. We have already considered, in another connexion, the statement of Sir Robert Borden with regard to the new position of the Dominions at the Peace Conference and in the League of Nations.¹ "The constitutional structure of the British Empire," Sir Robert naively admitted, "is imperfectly understood by other nations, even by a nation so closely allied in kinship, in language and the character of its institutions, as the United States. Such lack of comprehension need excite no surprise because the association between the mother

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 2nd sess. 1919, p. 29.

country and the great self-governing Dominions has been for years in a condition of development and that development is not yet complete. The future relationship of the nations of the Empire must be determined in accordance with the will of the mother country and of each Dominion in a constitutional Conference to be summoned in the not distant future. Undoubtedly it will be based upon equality of nationhood. Each nation must preserve unimpaired its absolute autonomy ; but it must likewise have a voice as to those external relations which involve the issue of peace or war. . . . On behalf of my country I stood firmly on this solid ground ; that in the greatest of all wars, in which the world's liberty, the world's justice, in short, the world's future destiny was at stake, Canada had led the democracies of both the American continents. Her resolve had given inspiration, her sacrifices had been conspicuous ; her effort was unabated to the end. The same indomitable spirit which made her capable of that effort and sacrifice, made her equally incapable of accepting at the Peace Conference, the League of Nations, or elsewhere, a status inferior to nations less advanced in their development, less amply endowed in wealth, resources and population, no more complete in their sovereignty and far less conspicuous in their sacrifice."¹ He therefore insisted that each Dominion must sign the Peace in a separate capacity and be a separate member of the League of Nations.

But Sir Robert perhaps did not realize the logical outcome of the course he had adopted. In New Zealand especially, where the flame of imperial patriotism burns perhaps stronger than elsewhere, the new departure has caused no little heartburnings and doubts ; whilst from Australia an able publicist has subjected the course adopted to a most powerful and searching criticism.² In the New Zealand Parliament the question was very ably dealt with by Mr. Downie Stewart, who is now a member of the Ministry. "All constitutional writers," he said, "are agreed that the last and final test of whether a Power is a Sovereign Power or not is the question whether it has power to declare war and peace. . . . I should like to know from the Prime Minister whether any consideration was given by the delegates to the question as to what the effect would be of their taking upon themselves the burden of signing

¹ *Can. Hans.*, 2nd sess. 1919, pp. 21-2.

² "Imperial Unity and the Peace Treaty," *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 235, pp. 286-306.

this Peace Treaty—i.e. from a constitutional point of view—because, when New Zealand signed the Peace Treaty, unless it be that she was asked to sign it merely as a compliment to her, she took upon herself the status of a Power, involving herself in all the rights and obligations of one of the signatories of that Treaty. That means that she may have created for herself a new status altogether in the world of foreign affairs, and, instead of it being an act (as popularly supposed) to bring together more closely the component parts of the Empire, it may be that it really was the first step towards obtaining our independence, and treating ourselves as a Sovereign Power. If that is so, a most anomalous position arises, because you cannot have citizens in a Dominion like this owing loyalty and duty to two separate Sovereign Powers. . . . The way the question will arise in practical politics is this. When it comes to carrying out the terms of this Treaty, in reference either to Samoa or any of the other mandates, we want to know what our position is with foreign Powers. If they say to us : ‘ We treat you as a Sovereign State. You made peace, on your own initiative and by your own act, and we look to you in the future whenever a question of external affairs arises to act as an independent Power, making peace or war on your own initiative,’ one can see at once that it gives rise to an immense change in the British Constitution ; and may give rise to the greatest conflict between the different component parts of the Empire. Assuming that, in reference to Samoa, we got in conflict with some Eastern Power, and that our view does not coincide with that of South Africa or Canada, or even that of the Imperial Government, does it mean that we have, by the act of signing the Treaty, assumed to ourselves sovereign power, to make peace or war ? . . . What is to be our position in the future with regard to international disputes ? We cannot owe allegiance to two sovereigns. We cannot claim to have the right to a voice in international affairs and in making peace or war, and allow that we are at the same time subject to the Imperial Government. The fact is that, before any such act as the signing of the Peace Treaty by the representatives of the self-governing Dominions took place, there should have been an organized change in the constitution of the British Empire, with a view to providing for such a contingency. If we had a voice in foreign affairs, and if we were represented in the control of the diplomatic authorities in Great Britain, then no difficulty would arise, because our position would have been clear, but our

signing the Treaty as one of the self-governing Dominions places us in a most anomalous position with regard to foreign affairs, and, sooner or later, the question will be raised as to our position. . . . The only interpretation of this act from a constitutional point of view is that it makes for separation.”¹

Mr. Massey's reply was more satisfactory from a sentimental than from an argumentative point of view. The Dominions had signed the Treaty not as independent nations, in the ordinary sense of the term; but as partners, partners, with everything that the name implies. The great change, he insisted, did not take place with the signing of the Treaty but from the date that the representatives of the Dominions were called to the councils of the Empire, i.e. from the setting up of the first Imperial War Cabinet. Much, no doubt, remained to be done; and the final constitution was as yet in embryo. But, so far as making war or peace was concerned, no Dominion had power to make either peace or war. “If it became necessary and I hope it never will, for Britain to declare war, she will do so wholly as an Empire, not as the United Kingdom or as England, and it will make peace as an Empire, and in making war or peace the British Dominions will have a full say. There is no such thing as a tendency to break away on the part of the British Dominions. As a matter of fact, after what has taken place—the setting up of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917 and all the proceedings from that time forward, . . . it all means that we have been brought much closer together than ever before. . . . To-day we are united, the Dominions of the Empire, the United Kingdom, and dependencies under one Crown, one flag, and one constitution; and I hope that natural alliance will last for all time. . . . One of the greatest results of the war is that fact that it has cemented the British Empire into one complete whole—into a unity that cannot be destroyed, and which I believe will stand the test of time.”²

It will be noticed that Mr. Massey altogether avoided the legal argument. That the relations between the different portions of the self-governing Empire had been eminently satisfactory throws no light on the question of their relations with foreign Powers. An analogy can be drawn from personal experience. Most of us have come across families, the members of which treated each other, on the surface, in the most casual and cavalier fashion, and

¹ *N.Z. Hans.*, 6th sess., 1919, pp. 511-3.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 518-9.

yet between whom we knew that there were the underlying roots of the deepest mutual confidence and trust. But in such cases the lot of the unfortunate outsider is by no means an easy one. We do not want the members of the British Commonwealth to be so many *enfants terribles* in the society of the nations.

In a valuable paper on the Samoan Mandate, read at the Royal Colonial Institute,¹ Sir James Allen, who had been the New Zealand minister for defence during the war, called attention to the differing methods employed by the Dominions in making provision for carrying out the mandates given to them. The question, he explained, had arisen, whether the Dominions should receive their mandates direct from the proper authority, whoever that might be, or whether it was not more in accord with imperial ideas to utilize legislation already provided by the Imperial Parliament. He called attention to the difference in the action of South Africa and of New Zealand with regard to the mandates. In South Africa the mandate was taken as coming direct from the "principal allied and associated Powers," and South Africa was treated as fully competent in constitutional law to undertake such mandate and to provide for its execution, without any delegation from the Crown in its imperial capacity, or any augmentation of powers from the British Parliament. General Smuts was reported as saying: "It was incorrect to say that in the League the Empire was regarded as a unit. The Empire was regarded as a group, but South Africa had exactly the same right and voice as England." ² The Treaty of Peace and South-West Africa Mandate Act of 1919 was, therefore, passed without seeking for any authority from Great Britain.

Acting upon a recent decision of the Appeal Court of the Dominion that New Zealand could not legislate for territories beyond its limits, the Government determined to take advantage of imperial legislation known as the "Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890." Under authority of this Act an imperial Order-in-Council was gazetted on 11 March, 1920, and under its authority and that of the New Zealand Treaty of Peace Act of 1919, the Samoan Constitutional Order, 1920, was gazetted on 1 April, 1920, and civil government established in Samoa on 1 May.³

Lastly, great attention should be paid to the very able warnings of Mr. Eggleston in the article already cited. The extreme

¹ *United Empire*, Vol. XI, New Series, pp. 648-58.

² *Cape Times*, 10 Sept., 1919.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 652.

significance of the Dominions not only sitting at the Council table as separate Powers but also signing the Peace Treaty on their own behalf and becoming independent members of the League of Nations, had never been more clearly brought out ; ¹ though a writer in the *Round Table* had already commented on the curious anomaly that nations who would almost certainly rush to her aid were the Empire of Great Britain in danger, were yet unwilling to give such an undertaking in black and white, whereas they had gaily put their seal to promises which in sober fact they would be almost certain to refuse to fulfil.²

Mr. Eggleston has done well in refusing to do obeisance to the silence that generally surrounds this question. Neither statesmen nor public opinion seem to know the direction in which they are moving. To this rule there is one conspicuous exception. General Smuts knows his own mind and knows the form of the connexion for which he is willing to labour. The keynote of his position is that there shall be no intermediary organ between the King and his Dominion ministers. The last shred of authority by the British Government has, in his opinion, gone. Gone even more has the supremacy of the British Parliament. All that remains is the personal relation between the King and the Dominion. A few changes are necessary for the full realization of the new position, such as the discontinuance of the interposition of the Colonial Office in the appointment of Governors, etc., and the presence of Dominion diplomatic representatives with foreign states. "The campaign," Mr. Eggleston well reminded us, "which General Smuts has fought in South Africa since he returned to weld together the deeply divided elements, a campaign which the recent elections have crowned with striking success, is no doubt due in some measure to this skilful reading of the Peace Treaty. It is permissible to hope that this reconciliation is not founded on a contradiction. It will be seen, however, that, so far, General Smuts has been talking rather than acting. He himself confesses that his theory involves a considerable alteration in the machinery of the imperial system. No steps have yet been taken to bring about such an alteration."³

In any case it is difficult to avoid the horns of the dilemma. Either the system, adumbrated by General Smuts, involves a

¹ *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 235, p. 287-8.

² *Round Table*, No. 38, pp. 236-8.

³ *Quarterly Review* as cited, p. 296.

reactionary attempt to increase the power of the Crown, or it leads to impossible conclusions. Conceive the position of a King, bound to act on the advice of six different ministers, giving such advice in a directly contradictory manner.

But Mr. Eggleston raises a yet more insistent and difficult question. According to him, there is no justification for the doctrine of a British League of independent nations in the covenant itself. That covenant assumes that the individual members of the League will approach every question from an independent point of view. Could such a system work satisfactorily "if members who have an independent status and voice in the League are yet bound to one another in a complete naval and military organization? Will they use such an organization against one of their League? Will the British forces and the British economic organization be used to bring a recalcitrant Canada to book?"¹ The choice, he holds, has to be made between membership of the League and membership of the British League. "It will be a strange irony if the pacific policy of the Anglo-Saxon nations has erected something which destroys the most effective instrument of the world's peace—the British Commonwealth of Nations."²

"The most conspicuous element," he concludes, "in the whole episode has been the appetite for privilege and status, on the one hand, and the blindness, on the other, to the obligations and responsibilities which that status implies. None of the Dominions can protect itself with its own resources; and, in this essential respect, the basis of independence—even virtual independence—is absent. In short, there has been a failure to face the issue and the facts, a veiling of contradictions by their formulæ, and a radical irresponsibility."³

"The whole problem is to bring the Dominions as national units in touch with their responsibilities, to make them feel the realities of their position. . . . The only way in which the responsibilities of the Dominion leaders for the security of their own status can be discharged is by their deliberate choice of combined and co-operative action, and their rejection of everything which would prevent it. This may invoke a rejection of the separate voting power in the League, and the provision of some machinery by which the Empire can speak with a single voice. But it will not sacrifice the national identity of the Dominions. They could

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 301–2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 303.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

have a status in the League, take part in its subsidiary organizations and administrative activities, remaining nations, but realizing their nationhood in association with their partner nations in the British Commonwealth. This conception finally rules out the idea of imperial federation which would destroy the sense of responsibility in the Dominions by taking the problem of national security out of their hands, and placing it in the hands of an ineffective super-state remote from their daily life. These responsibilities must be discharged through their national institutions." ¹

I have quoted at such length from an Australian writer because I recognize that it is from the Dominions and not from Great Britain that the initiative must come which will make or mar the constitutional future of Greater Britain. Disquieting as these criticisms are, there are still further considerations tending to increase our alarm. Whether or not, under the strange, new conditions, imperial unity, as reflected in common policy or co-ordinated action, can continue, depends upon the possibility of continuing, amidst the distractions of peace, that close co-operation in council that helped to win the war.

We have seen that the Dominion Prime Ministers have remained faithful to their former convictions; but the attitude of the electors in the various countries has been much less satisfactory. Assuredly, they showed little generosity in their treatment of the statesmen who toiled and moiled at the work of the British Empire and of civilization. Sir R. Borden in Canada lost some parliamentary strength by his continuous absence; and Mr. Hughes suffered at the hands of the Commonwealth electors from the same cause. In South Africa, although the position has been retrieved by the results of the last election, the preceding one gave the nationalists a majority over the South African party, which constituted the supporters of the Government. Nowhere was the result encouraging to those who recognize that, without continuous consultation and discussion, there can be no common policy.

For, consider how the meeting of 1921 seems to have cleared the air. Beforehand there was distrust and suspicion in Canada, lest an aggressive British Ministry should attempt to draw the peace-loving Dominions into the vortex of world-politics; and in South Africa the idealist, General Smuts, seemed desirous of

¹ *Quarterly Review*, as cited, p. 305.

shaking himself free from the dust and dirt that have followed the European settlement. When, even in Great Britain, men began to ask themselves whether we could not, more and more, withdraw into our own shell, leaving, mainly, the solution of continental problems to those most closely concerned with them, is it to be wondered at if in the Dominions such a line of argument began to be heard? But if the world is, indeed, a troubled sea, casting up mire and dirt, the qualities required to calm it are just those which these new communities peculiarly possess—optimism, confidence in their own powers, and the determination to put to good use their own unrivalled natural resources. Once already they have responded to the cry of Europe. But “Come over and help us” sounds as clear to-day as it sounded in the dark days of 1914.

Again, consider what, without co-operation, the consequences must be. “I do not believe,” Lord Milner said in the House of Lords on June 17, 1920, “that on any great world question different views will be taken by the different parts of the Empire, so long as they remain in intimate touch with one another; and are able to consult steadily, before any crisis arises. What I dread is the possibility of a clash because action has been taken by one member of the family—it naturally would be by the United Kingdom—or because some course has been pursued in foreign policy by our own Foreign Office . . . which brings us up to a certain difficulty, a critical position when we should not find ourselves supported by other members of the family, simply because they did not know enough of the previous circumstances which had put us in the position when that decision had to be taken. Therefore what seems of vital importance is to keep up continuous knowledge.”¹

Another proposed measure is big with possibilities of trouble and misunderstanding. Canada has decided to have diplomatic representation at Washington—though no one seems to give more than a half-hearted approval to the measure. It is true, as explained in an official announcement of 10 May, 1920, that the new arrangement will not denote any departure, either on the part of the British Government or of the Canadian Government, from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the British Empire; but it may well be the thin end of the wedge; and if Canada leads the way, the Commonwealth will not be left behind; and, if the former

¹ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, I, p. 402.

requires a separate Minister at Washington, the latter will, as reasonably, require one at Tokyo, to watch over Australian interests. But, if each member of the partnership is to have a distinct diplomatic representation and to speak with a distinct voice, and, if the Dominions are too suspicious or too indifferent to thresh out a common policy, along with Great Britain, will it be possible for the British Empire to continue? Assuredly of this Commonwealth of Nations no less than of other organizations must the saying hold true: "A house divided against itself cannot stand." We have noted the strange suggestion of General Smuts that a single recalcitrant Dominion should be able to hold up the policy of the British Empire; but, quite apart from this, without singleness of purpose and of aim there can be no successful achievement.

Meanwhile, apart from the difficulties of time and space that might be partially met by the meetings to settle policy being held in different years at different places,¹ there is one change that might greatly improve the prospects of permanent co-operation. It was generally agreed, when a constitutional convention was in question, that it ought to be attended by leaders of the opposition, as well as by Ministers. Why should not the same principle be applied to the meetings of Prime Ministers; and the leaders of the opposition in the respective Parliaments be summoned, along with them? The leader of the opposition in Canada is a recognized official, receiving payment as such, and the presence of these opposition leaders at the Council meetings which settled future policy would help more than anything to secure continuity of policy; or else to expose the difficulties in the way that made the adoption of any particular policy full of risk. One condition would be necessary. An opposition leader should be willing to be sworn a member of the British Privy Council. Otherwise we might be admitting a

¹ Mr. Fisher and other Dominion statesmen have urged that the meetings of the Imperial Conference should not be held exclusively in London; it would be much easier to comply with this wish in the case of a conference of Prime Ministers where the questions at issue were questions of broad policy which did not require the presence on the spot of many permanent officials. Granted that the British Minister present was in the entire confidence of his colleagues and expressed their collective mind, it would not always be necessary that he should be the Prime Minister, so long as he was a strong man, able to hold his own among possible critics or opponents.

wolf into the sheepfold of imperial interests. (I do not know how far an opposition, such as that led by General Hertzog or the new Labour party in Australia, would be willing to call itself "His Majesty's opposition.") We in Great Britain know the advantage reaped by the recognition of the fact that questions of foreign policy stood outside the range of party politics; ministers like Lord Lansdowne and Sir E. (Lord) Grey speaking with a single voice. It is surely worth while to make some effort to attain this object, where imperial questions are concerned.

We have seen what value it was to the Empire that Mr. Fisher had been behind the scenes in 1911. Is not the moral that the more Dominions Ministers, present and future, can approach imperial questions with a full understanding of them, the more trust can be placed in them in times of need?

But even if political co-operation were satisfactorily secured, all would not have been accomplished. Unless a union of hearts accompany political union, connexion is at best precarious and temporary. We have seen how great a part the Imperial Conference has played in establishing friendly relations among the political leaders. But the Imperial Conference is only one out of many organizations working in the same direction. There is the Association of the Parliaments of the Empire, the Imperial Press Conference, the meetings of the Imperial Chambers of Commerce, and many other congresses and conferences, all making for a better understanding and more intimate relations. With respect to Canada, at any rate, there was much going to and fro between Great Britain and it before the war; though, as has been already noted, the sequelæ of the War have given a rude setback to such travelling, as well as to communication by letter.

But if the War has, in this direction, worked mischief, in another it has brought forth good. During it hundreds of thousands of Dominion soldiers found themselves in Great Britain, either training or on leave, or in hospital, and the cordial relations thus established between the different peoples have left lasting marks. (Thus we are told that the well-known warning "No Englishman need apply" is no longer ever seen in Canada.)

Meanwhile, under the inspiration of the late Lord Grey, and through the efforts of men like Sir Charles Lucas, Sir Godfrey

Lagden and Sir Harry Wilson, the Royal Colonial Institute has been extending its influence and doing yeoman service in the cause of a United Empire ; if only it could secure the sympathies of organized labour there would be hardly a limit to the range of its activities. Again, for the last ten years of our period the *Round Table* has supplied to the more thoughtful members of all parties a knowledge and understanding of Dominion questions which was before unattainable in the mother country. If the knowledge of colonial history amongst the educated classes of Great Britain is still small, compared with their knowledge of European history, there has none the less been a great improvement in the last twenty years. Upon the whole, the stars in their courses seem fighting on the side of a sane imperialism. Still, there is, perhaps, room for warning. The road to greatness can never be easy ; and it is by sacrifice that such greatness is attained. We have before us the lessons of the war. How different might be the present state of England, had an appeal been made to the higher side of the workers, the employers making manifest that they also were prepared to forego private gain. Instead, the workers were encouraged to extort the utmost that could be extracted from the needs of their country, whilst profiteering went on naked and unashamed. Not by such means can the new Britain, or the new Greater Britain, we have dreamed of, be won or preserved ; only by the old-fashioned virtues of self-sacrifice, regard for others, and merging one's own petty interests in the making of a greater whole, can the blessing be fulfilled for which Jacob wrestled till the breaking of the day.

[NOTE.—In a powerful and closely reasoned article in the *Canadian Historical Review* (Vol. III, pp. 3-23), Sir Clifford Sifton has insisted upon the necessity of an amendment of the British North America Act, not merely from the point of view of the relations between the Dominion and the Provinces, but from that of the relations between Canada and Great Britain. In times past Sir Clifford has shown himself a good friend to the British connexion ; one may be allowed to doubt whether, if the course he recommends were adopted, at the present time and under present conditions, it would make for the permanence of that connexion.

In the last conversation that the present writer had with Mr. G. L. Beer (whose loss one does not know whether most to deplore from the point of view of colonial economic history or from the point of view of present-day relations between the United States and Great Britain)

he said that, if the war ended in a draw, he thought that something in the nature of an English-speaking federation might come about ; but that, if the victory was decisive, the prospect would be less favourable. Similarly the very completeness of the Allies' triumph tends, with regard to the Dominions, to strengthen centrifugal tendencies.]

Appendix to Part I

A. THE NATIVE QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Among the problems confronting the British Empire none is more important or more difficult than the question—What is to be the future of the native under British rule? As the public conscience grows more and more sensitive, and as means of communication and publicity bridge the seas that divide continents, criticism will be more and more heard, not always based on the necessary knowledge. To understand the situation it is necessary to realize what was the life of the native under former conditions, as well as what it is now under European influence. Not much knowledge is required to dispel the fantastic notion of the primeval savage, living an independent life, in cheerful surroundings. In fact, his life was one of constant dread, dread of enemies natural and supernatural, of the wild beast of the jungle, and of the devils and their attendant witchcraft, that dogged his every movement. The coming of the white man has not always made the black man's lot a happy one; but at least it has added to his security. We may admit that civilized, or so-called civilized, men have both done those things that they ought not to have done and not done those things that they ought to have done; and yet distrust the judgement of those who, from the safe security of an arm-chair in England, are always sure that their fellow-countrymen must be in fault when the native question is in issue. For the most part dealings with natives belong to Crown Colony Governments; but there is one Dominion, the Union of South Africa, where the subject is one of the most vital importance. In British South Africa, where the natives outnumber the Europeans by some four to one, the complexity and difficulty of the subject are being continually brought home. In a purely tropical country like Northern Nigeria, where the number of resident Europeans must in the nature of things be small, the problem is comparatively easy; but in a white man's land, such as Cape Colony or the Transvaal, where a European democracy is confronted with a huge native population living in their midst, the problem may well seem almost insoluble. What is certain is that there is no one cut and dried way of finding safety. It is easy to say that God meant the black man to be a hewer of wood and a drawer of

water for the white man, and that any interference with that position is bound to lead to trouble ; but unfortunately the black man sees things in a different light. "Contact with the white man *has* educated the native, and to attempt to prevent him from getting a better education is as wise as screwing down the safety valve of an engine." ¹

On the other hand, to claim equality for the black man, as he exists at present, is to fly in the face of both science and instinct. Men may have advanced since the dictum of the Transvaal Republic's constitution : "The people will suffer no equality of white and blacks in either Church or State" ; but the spirit of that law still prevails.

More plausible is the policy of those who would separate the races, as far as possible ; the aim being to prevent race deterioration, to preserve race integrity, and to give to both the opportunity to build up and develop their separate racial type. The success of this policy in the Transkei and Basutoland has been undoubted ; but the difficulty is that, in the complex life of South Africa, white men and black work side by side, in a manner which forbids any such segregation. For better or for worse they form indispensable parts of one artificial whole.

What, then, is the peculiar character of this native problem that can be studied so profitably in the history of South Africa, both because it there shows its various aspects and because it has there been the subject of patient and exhaustive investigation ? That it has been dealt with differently in Cape Colony, Natal and the Transvaal is not merely the result of chance or of different national characteristics in Dutch or English ; but is, in great measure, due to a difference in the natives in question.

Still, the main movement has been everywhere the same. The one industry of the native was the pastoral ; and his wealth consisted in his sheep, cattle and goats. With the dominance of the European, there came the inevitable enclosure of the lands ; so that the utmost the native could obtain was the setting aside of certain reserves for his exclusive occupation. According to the *Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission*, 1903-5, "the policy of the Government of the Cape Colony, in respect of native land tenure, has been to begin by adopting the communal tenure of occupation observed by tribes in the independent state, and, by gradually adapting it to the changing conditions of life attendant upon the mode of civilization, while at the same time establishing a just and sound administration of their personal as well as tribal affairs, to prepare the way for recognition by the people of the advantages of an individual system tending towards assimilation of European methods." ² Under the Glen

¹ C. T. Loram, *The Education of the South African Native*, p. 19.

² Cd. 2399, 1905, p. 11.

Grey Act of 1894 a very efficient system of granting to the natives the benefit of private ownership of land was established in the Cape Colony. An impartial investigation, adjustment and settlement of disputes and difficulties, preceding detailed survey, have gone far, we are told, not only to remove prejudice and misapprehension from the minds of the natives, but also to facilitate subsequent work.¹ The grant is subject to the payment of a small annual quit rent ; is inalienable without the Governor's consent, and cannot be subdivided or sublet.

In all the South African provinces and possessions tracts of land have been set aside and reserved to natives for communal occupation. But, granting the attachment of the natives to the system of communal or tribal system of land tenure and its present advantages, it still seems certain that progressive tendencies are at work ; and that it is necessary to provide for the change which such tendencies are bringing about.² In this state of things, there is an inevitable movement in the direction of individual ownership.

In 1913 a Natives' Land Bill was introduced which sought to give effect to the principle of segregation. It provided that no native could hire or purchase land from a European, and that no European could hire or purchase land from a native. Non-native areas were to be created as well as additional native areas. On the second reading Mr. Merriman said that Mr. Rhodes and he had always agreed that it was the native question that made politics interesting in South Africa and raised them above a mere wrangle between the Ins and the Outs. Upon the answer to the question whether they did or did not their duty depended the whole future, not only of their part of South Africa, but of the whole of Africa. It was not the present generation that was going to pay for present mistakes, but those who came after it would have to pay.³

We have seen the mark made by General Smuts on the imperial and international relations of South Africa. But his attention was not confined to the consideration of such questions.

In the Native Affairs Bill of 1920 he made a genuine attempt to solve the most difficult of all South African problems. "Reform," he declared (26 May), "was long overdue ; no important departure in native policy having been made during the last twenty-five or twenty-six years—since the passing of the Glen Grey Act." To some extent the main provisions of the Bill were modelled on the lines of the schedule of the Union of South Africa Act. Speaking of the Natives' Land Act of 1913 General Smuts explained that the governing idea in those days was "segregation." It was thought that the proper solution was to divide South Africa into two camps, white and

¹ Cd. 2399, 1905, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

³ *Union of S.A. Deb.*, 1913, p. 2440.

black, and build up specific institutions which would give scope to both parts of the population. Under that Act a Commission was appointed to demarcate the areas in South Africa which should be white or native. This Commission did not report till 1916; and in 1917 the Government introduced an important and far-reaching Native Affairs Bill. This Bill, however, encountered very stormy weather; the native belief being that it represented a policy of repression, with the object of ousting them from the land. In this state of things the boundaries under the Act had to be reconsidered. Moreover, they had attempted too much, in covering the whole ground in one Bill, and it was decided to deal with the subject in different sections. The first step was the creation of new machinery, to shape a correct native policy. General Smuts had been deeply impressed by the humiliating sight of a native deputation to Paris, praying for the intervention of the British Government, the bearers of "an appalling document" animated by a spirit of distrust of the white people of South Africa.

"When he came back to South Africa, he found that the state of affairs had grown much worse, partly owing to the psychology of the war. The old trust and respect of the white man of a generation ago . . . was fast being replaced by something quite different. . . . The most complicated factor was the complete breaking up of the old tribal life and the engagement of more and more of the natives in the industrial life of the country. . . . The white man had been trying to give to the native a sort of education which was largely unsuitable, and the result was they were leading him on educational lines up to a dead wall over which he could not get; and he was left to the mercy of those agitators who were trying to poison his mind against the white people." "Only in one province had the native the vote; and nowhere was there the machinery whereby he could express his own views and bring them to the notice of the Government and people of the country. All these complications and troubles were leading to an estrangement which boded ill for the future of South Africa."¹

Under the terms of the new measure a Commission was set on foot to deal with the question of (a) territorial segregation; (b) education; (c) the life of the native in urban and industrial centres; (d) local government and taxation.

A further provision dealt with the creation of local councils, to consist of natives, with the exception of the chairman, who would be a government official. This part of the Bill followed on the lines of the Glen Grey Act. Lastly, there was to be established a system of native conferences, such as had been contemplated in the Transvaal and Orange Free State Constitutions of 1907, but had never been started.

¹ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, I, pp. 555-57.

The moral of the whole business to a Nationalist stalwart was that the white man must remain "boss." "He strongly deprecated the natives' claim to send deputations to Europe. The sooner they severed this bond with England the better it would be ; so that they would be able to administer their own domestic affairs." ¹

B. BRITISH INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

No chapter in imperial history is more melancholy and humiliating than that which deals with the treatment accorded to British Indians in British South Africa. Lord Lansdowne had put forward as one of the main grounds of the South African War the insistence upon a more generous treatment of British Indians. And yet what do we find ? That their condition became seriously worse under the substitution of British for Boer jurisdiction. In a temperate and convincing letter to Mr. Chamberlain dated 15 September, 1903, Sir M. Bhowndegree, M.P., drew a striking comparison between the state of things prevailing before and after the war. Before, Indians were free to enter the country without restrictions ; after, immigration was barred except that of *bona fide* refugees who had left on the eve of the war. Before, the payment of a registration fee was not required ; after, an annual fee of £3 was exacted on pain of fine or imprisonment. Before, trading in any part of the country had been allowed without licence ; after, all trading, outside allotted locations, was strictly forbidden. Before, residing in any part of the republic had been possible ; after, all Indians, except an educated few, were compelled to reside in locations. Before, land could be practically held in possession, some European lending his name as nominal owner ; after, the rule against Asiatics holding real property was rigidly enforced even when the land was needed for religious purposes. Before, Indians could hold nine years' leases for property in their locations in Johannesburg ; after, owners of such leases were expropriated under the Insanitary Areas Commission's Report, without guarantee of receiving a title elsewhere in the town. Before, there had been no separate inquisitorial Asiatic department ; after, that office was established, with arbitrary proceedings and delays. Before, there had been practical freedom to travel ; after, a vexatious system of passes, vouched by photographs, was set on foot. Before, harsh restrictions, imposed by law, had remained inoperative, owing, largely, to British interference ; after, these were rigorously put in force, and British Indians found themselves classed with savage and semi-civilized races.¹

¹ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, I, p. 566.

² *Correspondence relating to the Position of British Indians in the Transvaal*, 1904, Cd. 2239, pp. 4-22.

An Ordinance was passed by the Transvaal Government in 1906, making still more difficult the position of the British Indians. That Ordinance was disallowed by the home Government, but when, on the introduction of responsible government, the same measure in effect was put forward, Lord Elgin, as Secretary of State, reluctantly gave his assent. He considered it his duty to place it on record that His Majesty's Government did not consider the position of Asiatics, lawfully resident in the Transvaal, to be satisfactory, as settled by this Act ; that they adhered to the opinion which had been expressed by successive Secretaries of State as to the desirability of relaxing the restrictions to which Asiatics were at present subject. They commended this view to the Transvaal Government in the hope that practical effect might be given to it.¹ However, *mens immota manet, lacrymæ voluntur inanes* ; and the Transvaal authorities went on their way regardless. In vain had the Secretary of State for India pointed out the unfortunate effect upon public opinion in India which must be produced by the passing of the Bill.² The Act of 1907 was considered by the Indian community to be humiliating and deliberately directed against their self-respect ; and therefore it was determined to adopt passive resistance. According to the statement of an Indian, over three thousand five hundred imprisonments took place during the struggle ; over one hundred deportations to India occurred ; and two deaths were the result of the suffering gone through during the crisis. Several families were rendered homeless and had to be supported from public funds.³

At last, in 1911, a provisional settlement was arrived at ; which seemed to show a more friendly attitude on the part of the South African Government. The Indians thought that, in return for an almost absolute prohibition of all future immigration, those already resident would find themselves free from the state of uncertainty in which they had been living, and might look forward to a steady improvement in their status as a permanent element in the new nation that was forming in South Africa. The inauguration of the Union at once gave ground for hopes and for misgivings.

But the community, the same Indian asserted, was soon to be disillusioned. The administration of existing laws, specially affecting it, grew steadily harsher. What has been termed the "Northern" spirit began to pervade the administration of Natal and the Cape. "Thus the spirit of the settlement certainly began to be broken as soon as it was effected."⁴

According to General Botha, the bone of contention in the measure

¹ *Further Correspondence*, 1908, Cd. 3887, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³ *Correspondence relating to the Immigration Restriction Act*, Cd. 7111, 1913.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

of 1911 was the provision, taken from the Australian law, giving immigration officers discretionary powers with regard to the entrance of a few selected Asiatics; the attitude of the Orange Free State making such a provision nugatory in its case. Unanimous objection was made by all members of Parliament, representing the Orange Free State constituencies, to any educated Indian being allowed to enter that province; and the Orange Free State Provincial Council protested strongly to the same effect.¹

(The minister in charge of the Bill of 1913 declared that "in the Orange Free State they had shown from the start what was good for the country, and it was not the first time that the Orange Free State had shown South Africa what was to be done, and that Bill was going to preserve their rights." ²)

The Indian community, on the other hand, stated that they accepted the draft law as it stood; but that they would be compelled to continue their agitation in order to secure that all educated Asiatics should enjoy the same freedom in the Orange Free State as it was contemplated that they should enjoy in the other provinces of the Union.³

Natal afforded the clearest instance of injustice suffered by the Indian community. Here their presence was the direct result of the act of the Government which had introduced them as indentured labourers. It certainly seemed hard that because of a new policy they should be subjected to a special tax of £3 a head, if they did not at once leave the country at the termination of their indenture.

Meanwhile the abortive Bill of 1912 brought things no nearer to a settlement. Then came the memorable visit of Mr. Gokhale; and once more high hopes were raised. Declarations were made by responsible ministers inducing the expectation that a satisfactory Bill would be passed during the next session, and that the objectionable tax of £3 in Natal would be withdrawn.

But the Bill of 1913, according to the Indian contention, dashed these hopes to the ground. As first drafted it was said to have broken almost every condition of the settlement of 1911; and, though afterwards improved, the failure to remit the £3 tax, except in the case of women, remained a distinct grievance.⁴

According to Mr. Fischer, the minister in charge of the Bill, the attitude of Mr. Gokhale in South Africa had been most reasonable, but after his return to India his whole tone changed. "He said these people should be able to enter and leave South Africa without difficulty.

¹ *Further Correspondence respecting a Bill to Regulate Immigration into the Union of South Africa, with Special Reference to Asiatics*, 1912, Cd. 6283, p. 2.

² *Correspondence*, etc., Cd. 6940, 1913, p. 22.

³ Cd. 6283, p. 2.

⁴ Cd. 7111, 1913, p. 26.

They should have freedom of movement from province to province, and should be able to reside wherever they chose, to acquire their own land and other properties and receive proper assistance from the State, in regard to the education of their children, and be entitled to the political franchise, and entry into the public service and public life should be freely open to them. That was a very laudable wish on their part; but they would be fools if they allowed that laudable ambition to be realized. . . . Let them be honest about it. One race would have to be the master, and they who were masters at present had better remain masters.”¹

Evidently, in spite of the efforts of men like Botha and Smuts to secure a compromise, the prevailing temper was not one very favourable for it. Our Indian authority goes on: “Notwithstanding . . . Mr. Gandhi was authorized to enter into negotiations for a settlement by submitting proposals which, if accepted, would have just, but only just, sufficed to fulfil the letter of the provisional agreement of 1911. . . . But the Government . . . not only rejected most of Mr. Ghandi’s proposals, but they are showing by their administration of the new Act in Natal and by . . . regulations under the Act that it is their desire not only to keep out new immigrants, but also to keep out domiciled residents who before the new Act found no difficulty in re-entering, and to put obstacles in the way of wives of domiciled Indians entering their respective provinces.”²

At the same time there can be no doubt that the Act of 1913 was a great step forward in the settlement of the question. In justice to South Africa it should be remembered that that country is the only Dominion which allows (subject to strict precautions) any Indian who has acquired the right of residence to bring his wife and young children from India to take up permanent residence.³ (We need not here trouble ourselves over the controversy about what is a monogamous marriage.)

With the general cessation of immigration the necessity of those odious precautions, such as a record of finger prints, will have gone and there will be less friction between the two races. General Smuts at the Imperial War Conference of 1917 took a very optimistic attitude. “In South Africa,” he said, “there has been this fundamental trouble, that the white community have been afraid of opening the door too wide to Indian immigration. We are not a homogeneous population. We are a white minority on a black continent, and the settlers in South Africa have for many years been actuated by the fear that to open the door to another non-white race would make the position

¹ Cd. 6940, pp. 22-23.

² Cd. 7111, p. 26.

³ *Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers laid before the Imperial War Conference, 1917*, p. 160.

of the few whites in South Africa very dangerous indeed. It is because of that fear, and not because of any other attitude towards the question of Asiatics, that they have adopted an attitude which sometimes, I am bound to admit, has assumed the outward form, although not the reality, of intolerance. Luckily we have got over those difficulties. The visit of the late Mr. Gokhale to South Africa did an enormous amount of good. His visit was followed later by the visit of Sir Benjamin Robertson, a distinguished public servant of India, who also assisted the Government to overcome great difficulties three years ago. The result has been the passage of legislation to which both the white and the Indian communities in South Africa agreed. There is still a difference of opinion on administrative matters of detail, but I feel sure, and I have always felt sure, that, once the white community of South Africa were rid of the fear that they were going to be flooded by unlimited immigration from India, all the other questions would be considered subsidiary and would become easily and perfectly soluble. That is the position in which we are now—that the fear, which has formerly obsessed the settlers there, has been removed; the great principle of restricting immigration is on our statute book with the consent of the Indian population in South Africa, and the Indian authorities in India, and that being so I think that the door is open now for a peaceful and statesmanlike solution of all the minor administrative troubles which occurred and will occur from time to time. . . . I, for one, do not consider that amongst the multitudinous problems which confront us in our country the question of India will trouble us much in future.”¹

Still we have already seen that all South Africans do not regard the Indian question with such an enlightened eye; and any moment the question of the franchise may become of importance. In the past the argument in Natal for the refusal of this has been the reminder that in India Indians were without this privilege; but the introduction of the new system of government in India has altered all this; and, seeing that the Indian population of South Africa is strictly limited, it would, surely, be a measure of wisdom to give them votes, subject to a fairly high educational condition. At the Conference of Prime Ministers in 1921 the Indian representatives laid great stress upon this point. They were willing to maintain the compromise under which immigration from India to the Dominions should be severely restricted; but they insisted that such Indians as had found their way to the Dominions should be placed on a footing of political equality. The Conference “in the interests of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth” recognized the justice of this claim; but unfortunately the

¹ *Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers laid before the Imperial War Conference, 1917, pp. 119-20.*

representatives of South Africa were unable to accept this resolution "in view of the exceptional circumstances of the greater part of the Union."

In 1919, to remedy the existing confusion in the effect of the law with regard to the position of Indian traders in the Transvaal, the Asiatics Trading and Land and Trading Amendment Act was passed, under which in mining areas no *new* trading licences may be issued except in respect of a business for which a licence was held before 1 May, 1919. In non-mining areas the position of the Indians was not altered except that evasions of the law, by forming a limited company or by becoming the mortgagee of a nominal European owner, were henceforth made impossible.¹

A Royal Commission which considered the whole question of the position of Indians in the Union in 1920 reported against compulsory repatriation or segregation which had been put forward as necessary. They recommended a revision of trade licensing laws, and that they should be uniform throughout the Union. The right of Asiatics to acquire and own land for farming or agricultural purposes should be confined to the coast belt. A further recommendation was the appointment of a single responsible official to administer Asiatic affairs.

The figures of the 1921 Census have given the quietus to the panic rumours of a great increase in the number of Indians in the Union that had been prevalent. Nevertheless, no final solution of the problem has been attained. One fully recognizes that Europeans in South Africa have to maintain at all costs their standard of living and of civilization. Still, in doing this, they should lay to heart General Smuts' pregnant warning. "Anything we did in Natal or the Union had a very far-reaching influence, an influence which might even shake the foundations of the Empire. . . . The best thing they could do was to induce Indians in ever-increasing numbers to leave South Africa and to go back to their own country. Let them reverse the process of the past and encourage the white, while watching the Asiatic population dwindle. He felt that that was the solution which was fundamentally sound." ²

C. RHODESIA

Hitherto we have been mainly dealing with the evolution of the Dominion status and with some of its incidents; but it is impossible to avoid all mention of that great province which, although it is only now reaching the stature of complete self-government, yet from the

¹ See the very clear and able statement of the case from the point of view of the moderate advocates of differentiation in the *Round Table*, No. 38, pp. 445-62.

² Speech, 20 Dec., 1921, quoted from the *Round Table*, No. 46, pp. 446-47, from which I have also taken the account of the Commission.

first carried within its loins the certainty of such development. It is a matter of common knowledge how the future Rhodesia, commanding the road to the north, was saved from the possible intrusion of Germany by the determination and the disinterestedness of one man. When Cecil Rhodes died it seemed to settlers and natives alike that their mainstay had left them ; and that they must henceforth bear the ills of fortune, unaided by the sympathy and help of the founder. But the directors of the British South Africa Company endeavoured to rise to the level of his example. Sir Louis Michell, after his visit in 1902, reported that, though the first pioneers and their immediate successors had had troublesome times and scanty rewards, still a great future awaited the country ; and, in spite of many initial difficulties, Rhodesia was going to hold its own as an integral factor in the ultimate settlement of South Africa.¹

Considering the criticisms that have been made on the treatment of the native by the Rhodesian authorities, it is interesting to note the reports of the Native Commissioners. The Chief Commissioner in Matabeleland reported that the progress of transition from a well-defined but barbarous social system to one of progressive civilization continued to accelerate, though it was bound to be slow in a country showing so great a disparity between the native and the European population. Firm and patient tutelage was the only way to counteract the disintegrating and degrading tendencies of the first contact with civilization.² The Mashonaland Commissioner wrote : " To accustom the natives to steady work is a task which will take years to accomplish, more particularly as they have no desire to become rich. Their one idea is to obtain the necessary money to pay the tax, which can be obtained within two months, and then to return to their homes and loll about in idleness, drinking beer. . . . It will be necessary to introduce a higher standard of living at the kraals ; and the natives, while at work, must be educated in higher wants and ambitions, so that, when they return to their kraals, their friends may regard them with envy, inducing rivalry."³

The next year's Report recorded a distinct improvement among the Matabele. The natives were making rapid progress in their appreciation of their relations to the Government ; they recognized that the Company's rule was not a matter of brute force. Accordingly, constant contact with a military force was no longer necessary ; and everything possible should now be done to subordinate the crude conception of the police in the native mind to the idea of an arm of the civil administration.⁴ The poll-tax had been raised to £1 a head instead of 10s. ;

¹ *British South Africa Company's Report for Year ending March 1, 1903*, pp. 1-2.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1904, pp. 6-7.

the British Government having refused to sanction a tax of £2, as in the Transvaal. Native taxation was about 6s. 3d. a head, and European about £9.

At last in 1906 it seemed as if the tide had turned. For the first time there was an apparent surplus of revenue over expenditure for Southern Rhodesia, leaving out of account the territory to the north. A little later the extension of the railway north from Broken Hill to the rich mineral district of the Belgian province of Katanga held out hopes of increased traffic for the railways.

Meanwhile, as the settlers grew in number and in importance, they naturally chafed at having so little say in the management of affairs. The Company was prepared to meet their wishes as far as was possible. So long as it had the financial responsibility of administration, it had to maintain the control of the purse-strings ; and it had to be secured in the enjoyment of its commercial rights and privileges. Subject to those limitations the people of Rhodesia should enjoy the fullest possible liberty to manage their own affairs.¹

In justice to the Company it should be noted that the native population increased 50 per cent in the six years 1901 to 1907, from some 480,000 to some 639,000 ; and the number of their cattle was multiplied nearly by four. These and similar facts showed that the claim to have extended the blessings of civilization was no empty boast, and that the result of the occupation of that great country had been to give peace, security and good government to hundreds of thousands of individuals who, not twenty years ago, lived and moved in daily fear of their lives.² "The chiefs carry out the duties entrusted to them with tact and discretion ; they view with pride the distinction conferred on them, and, with few exceptions, command the respect of the people. . . . Progress in civilization is very perceptible. . . . The local native . . . is by instinct an agriculturist and stock-breeder ; and in these directions he has shown a distinct tendency to acquire knowledge with a view to further his own interests."³ In this state of things it seemed advisable to increase the responsibilities of the chiefs and also to set on foot native councils with certain powers in regard to local matters.⁴ At the same time the management of the lands reserved for the natives was far from satisfactory, and it was proposed to introduce regulations with regard to it on the lines of the Cape Colony Glen Grey Act.⁵

A memorable event of the year 1908 was the completion of the Rhodesian trunk line from south to north. The country had now been made accessible by main lines from south to north and from east to west. The financial horizon was clearer, and the company was free to proceed

¹ *Ibid.*, 1907, pp. 6-7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1908, pp. 31-32.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

energetically with the scientific development and settlement of its great estate.¹

The prospect of cheap land, easy terms of purchase and an assured and abundant rainfall was attracting large numbers of the most desirable class of settler, both Dutch and English, from other portions of South Africa where they had had a hard struggle against the unfavourable conditions of high-priced land, droughts and plagues.²

Year by year the tone of the Reports became more confident, and there seemed every reason to believe that Rhodesia had entered upon a period of solid progress and real prosperity.³ With regard to white and black alike, there was this feeling of hopefulness. The native was clamouring for education and meant to have it ; and it was the duty of the Government to aid and guide him in the right direction, in order that, in time, he might take his place as a useful citizen.⁴ In 1910 North-East and North-West Rhodesia were united as one in Northern Rhodesia. With responsibilities for a population of over a million natives and only some twenty thousand Europeans, it was impossible to segregate completely the native population in Reserves, with the object of keeping them from contact with the European inhabitants. The true policy was to make the native as efficient as possible so as to enable him to contribute his maximum to the development of the country.⁵

A committee which considered the whole native question in 1910-11 recommended (1) that existing native laws and customs should, as far as possible, be respected ; (2) that the authority of the chiefs should be recognized ; (3) that the natives should be induced to leave their Reserves and cultivate habits of industry ; (4) that medical supervision and provision should be provided for native areas ; (5) that increased attention should be paid to native education, especially industrial education ; (6) that a special tribunal should be established for cases between natives ; (7) that a secretary for native affairs should be appointed ; (8) that native administration should be combined with the district courts and offices ; and, lastly, that a Government department should be created for the registration, inspection and supervision of native labour, but that no recruiting should be carried on by Government officials.⁶

With the increase of the European population the office work of the Native Commissioners was inevitably increased ; so that it became more difficult for them to visit the natives in their own homes and observe for themselves the conditions under which they lived, and

¹ *British South Africa Company's Report for Year ending March 1, 1909*, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, 1910, p. 69.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵ *Meeting of Company*, 23 Feb., 1911, p. 12.

⁶ *Report*, 1911, p. 45.

to come by these means into friendly relations with them. The only remedy was an increase in the number of these Commissioners.¹ At the same time from Mashonaland the ominous complaint was heard that the younger generation was breaking away from the old tribal control and that the chiefs were no longer held in awe. The communal system was gradually dying out, and a tendency towards individualism was gradually making its way. In this state of things an increase in the powers of the Native Commissioners which had been made was followed by excellent results.²

Renewed political discontent amongst the white settlers called forth a full statement of the Company's policy from Mr. Rochfort Maguire on 22 March, 1913: "It was always," he said, "the great object and aim of our founder to build up here in Rhodesia a great self-governing State. This was what he dreamed of and worked for. . . . It seems to me that the two outstanding factors in Southern Rhodesia are the Chartered Company and the white population. Without the initiative, the resources, the self-sacrifice of the Company, securing the occupation, the civilization of the country, on the basis we see to-day, would not have taken place in our time. But the object of all these labours and toil was to place in this country a white population, to build it up in strength and in numbers, and to fit it to take its place among the peoples of the Empire.

"In the early days, the population, I may say, was dependent for its existence in the country upon the Company. . . . But, as the population grew in numbers and in strength, the Company had recognized the fact by giving it increased political power. That process would be continued until self-government was reached. But it should be recognized that the Company had also its place in the country; that its interests and those of the population were indissoluble, and therefore it was necessary to have a clear statement regarding their respective rights."

He then proceeded to outline the constitutional and fiscal policy of the Board. The Company, as in the past, wished to ensure adequate representation of the community in the Legislative Assembly. The Administration had been instructed to introduce a redistribution ordinance during the next session of the Council; under which the number of elected members would be raised to twelve, as against eight nominated by the Company. As and when the circumstances of the territory warranted, further increases in the number and in the proportional power of the elected members would be brought about.

After dealing with financial matters, into which we need not here enter, Mr. Maguire said: "That is the statement. You will observe

¹ *Ibid.*, 1912, p. 48.

² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

it is a proposal for bridging over the period antecedent to self-government ; the ideal towards which we are working.

" Some here may have other ideals. There is the ideal of merging the identity of Rhodesia into that of the great State to the south, of closing, as it were, the history of Rhodesia, at the outset of its political career. I am not here to condemn that ideal, but frankly I do not share it. . . .

" You will weigh well the arguments in favour of advancing on the defined paths on which you have advanced so far, as opposed to a plunge, alluring it may be, but into the unknown. You will consider whether under any other form of representative government you would, in fact, be more able to impose the will of the people of Rhodesia upon those in whose hands the administration is placed than you are able to impose it upon the Chartered Company. That is the reality of government ; and, believe me, it is the heart of this question. The Company is here with you ; it spends its time in ascertaining your wishes and your wants. Its resources are devoted to the country. Its interests are your interests. Its existence is bound up with your prosperity. Short of self-government it does not seem to me that there can be any form of government over which you would exercise so great an influence ; and, beyond all that, you have the Crown to appeal to. As has been finely said, you are, as it were, carving your names on the rind of a young tree, and you will find them written in larger letters as the trunk expands. That young tree is the nation of Rhodesia. See to it that the characters are written in characters straight and clear."¹

The Charter expired in October, 1914, and the question of its renewal had to be faced. The result of the elections to the Legislative Council decided that question. The electors were unanimous in favour of the continuance of the Company's rule ; the two possible alternatives, Crown Colony government and absorption in the South African Union, commending themselves to few.

But though the majority of the settlers might recognize that, for the present, they could not stand alone, it by no means followed that they were willing to give a blind assent to whatever was proposed by the Company. On two questions the Company and the settlers' representatives were at issue—on the question of the ownership of the land and on the question of the appropriation of the public revenue. With regard to the first a resolution of the Legislative Council (17 April, 1914) claimed, on behalf of the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia, that the ownership of the unalienated land in that territory was not vested in the British South Africa Company as its commercial or private property. So far as it had possessed ownership, such ownership had

¹ *Correspondence relating to the Continuance of the Charter of the British South Africa Company*, Cd. 7645, 1914, pp. 31-37.

been merely that of a trustee, acting on behalf of the people.¹ With regard to the second point at issue a draft Proclamation of Lord Gladstone would have given to the elected members a majority in the Legislative Council for all purposes without reservations; but against such a state of things the Company strongly protested. The danger to be guarded against was that the executive might be paralysed and rendered incapable of carrying out its administrative duties. It was therefore proposed to give to the governing authority, in certain circumstances, the power to act against the votes of the majority of the Legislative Council; such power to be used only in exceptional cases and under carefully regulated conditions.²

The Secretary of State agreed with the Company in considering that the suggestion that any member of the Legislative Council should have the right to propose the appropriation of the public revenue could not be sanctioned. It was contrary to the principle, which was almost universally followed in the British Empire, that the expenditure of public money could only be proposed by those responsible for its administration.³

At the outbreak of war the European population had increased to upwards of 30,000 in Southern Rhodesia and 2,250 in Northern Rhodesia; and the receipts from the Company's land and mineral estate were steadily increasing.⁴ Practically every man went to the front who could be spared, without endangering the safety of the population and bringing the administration, the railway and the chief industries to a standstill. The natives awaited with calm confidence the issue of the war. Should the occasion ever arise, the chief Native Commissioner reported, to call for their services for military purposes, they would loyally respond. The system of holding meetings of the chiefs and headmen, addressed by the Administrator, proved very successful in establishing friendly and intimate relations between the natives and the Government.⁵ Wonderfully willing was the response in Northern Rhodesia, no less than in Southern, to the calls made on the natives for food, and for work as carriers, military porters, or on the construction of roads and telegraph lines.⁶

The Company's Report of 1918 noted with just pride the steadiness of loyalty exhibited by the native population of both the Rhodesias during the war. In Northern Rhodesia very heavy and con-

¹ *Papers relating to a Reference to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the Question of the Ownership of Land in Southern Rhodesia*, Cd. 7509, 1914.

² *Correspondence relating to the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia*, Cd. 7264, 1914.

³ Cd. 7645, 1914, p. 29.

⁴ *Rep.*, 1913 and 1914, p. 42.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1915, p. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1916, p. 7.

tinuous demands had been made on the natives for portage purposes ; and serious troubles had arisen among the natives in Portuguese East Africa, and thousands of refugees had sought an asylum within British territory. Finally a severe epidemic of influenza in 1918 had added to other ills ; and yet, throughout, the attitude of the natives had been one of steady confidence in the administration and of an increasing disposition towards education and industrial habits. " When the King," a message from the Southern Rhodesian chiefs declared, " called for help, we sent our young men, who fought and died beside the English ; and we claim that our blood and that of the English are now one."

The South Africa Company might legitimately claim that this satisfactory attitude was a strong tribute to the system upon which its native policy had been framed, and to the officials who had been directly concerned in carrying it out.¹

Lord Buxton, the High Commissioner, said at Salisbury on 26 August, 1919 : " I have taken naturally and hereditarily a great interest in the question, and I can say, and I desire to say it emphatically, that from what I have seen and learned the administrative treatment and the attitude of mind of the Europeans in Rhodesia with regard to the natives compares favourably with any other community in which Europeans have control of the natives." ²

A Royal Commission in 1915 dealt with the subject of the Native Reserves. The native population in 1913 was about 712,780, of whom about 400,000 were living in Reserves ; the total area of the Reserves allowing a higher amount for each inhabitant than that obtaining in other parts of South Africa. The cumulative effect of the available evidence went to show that the aggregate area of Reserves was more than sufficient for the present and future needs of the native population. If, therefore, there was congestion in any particular district, what was wanted was either a readjustment or a redistribution of population. Above all, it was indispensable to induce the natives to make a better use of the lands assigned them.³ The native outlook was changing ; and, in time, more stable conditions would come about ; while the facilities for travel and communication would help to break down old prejudices.

There had been nothing in the conduct of the administration either to limit the areas set aside for the exclusive use of the natives or to delay the economic development of these areas. To set aside areas

¹ *Rep.*, 1918, pp. 6-7.

² *Correspondence with the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society relating to the Native Reserves in Southern Rhodesia*, Cd. 547, 1920, p. 29.

³ *Papers relating to the Southern Rhodesia Native Lands Commission*, 1915, Cd. 8674, 1917, p. 12.

quite unnecessarily large for future needs would not be in the real interests of the natives; for it would have the effect of retarding what should be the aim of those placed in the position of trustees of the native interests, viz. the spread of education and of sound progress.¹ The Commission made practical recommendations with regard to improving the cultivation of the Reserves; such as the securing of a water-supply, adequate roads and rights of way, and improved methods of agriculture. It was desirable that the amount of money allotted to the education of the native should be increased. Lastly, the chiefs and headmen should be induced to recognize and discharge their obligations towards the people. They should recognize that, to some extent, they held the Reserves in trust for the people, who were, and ought to be, the true owners and beneficiaries. The native community should be educated to grasp the idea that the chiefs and headmen were merely trustees and guardians of the people. Many chiefs were vested with authority and drew money subsidies from the Government; but these privileges entailed obligations and responsibilities towards the people they were required to control and to protect.²

So far, there seems little to quarrel with the tone or temper of the Commission's Report, but they recommended some curtailment, as well as a readjustment, of the native areas; and at once the Aborigines' Protection Society detected a malignant invasion of native rights. One of the Commissioners was denounced as an official of the Land Department of the Company, and another was suspect as having taken part in the Jameson Raid. The following is an example of the Society's methods of writing history: "The Mashonas and the Matabele (somewhat in the relations of the Saxons and the Normans in early England) were in the country before Europeans came there at all. Europeans, desiring the land, picked a quarrel with the Matabele; and under pretext of a title doubly vicious . . . appropriated and alienated vast tracts of land and herds of cattle, ignoring any rights, not only of the Matabele over-lords . . . but of the Mashonas (whom they used to assist in smashing the Matabele, but gave to them no land or loot as they did to their white followers), who had perhaps a closer and more legitimate interest in the soil, and imposed rent and taxation upon them for occupying their own settlements."³ Sufficient comment on all this will be found in the reply of Mr. H. S. Keigwin, a Native Commissioner.

The natives, on application, had been granted over half a million acres of new Reserves. The native practice was continually to change their lands, getting, as a rule, not more than two years' crops off the same piece of land. "I maintain, and speak with experience of the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

endorsement of native opinion, that this provision of Reserves is the most popular, the most equitable and the most sensible administrative action. The total area is generous, the type of soil is suitable. The obligation, if any, now rests on the native. One has only to look back a few years and one sees the Matabele as fugitives from Tschaka ; defeated later and driven north by the Boers ; exposed to an attack from them at any time ; a wandering section of a tribe, scarcely yet settled in the country, to which they had fled. But for our arrival and the consequent ordering of the country, they would have done little in the way of agriculture, but would have carried on their brigandage till wiped out by some stronger force, or driven farther north, to begin it all over again. Longer established, but by no means indigenous, the Mashonas were a motley crowd of mixed tribes, with no central tribal control, no military organization, a prey to the first army that should attack them. They lived mostly in the hills, planting lands in the bush, never sure that they would not be wiped out in the night. To-day they are down in the open, with ample room for lands, growing rich with flocks and herds, men and women secure from attack ; free and unmolested. Both the tribes have the protection and the advice of the Native Department, while provision for their education and development is every day increasing. That a man can so shut his eyes to this beneficent result of less than thirty years of chartered rule, and try to make out these same people to be victims of ruthless spoliation, passes understanding.”¹

But a worse blow was to fall upon the British South Africa Company than the angry words of men who showed their love of humanity chiefly by bringing railing accusations against their fellow-countrymen. There can be no doubt but that the Company honestly believed that the ownership of the unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia belonged to it ; and most people were under the impression that this was so. When, therefore, the long delayed decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was given on 28 July, 1918,² it came as a bomb-shell. The questions at issue were fairly simple. Had the original charter contained any grant of the unalienated lands ? No ; because the ownership of the lands still remained with Lobengula. But had his overthrow in 1893, followed by the confiscation of the lands, inured to the benefit of the Company ? Again no ; because, in the absence of an express grant, the ownership must rest with the Crown ; and there was no evidence of such express grant. On the other hand the Company was declared to be entitled to certain payments from the British Government, into the details of which it is unnecessary here to enter.

¹ *Papers relating to the Southern Rhodesia Native Lands Commission*, 1915, Cd. 8674, 1917, pp. 39-40.

² Cmd. 547, 1920, pp. 40-2.

A General Election, held in April, 1919, for the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council returned a body of members unanimously opposed alike to the incorporation of the territory in the Union and to the continuance of the Company's government. With a single exception all the members were in favour of the immediate introduction of responsible government. The reluctance, however, to enter the Union was perhaps in great measure caused by the fear of falling under the rule of a Dutch majority ; and the recent merging of parties, under a Ministry representing both the Dutch and the British races, may well cause the Southern Rhodesian electors to modify their opinions. From the point of view of imperial interests the addition of Rhodesia as a province of the Union would be of very great value. A population of several thousands in what was German South-West Africa must shortly receive the vote and help to swell the number of Nationalist electors. An antidote in the shape of a much larger number of voters, mainly British, from the most British portion of South Africa, would be very welcome to all those who believe in the ideals of Cecil Rhodes, and that his mantle has now fallen upon the shoulders of General Smuts.

The question was further considered in 1921 by a committee presided over by Lord Buxton. With regard to the natives they recommended that no conditions, disabilities or restrictions should be imposed by law, without the previous consent of the imperial authority, which did not equally apply to persons of European descent (save in respect of arms, ammunition and liquor) ; whilst the right to the franchise should remain unaffected. The native reserves should remain inalienable except in the special circumstances provided for by an Order-in-Council of 1920. The right of the natives to acquire individual titles to land should be preserved, even though, in fact, it was very improbable that many of them would be in a position to avail themselves of such right.

With regard to claims of the Chartered Company, the committee recommended that, the Cave Commission having awarded the sum of £4,400,000 for losses on administration, and the Colonial Office having stated that "unalienated lands would remain in the hands of the Crown's nominees until the sum due to the company had been liquidated," a Land Board should be set on foot, to consist of three members, one to be nominated by the High Commissioner, one by the Chartered Company, and one by the Governor-in-Council. The first of these should be chairman.

"The imperial authority would thus be in a position to adjust the balance fairly as between possible rival policies for the disposal of the land ; and to secure that, on the one hand, land settlement was not unduly delayed, and that, on the other, the Company's security was not rendered nugatory. So soon as the charge in respect of the deficit had been liquidated, the remaining balance of the Crown land would be

handed over to the Government of Southern Rhodesia. On establishment of responsible government, the total capital expenditure for which the Colony would be liable would be about £1,500,000, which would involve a charge for interest and sinking fund of over £100,000 a year. The Committee recommended that the detailed scheme should be submitted to a referendum of the white settlers, for acceptance or rejection.

A Constitution similar to that granted to the Transvaal in 1906 has now been agreed upon; and, when once the terms, on which admission to the South African Union would be granted, have been made known, the electors of Southern Rhodesia will decide whether Southern Rhodesia shall take its place in the partnership of British nations as a separate colony, or as a part of the South African Union.

It will no doubt be necessary to separate the territories lying to the north of Southern Rhodesia and deal with them on a separate basis. It was the vastness of its extent and the multifarious character of its obligations that prevented the British South Africa Company from ever becoming a paying concern. Relieved from the burdens of Government one may hope for it a more successful future as a commercial venture. Assuredly nobody has ever deserved better at the hands of the British Commonwealth than these directors and shareholders who have borne the heat of the day with constant disappointments and with no financial returns. Of the future of the country they have developed there can be no doubt. With a more fertile soil than any other portion of South Africa, with great mineral resources still mainly waiting development, above all with a population in some respects the salt of the earth, Rhodesia, whether, for a time, a separate self-governing colony, or whether in the immediate future an important province of the Union, will take its rightful share in the moulding of the future of South Africa.

PART II

THE GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD RACES

I chose out their way, and sat chief, and dwelt as a King in the army,
as one that comforteth the mourners. JOB

Some Empires have rested on armies and some on Constitutions. It
is the boast of the British Empire that it rests on men.

LORD ROSEBERRY

CHAPTER I

AFRICA

HITHERTO we have been dealing with the self-governing Dominions, but there are other portions of the Empire which, though their nominal boundaries have not been greatly extended (except under the Treaty of Bangkok with Siam and by the acquisition of territory under mandate), have shown during the last twenty years development no less remarkable. Space forbids to deal with the full story of that development; and here we shall mainly concentrate on one aspect of it—how far has Great Britain in moving forwards realized her responsibilities towards the native races committed to her charge? An answer to the question is the more necessary because it has been maintained by writers of ability that whereas before the latter part of the nineteenth century other motives were at work, afterwards commercial greed dominated the situation.¹

For present purposes it will be sufficient to deal with typical African Colonies and Protectorates and with Malaya.

UGANDA

How far, then, does the case of Uganda support such a theory? When the Government of Lord Rosebery decided, after consider-

¹ See *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, 1919, by L. Woolf.

able hesitations and heartburnings, to maintain the British hold of Uganda, the motives at work had assuredly nothing to do with the prospect of commercial gain. The heart of the religious world in Great Britain had been deeply stirred by the news of zealous Christian congregations in the depths of Africa ; so that a forward policy was approved in circles not always favourable to such a policy. Further, there was the political motive. The British road to India lay through Egypt ; and to ensure the safety of Egypt, it was necessary that not only the Sudan, but also Uganda, which had within its limits the main source of the Nile supply, should be under British control.¹

At the same time the aim was to help and encourage the natives to govern themselves, so far as possible, without too much interference from European officials. In speaking of Uganda one must distinguish between the Protectorate, as a whole, and the more limited Uganda or Buganda kingdom or province. Under the Agreement of 10 March, 1900, that province was divided into twenty districts, each under a native chief, appointed by the King, with the approval of the British representative. The King was assisted by a Native Council or Parliament, elected on lines laid down by the British authorities, the power of life and death being reserved to the British representative. Under the same agreement the power of taxation was limited to a hut and gun tax, to be collected by the native chiefs and handed over to the British officials. The King, the native ministers and the district chiefs received their salaries direct from the British authorities, and were forbidden to exact further payments from their native subjects. By these means the natives were being taught to govern themselves "within the limits of law and order, and a regard for the principles of civilization."²

The natives were to retain in their exclusive possession all lands that were actually occupied or cultivated by them, whether as individuals or as members of a tribe. But the forests and waste lands became British property, direct compensation being paid to the chiefs or inhabitants. By these arrangements the natives were freed from the fear that European control would mean the loss of their lands and reduce them to the position of mere tenants at sufferance of European landlords.³

¹ See the very able and comprehensive Report of Sir H. Johnston on the *Protectorate of Uganda*, Cd. 671, 1901.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Sir Harry Johnston dealt boldly with the question—Were the natives happier before the time of the British Protectorate? Under the old regime “as soon as the chief died, his successor sent out immediately a large party of warriors to slay all persons they could meet within a radius of two miles. Next day a youth and a girl were captured and killed; their sexual organs, together with those of a bull, were cut out and placed inside a large drum. . . . After the chief was seated on his throne, he sent out men to kill any whom they might find in the vicinity. After that a war against a neighbouring chief or nation was absolutely obligatory, and until this was completed the chief and his subjects were expected to shave their heads. Any person who refused to go to war or to keep his head shaved was immediately put to death.

“In parts cannibalism of a disgusting kind was much in vogue. In others accusations of witchcraft were constantly made and followed by poisoning or stabbing the accused. The vicinity of the King’s palace at Mengo was bloodstained with the constant slaughter and maiming of wives, councillors, pages and slaves. King Mutesa beheaded his wives for forgetting to shut the door. Pages were horribly mutilated for treading on the tail of a pet dog. In Busoga, until something like the establishment of British rule about two years ago, no girl of pleasing appearance was allowed to remain in her own home, or with a husband of the peasant class. She was immediately haled off to swell the harem of a local chief. . . . Wars would take place, resulting in the complete depopulation of the country of its domestic animals and of its cultivation. Many parts of the main plateau show traces of once numerous villages, which are now without a single human inhabitant.”

If these conditions prevailed prior to the incoming of the British the natives obviously must have been happier under British control so long as this was exercised in their interests as inhabitants of the soil. Sir H. Johnston added the warning which the negrophil is often apt to forget: “In their turn . . . the natives must meet us by taking up their burden and furnishing their share of the revenue which is adjusted to their means. Even this taxation comes far below the amount of property they were formerly accustomed to give or to lose when wholly at the mercy of the chiefs, or of conquerors of negro race. No one can be so cruel to the negro as the negro.”¹

It is gratifying to note that his successors have followed with

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

the most satisfactory results upon the lines laid down by Sir Harry Johnston. Year after year the annual reports spoke of improvements in the working of the Native Governments.¹ The appointment of an English tutor for the ten-year-old king of Uganda was a measure of good promise.

It was strong testimony to the confidence shown in the British authority that it was possible to move the inhabitants of the fly-infested shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza to districts in the interior without exciting their alarm. By these means sleeping sickness was reduced from a dominant scourge to a mere sporadic trouble.²

In agricultural development the record was still more satisfactory. Cotton in a few years became the most important crop, and its extension was only checked by the lack of transport facilities from the interior to the shores of the lakes. The peasants were willing to grow cotton, provided that they had not to carry their crops on their heads for more than a two days' journey.

In the cultivation of cotton it is fortunately possible to reconcile the needs of Europe with the interests of the native community. The capitalist finds cotton a precarious crop, and it is especially adapted to the system of *la petite culture*. "There is a poetic justice," Major Sir Humphrey Leggatt, speaking with official knowledge, declared, "in the fact that our hopes are very much turned towards Africa as a field from which to obtain further supplies of cotton, for . . . in the old days the industry was carried on in America by slave labour from Africa. To-day our hopes are turned to Africa for cotton to be grown under the British flag, not by slave labour, not even by wage labour, but as a native industry." By native industry was meant the system of the native working for his own account, on his own land, and with full freedom to sell to the customer who should offer the highest price.

Sir Humphrey drew a striking contrast between British and German methods. In Uganda the amount of the crop in 1920 was some 50,000 bales. In German East Africa, where the plantation or capitalist system had prevailed, the limit reached was only from 5,000 to 6,000 bales. The natives were driven to work on the plantations by the threat of increased taxation. Nevertheless, they ran away; so that it proved impossible to increase the output. When the British took over the government

¹ See especially *Rep.* 1905-6, No. 525, Cd. 3285-12, and *Rep.* 1906-7, Cd. 3729-22.

² *Rep.* 1907-8, Cd. 3729-22.

the first request of the natives was for cotton-seed, so as to grow cotton on their own account.¹

At the same time it remains certain that no great progress can be made unless the means of transport are considerably developed. It is useless for the British Government and the cotton manufacturers of Great Britain to furnish funds, unless the local Governments, assisted, if necessary, by the imperial, are prepared to provide the indispensable railways or steamers.

Yet more pressing is the need for good metalled roads, by which means alone can the wasteful and distressing system of human portorage become a thing of the past. As early as 1907-8 a definite programme of road construction was begun in Uganda with substantial results.² The Uganda Railway will be dealt with later³; but it must be remembered that it belonged to Uganda only in name. Great therefore was the joy of those connected with Uganda when, at last, a railway was built from Lake Kioga to Lake Victoria Nyanza at Jinju, the head-quarters of the Eastern Province. It was opened for traffic in 1912, and must greatly help in the development of cotton growing.⁴

A system of employing native instructors in the methods of growing cotton was introduced in 1910, and has proved very successful. It is obvious that a few British officials on their tours over a huge area were not able to give the individual care and attention required for the purpose.⁵

The solution of the land problem found by the Uganda authorities was as follows: It seemed an absurdity wholly to bar the door against alienation to Europeans, where, as in Buganda, some three thousand five hundred native landholders owned some nine thousand square miles. But, to ensure fair terms to the natives, it was made obligatory that, when a sale was intended, the land should first be transferred to the Government and become Crown land, the consent of the Native Council to the proposed sale having been first obtained. The next step was for the Government to

¹ Paper on "Cotton Growing within the Empire," by W. J. McConnell, Chairman of the Fine Cotton Spinners' Association, *United Empire*, XII (New Series), pp. 230-43.

² *Rep.*, 1907-8, No. 608, Cd. 4438-9.

³ See p. 201.

⁴ *Rep.*, 1910-1, No. 708, Cd. 6007-8, p. 25. See also *Rep.* 1909-10, No. 670, Cd. 5467-6, p. 3. On the general question of transport in tropical Africa see *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, by Sir F. Lugard, 1922, pp. 461-76.

⁵ *Rep.*, 1910-1, No. 708, p. 22.

give formal approval of the price to be paid ; after which the purchaser obtained the land on lease from the Government on certain conditions, the due fulfilment of which was required prior to the grant of freehold rights.¹

With regard to taxation a general poll tax of five rupees a head was substituted for the mixed system of hut and poll taxes hitherto prevailing. It was found that the young men evaded the payment of the hut tax by refraining from marriage, and so far as the new system involved increased taxation, its justification lay in the greatly increased prosperity.²

Many of the Buganda chiefs owned large rubber and coffee plantations³; and some conducted their correspondence by means of typewriters, and inspected their districts on motor-bicycles. The native administration of the province had by 1912 marked a high level of efficiency ; and, although Buganda was in advance of the other provinces, there were everywhere signs of steady progress.⁴ The native courts, the records of which were systematically examined by the district officers, gave, as a general rule, just and impartial decisions, and, although the duties imposed on the chiefs had become increasingly onerous, they were, for the most part, performed in a most creditable manner.⁵

The success of the system was largely due to the close contact which it brought about between the British officials and the native community. The constant tours of the governor were beneficial in two ways. On the one hand they gave the British representative a first-hand knowledge of the various local conditions. On the other hand they made a strong impression upon the minds of the natives. Thus year by year the cordial relations existing between the government and the governed became closer and closer.⁶

The one fly in the amber was owing to the presence of the European capitalist and the consequent demand for labour. The Buganda, with his many virtues, had not yet risen to the height of welcoming steady employment, and it was difficult to induce him to work for more than two hours at a time. When harassed by the

¹ *Rep.*, 1911-2, No. 743, Cd. 6007-43, p. 20.

² *Rep.*, 1909-10, No. 670, pp. 3-4.

³ *Rep.*, 1911-2, No. 743, p. 24.

⁴ *Rep.*, 1912-3, No. 787, Cd. 7050-28.

⁵ *Rep.*, 1913-4, No. 831, Cd. 7622-22, p. 28.

⁶ *Rep.*, 1909-10, No. 670, p. 4.

constant suggestions of his chief that he should volunteer for work on a plantation, he often preferred to move farther afield. Moreover, the growth of large trading centres, with considerable floating populations, tended to increase the chiefs' difficulties and to undermine their hold upon the people. This, however, was the inevitable consequence of material progress and prosperity.¹

Just before the outbreak of the Great War the Protectorate was financially in a somewhat difficult position. The development of its system of communications was an urgent and generally recognized need, and, although progress had been made, resulting in an expansion of trade and agriculture, followed by an increase of population, such developments, in their turn, demanded an increased staff and increased expenditure on sanitation and other public services, not of a directly remunerative character. As, moreover, the newly-constructed sections of the system of communications did not at once reach a paying stage, it was very difficult to find funds from local sources to meet the constantly increasing local expenditure. Not only was it difficult to effect the necessary improvements, but there was even difficulty in meeting the charges on the loan made by the Imperial Government, expenditure from which alone the money for improvements in the system of communication could be obtained.²

Still, British methods were justified by their fruits ; and, when the Great War broke out, the Government could not only count on the personal services of nearly every able-bodied white man, but had also behind it the enthusiastic loyalty of the whole native and Indian population.³

It was not merely that the political relations with the existing Native Governments continued to be satisfactory during the war, it proved possible to make a notable advance in the administration of outlying districts. The adjustment of the frontier between Uganda and the Sudan in 1914 enabled a closer hold to be obtained of the area on the west bank of the Nile, which had hitherto been outside the pale of British administration, thus facilitating the work of the British officials on the east bank of the river.⁴

Throughout the length and breadth of Uganda the chiefs, without exception, gave ready and unstinted help in complying

¹ *Rep.*, 1913-4, No. 831, Cd. 7622-22, p. 28.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴ *Rep.*, 1914-5, Cd. 7622-64.

with the extensive demands for labour, food supplies and the maintenance of roads ; conduct the more praiseworthy because the situation prevented extensive touring on the part of the few remaining district officers.¹

With regard to Uganda, then, unless British reports are to be set aside as fictions, the coming of British rule has not been followed by misery or degradation to the native population.

Before passing from Uganda we may note a strong line of distinction between its case and that of Kenya. In Uganda there are native states fairly well organized, and there is no portion of it suitable for European settlement. Hence, unlike Kenya, it seems destined to remain a British Protectorate.

KENYA

In turning to British East Africa, or Kenya, as it is now called, we are confronted with a different problem. So far, indeed, as purely native questions are concerned, the position is much the same as in Uganda. The hut tax, introduced in 1900, has received its *quid pro quo* in the suppression of the slave trade, and in the carrying out of numerous improvements. A few years before the British occupation East Africa had been a human hunting-ground, only that the hunters did not even take the trouble to preserve the game. The Arab chiefs along the coast exacted a tribute of two out of every three children. Arab caravans ravaged the interior and carried off the population of whole villages, of whom only a small proportion reached the coast alive. The background of slavery and bloodshed was diversified by interludes of terrible famine. Contrast with this state of things the results of the *Pax Britannica*. No doubt, as Sir Charles Eliot shrewdly admitted, the natives did not admire the good deeds of the British as much as they admired them themselves, and the pleasures of freedom were modified by the regret that it was no longer possible to be a slave-owner. Still, the fact remained that it was not the case of an old settled system having been destroyed. What had happened had been the introduction of order into blank, uninteresting, brutal barbarism, and the native seemed at last to acquiesce in the new condition of things.²

So far, all was plain sailing, but already from the point of view

¹ *Rep.* 1915-6, No. 914, Cd. 8434-1.

² *Rep. of H.M.'s Commissioner on the E. African Prot.*, Cd. 1626, 1902, pp. 12 and 29.

of the British authorities there was a cloud on the horizon. A considerable portion of the Protectorate seemed suitable for European immigration. Already there were numerous settlements near Nairobi; and in their presence the prescient mind of Sir C. Eliot saw the seeds of future troubles.

By a curious irony the weapon that was to facilitate European immigration was forged with a wholly different object. The General Act of the Brussels Conference of July, 1890, had declared that amongst the most effective means for counteracting the slave trade in the interior of Africa was the construction of roads and especially of railways. The building of the Uganda railway from Mombasa on the coast to Lake Victoria Nyanza was undertaken in redemption of this pledge. The alternative measure of the establishment of a chain of military posts or flying columns would have been open to obvious objections.¹

The construction of the line was much delayed by unforeseen events, and its total cost far exceeded the estimate. Nevertheless, by 1905 it was paying its way, and was opening up for settlement a land of fruitful promise. By its means a journey could be made in an hour which in a caravan had taken a whole day.²

But if the railway introduced a European population, it did not lighten the lot of the British administrators. Sir C. Eliot had urged the strengthening of the Government by the institution of a Council, comprising civil servants of some local experience³; but, at the time, nothing was done. Sir Charles found himself at issue with the Home Government on the subject of land grants, and he resigned in dudgeon.⁴ He was also in disagreement both with the home authorities and with his own expert subordinates on the question of granting a Reserve to the nomad tribe of the Masai. The sooner the tribe, he maintained, disappeared, the better. Knowledge of it should be confined to students of anthropology. Sir Charles was a very strong and able official, but on this subject the general opinion of those most competent to speak was against him. The Masai received their Reserve, the tribe being at first divided into two sections.⁵ In deference,

¹ *Final Report of the Uganda Railway Commission*, Cd. 2614, 1904. The text of the Act is summarized in A. H. Snow *The Question of Aborigines*, 1921, pp. 296-9.

² *Rep. relating to the Administration of the E. Afr. Prot.*, Cd. 2740, 1905.

³ *Corres. relating to the Resignation of Sir C. Eliot*, Cd. 2099, 1904, p. 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁵ *Mem. on the State of the E. African Prot.*, Cd. 2408, 1905.

however, to the exigencies of native rites, the tribe was, at a later date, again brought together.¹

A Land Board, instituted in 1906, at once went to work at the framing of a new Land Law. With regard to the position of the natives, there was no question. The land, it was recognized, belonged to the community, and there was no individual title to any of it. Accordingly, no private sale of land by individual natives to non-natives could be sanctioned. Outside the Native Reserves, however, the land might be alienated to the Government, which, in sanctioning such alienation, took into consideration the amount remaining for the native occupier.² It was with regard to the white settlers that new rules had to be framed. The conditions at first insisted upon by the Colonial Office, appeared to both the settlers and the officials on the spot to be wholly unsuited to local conditions. The area allowed for homestead farms was too small, and the term of the leases for grazing land was too short. In deference to these objections the original conditions were considerably modified.³

But one trouble was no sooner out of the way than another appeared. Although British East Africa did not strictly become a Colony till 1920, under its new name, Kenya, the administration had been strengthened in 1907 by the institution of an Executive and Legislative Council, by means of the latter of which the non-official white community might find a vent for their views and the Government obtain the benefit of independent criticism and advice.⁴ None the less, in the following year, the Government and the settlers were at hopeless issue over the problems of native labour. The latter, not unnaturally, resented the sight of natives lolling at their ease whilst crops were rotting from the shortage of labour. The problem, however, of inducing the native to work, without the goad of compulsion, was not made easier by angry abuse of the Governor and excited public meetings!⁵

Still, in spite of difficulties, development went on. In 1909 Sir Percy Girouard became Governor, who contrived to remain

¹ *Corres. relating to the Masai*, Cd. 5584, 1911.

² *Rep. relating to the Administration of the E. African Prot.*, Cd. 2740, 1905, p. 8.

³ *Corres. relating to the Tenure of Land in the E. African Prot.*, Cd. 4117, p. 38.

⁴ *Rep. E. African Prot.*, 1906-7, No. 537, Cd. 3729-21, pp. 31-2.

⁵ *Corr. relating to Affairs in the E. African Prot.*, Cd. 4122, 1908, p. 25.

in much better odour with the white community than had been his predecessor. Already there were some two thousand one hundred settlers in the Highlands, whilst very few of the oldest of the Colonies could provide greater social amenities than those found in this the youngest of them.¹

Nor was this development brought about at the expense of the negro. Great attention was paid to the native problem. The aim of the British authorities was to support the authority of the chiefs, of the councils of elders, and of the headmen in Native Reserves. It was to uphold and to strengthen the influence of the chiefs by recognizing them as an integral part of the administrative machinery. It was, in the absence of a chief, to fill the gap by a Council of Elders. By these means it was sought to prevent tribal disintegration. But this did not imply that the interest, supervision and guidance of the British officials should in any way be relaxed. On the contrary, it meant to them increased work and responsibility.²

Yet more difficult was the question of the policy to be pursued with regard to natives living in European towns or settlements. In their case it was inevitable that the airy structure of native custom and belief should totter to a fall. The native mind, brought into contact with civilization, had a rude awakening. He discovered his nakedness. He saw his cherished customs and beliefs ridiculed ; and he found that his chief was not so important or so rich as he had imagined. The opening up of the country by means of the railway and European settlement tended inevitably in the direction of denationalization. Outside the Reserves there was no staying the march of civilization. Officials, missionaries, planters, farmers, merchants and traders, sportsmen and tourists, one and all required labour, and were adding their contribution to the breaking-down of the tribal system. Granted that the native employed by a European was occasionally worse housed and fed than in his own village, and that the habit of daily work was irksome, still there was the sense that he was in a way his own master and that he could give his employer notice whenever he chose. Moreover, it was the interest of that employer to make his lot a desirable one ; and, apart from

¹ *Rep. E. Africa*, 1909-10, No. 669, Cd. 5467-5. It was technically a Protectorate till 1920, but having been given a Crown Colony constitution owing to the presence of a European population, was regarded as a colony in common parlance.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 38-9.

improving material conditions, there was a responsibility attaching to the master of helping to strengthen his servant's moral nature and to render him a more useful member of the society of which he formed a part.¹

Meanwhile, in the country generally, where native ways still reigned supreme, the introduction of the new policy, under which the tribal authority was revived and native tribunals were resuscitated, was attended with very satisfactory results.²

Space forbids to deal with the annual Reports before the Great War, which told the same tale of increasing development in the European Highlands and of increasing prosperity and content amongst the native community. The labour problem, indeed, had by no means found its solution, but somehow or other the work of the country went on with fairly satisfactory results. As in the case of Uganda, so in that of Kenya, we may say, "By their fruits ye shall know them." In the day of trial the native community remained conspicuously loyal; and even the Masai, of whom hard things had been thought and said by British critics, contributed of their own free will bullocks and sheep for the troops, notwithstanding their dislike of parting with their stock. Nor did the enemy's invasion of their Reserve shake their loyalty.³

It is interesting to compare British methods of colonial administration with German, as set forth in the fair-minded Report of the British Administrator of German East Africa, dated 22 March, 1918. It is fully admitted that the natives acquiesced in existing facts, and were not looking for deliverance. Further, the forced levies of men and material which resulted from the continuance of the protracted campaign, did not tend to put British rule in a very favourable light. Still, apart from temporary drawbacks, it became clear that the two Governments had been working under different systems. The Germans had, indeed, passed laws which were framed in the interests of the natives. Nevertheless, their ruling principle had been the betterment of the European element, even though it involved the exploitation of the black and his unfair treatment. The subordinate native officials and policemen were the curse of the country. The Germans, with the object of creating an intermediate class devoted to their interests, had winked at practices

¹ *Rep. E. Africa*, 1909-10, No. 669, Cd. 5467-5, p. 47.

² *Rep. E. African Prot.*, 1910-1, Cd. 6007-5, pp. 42 and 47.

³ *Rep. E. African Prot.*, 1915-6, Cd. 8434-8, p. 19.

which too often degenerated into extortion and oppression. The main reason given for preferring British rule was that it meant a release from this police tyranny. Witnesses were frequently tortured and prisoners brutally ill-treated to the point of death, without due inquiry being made by the German officials. The German district officer rarely left his headquarters. In the law courts many small cases were tried by natives who had the power to flog and to imprison. Subordinates exacted bribes, and cases were rapidly disposed of without evidence having been given; and it sometimes happened that man with a genuine grievance received a flogging for wasting an official's time. The natives noted that under British rule even trivial cases were made the subject of careful personal investigation by a responsible official, so that whether the parties to a suit were men of influence or humble nobodies, a miscarriage of justice could rarely occur. The natives further appreciated the ease with which British officials could be approached and the personal interest in their affairs shown by the constant tours made by the British district officers, with the object of establishing intimate relations with the individual people committed to their charge.¹ At the same time, an improvement was made in the methods of taxation, and reasonable time was given to natives in arrear.

It was, assuredly, in no spirit of Pharisaic self-complacency that this Report was written or is quoted, but, while there is a tendency to regard all imperialism as tarred with the same brush, and to suggest that the attitude of all Governments towards the natives is always the same, it is necessary to insist, in season and out of season, that there is a right way, as well as a wrong way, of dealing with the native problem, and that, whilst critics in Great Britain or America are demonstrating to their own satisfaction that the problem is insoluble, many a silent, superficially commonplace and uninteresting young Englishman has found the solution.

All this, however, only applies when the British official can stand *in loco parentis*. When the European element enters and there is a conflict between white and native interests, recent experience shows that the knot is as hard to unravel as ever it was. A circular, issued by the British East Africa Government in October, 1919, urged officials in charge of native areas to

¹ *Corr. relating to the Wishes of the German Colonies as to Their Future Government*, Cd. 9210, 1918, p. 26.

exercise every possible lawful influence with the view of inducing able-bodied male natives to work on plantations owned by whites. Native chiefs and elders were to be reminded that it was part of their duty to help in the provision of such labourers. It was the business of District Commissioners to keep a record of such chiefs and headmen as were helpful, and such as were not. The nature of these reports was to be communicated to the chiefs, and should they remain deaf to the wishes of the Government, the fact was to be reported to headquarters. Employers and their agents, when requiring native labour, were to be encouraged to enter native Reserves and to come in touch with the chiefs, headmen and natives. The circular closed with the veiled threat that, should the labour difficulty persist, it might be necessary to resort to other and special measures.¹

This circular called forth much disapproval. In an able protest the Bishop of Uganda and the head of the Church of Scotland Mission called attention to the sinister interpretation that would be placed by the native chiefs on such words as "influence," "induce," "advise" and "encourage."

The suggestion that the test of a chief's efficiency or inefficiency should be his success in furnishing labour was open to grave objection. The protest recognized that compulsory labour was not in itself an evil, at any rate, for work of national importance, and if imposed under certain strictly defined conditions. "We believe," it concluded, "that the straightest road is the best: that the work would be best done directly by Europeans, rather than indirectly through the native headman; and legally by definite enactment, under which each man knows his obligations and their limits, rather than by incessant appeals and demands, which would leave the natives in a state of bewildered irritation and will, we believe, fail to reach the desired end."²

No question could be one of greater difficulty. Lord Milner, in his despatch of 22 July, 1920, could, indeed, make it clear that, while he had assented to an Ordinance by which natives might, in certain cases, be required to perform paid labour for the Government, he was not prepared to go further or to allow any compulsion on behalf of private employers. But, with regard to the question of acting or not through the chiefs and headmen, he was in substantial agreement with the local authorities. It

¹ *Despatch to Gov. of the E. African Prot., relating to Native Labour*, Cd. 873, 1920.

² *Ibid.*, p. II.

was true that there was the risk of abuse, which must be jealously guarded against. The security of the natives from removal to distant parts for enforced labour was to be carefully safeguarded. But, on the other hand, it was the settled policy that action should be taken, so far as possible, through the native chiefs and headmen, with the object of maintaining the tribal organization. Satisfactory results were expected from the formation of a special branch of the administrative staff (including inspectors for special duty in connexion with native labour), directly under the control of the Chief Native Commissioner. These officials were to work in the native areas, to deal exclusively with the administration of those areas and with the care of the natives as distinct from the rest of the community.¹

An explanatory circular had been issued in the Protectorate (14 July, 1920), emphasizing that care must be taken that the chiefs did not make the call for labour the occasion for either favouritism or oppression, and that pressure was not brought on those whose labour was needed for the cultivation of their own land in the Reserve.

But it was not enough that Kenya should be troubled with its labour difficulty; another problem of a wider and more directly menacing character still confronts it. For a long time back there had been close and intimate communication between India and East Africa, and Sir H. Johnston, in his memorable report, had called the latter "the America of the Hindu." It is possible that, had Indian political consciousness been as fully developed twenty years ago as it is to-day, an attempt might have been made to make British East Africa an Indian province. But, afterwards, the Uganda Railway opened the way for white colonization, and the settlers, amongst whom were many South Africans, were unwilling to stand on an equality with Indian fellow-subjects. In 1907 the Governor suggested that the Highlands should receive different treatment, and that, outside them, Indian immigration should be encouraged. The home Government expressed its agreement, though the exclusion of Indians from the Highlands must be a matter of administration and not a restriction imposed by law.² But the Indians are by

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6. Sir F. Lugard treats with authority the labour question in *Tropical Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 390-424.

² *Corr. relating to the Tenure of Land in the E. African Prot.*, Cd. 4117, pp. 25 and 31.

no means content with this compromise. There is, it would seem, a certain note of exaggeration in arguments, such as that of the Aga Khan, when he insists that Indians "constructed the railway from the coast to the Lake Victoria Nyanza."¹ The capital furnished for the railway was out of the pockets of the British taxpayer, and British enterprise carried through the work. The part played by the Indian was merely that of the unskilled day labourer. However natural is the indignation aroused in the minds of patriotic Indians by the determination, acquiesced in by the British Government, not to tolerate the presence of Indians amongst the landowners of the Highlands, still we must recognize that the existence of the two races side by side would inevitably lead to results such as have written such a gloomy page in the history of South Africa. To warn off men of the Anglo-Saxon or Dutch race from a land well suited for white settlement on the ground that other parts of the world afford sufficient scope for their energies is an impossible policy, but is there no room for a compromise? Granted that the Highlands remain a European province, is there any reason why the vast area of the Kenya Colony and Protectorate should remain under the same political system as this exceptional portion? The distinction between Uganda and British East Africa has been always recognized. Why should not the part of the latter adapted for European settlement be severed from the rest, which must, *qua* the British, remain for ever a *Colonie d'Exploitation*? In course of time, as population develops in the Highlands, we shall have the inhabitants loudly claiming responsible government. Does experience go to show that a small community of somewhat aggressive settlers is the best body to which to entrust the destinies of a great native population? But if such a separation took place, there might be room in Kenya, as well as in Tanganyika, for a considerable number of Indian immigrants. The fact that the northern European and the Indian races naturally belong to and thrive best in different climates should afford a *modus vivendi* and prevent a clash of conflicting interests. Negotiations were on foot, towards the end of the nineteenth century, for the introduction of some eight hundred Indians into German East Africa, which only came to nothing because the proposed settlers were unwilling to relinquish their British-Indian nationality. Surely, outside the Highlands, there is room in Kenya also for

¹ *India in Transition*, 1918, p. 117.

large bodies of Indian immigrants. Moreover, under the mandate to be enforced by the League of Nations, Indians are not allowed to be placed in a position of inferiority, but if this is so, will it be possible for a neighbouring colony, under the direct control of the British Crown, to enforce a wholly different system? With regard to political rights, the attitude of the Indian representatives at the imperial meeting of Prime Ministers in 1921, emphasized the extreme importance of finding a satisfactory solution. As to this a fairly high educational qualification may settle the difficulty. But the more general question has got to be solved. Indian public opinion is thoroughly aroused, and between the temper prevailing in India and the tone adopted by the European settlers the task of British statesmanship is, indeed, a difficult one.

To add to that difficulty, Kenya has been passing through a trying time. The startling fall in prices which has taken place throughout the world has been here aggravated by movements in the country's currency. We may, however, be confident that this setback is merely temporary, and recovery should be hastened by the recent loan of five million pounds to be spent on the extension of railways and in building a deep-water pier at Kilindini Harbour, Mombasa.

[NOTE.—Proposals which seem to find favour with Mr. Churchill are in the air for the establishment of a great East African federation, to consist of Zanzibar, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika, and Sir F. Lugard has lent his powerful support to the view that it might be expedient to imitate the French systems by the appointment of two Governors-General, one for East and one for West Africa.¹ So far as such a change would make for efficiency in financial administration and the appropriation of moneys to the most urgent needs, it would be all to the good. But, on other grounds, it seems open to some objections. The Governor-General of so huge an area could hardly come into personal contact with the natives in the way which, in the past, has been the strongest feature of the British system; and, if the provincial Lieut.-Governors are to maintain the status and importance of the present Governors, the cost of the change would be considerable. The problem in these countries seems in great measure to be—how to promote material development without unduly interfering with native ideals and modes of life? No system of federation could give much light or leading in the direction of finding a solution of this difficulty. Sir F. Lugard also advocates the institution of an African Council at the Colonial Office on the model of the Council at the India Office before the restriction of its powers.]

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 179–82.

WEST AFRICA

SIERRA LEONE

In Sierra Leone, the new century opened under gloomy auspices. A hut tax had been imposed in the Protectorate, to meet the needs of the administration; and an abortive rebellion ensued, which was put down by force. Sir David Chalmers, who was sent out to report on the situation, strongly recommended the withdrawal of the tax.¹ Mr. Chamberlain, however, decided in favour of its continuance²; and it would seem that his confidence was justified.³ Under the Hut Tax Ordinance, the country was divided into districts and the proceeds of the tax collected in a district were appropriated to the credit of its own fund, and were expended on works of improvement in that particular district; local advisory boards being instituted in connexion with such works.⁴ The Protectorate comprised an area of about thirty thousand square miles, divided into five districts, each with a District and Assistant-District Commissioner. A step in advance was taken when it was found possible to relieve the Frontier Force of all duties connected with the civil administration.⁵

It must be remembered that the Protectorate was connected by a railway with Freetown, which was an imperial station garrisoned by regular troops. The policy of the Government was to employ the people of the various districts, so far as possible under their own chiefs, on the work of making roads, etc. The chiefs obtained the labourers, who were then paid a daily wage by the Government; the chiefs receiving a certain percentage on each labourer. Similarly, it was sought to strengthen the position of the native courts. These courts were the natural and convenient tribunals for the settlement of minor matters, both civil and criminal. Moreover, the chiefs were encouraged to exercise their powers and shown that they would have the support of the Government in so doing; and they honestly endeavoured to give just decisions.⁶

¹ *Rep. of H.M.'s Commissioner and Corr. on the Subject of the Rebellion in the Sierra Leone Protectorate*, Cd. 9388, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 170-3.

³ *Rep. S. Leone*, 1901, No. 361, Cd. 788-31, p. 35, and *Rep. of Gov. Sir C. King Harman on his Visit to the Prot.*, Cd. 1097, 1902.

⁴ *Rep. S. Leone*, 1902, No. 389, Cd. 1388-13, pp. 7-8.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1903, No. 423, Cd. 2238-1, pp. 27-8.

The extension of the railway to close to the frontier of Liberia, led to considerable development.¹ But the administration clearly recognized that material progress could not stand alone. Improvement in education was retarded by the inadequate salaries paid to the teachers; though the Government school at Bo for the sons of chiefs, started in 1906, was a move in the right direction,² as was the establishment of an Agricultural College through the munificence of a native merchant.³

Not less pressing was the need for sanitary reforms. The hill station at Freetown, indeed, redeemed that station from the charge of being "the white man's grave"⁴; but in a cosmopolitan community such as Freetown, it was difficult to effect sanitary improvements with the municipal body barring the way.⁵

Moreover, alongside of the general progress, in certain outlying districts, the old, horrible secret societies maintained their vigour.⁶ It would be wrong, however, to lay too much stress on these sinister symptoms. In most districts the progress was great, and the granting of prizes (in the form of attractive swords) to such chiefs as showed the greatest advances in the sanitary condition of their towns led to most useful competition.⁷

Again the growing interest taken by the chiefs in agricultural pursuits was attested by the active support given by them to the agricultural show held in 1911⁸; whilst by the encouragement of object lessons a distinct improvement was taking place in the character of the general education.

A new era, it was recognized, had dawned for the Protectorate, and a new spirit was abroad—the spirit of commercial enterprise which was penetrating into the minds of even the unsophisticated natives. The common people were awakening to a true sense of their position in the tribe. Men and women, who were formerly merged in the family of a powerful relation, were be-

¹ *Rep. S. Leone*, 1908, No. 611, Cd. 4448-20. See also *Papers relating to the Construction of Railways in S. Leone, etc.*, Cd. 2325, 1904.

² *Rep. S. Leone*, 1907, No. 588, Cd. 3729-52, p. 24 (18).

³ *Ibid.*, 1908, No. 611, Cd. 4448-20, p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1911, No. 722, Cd. 6007-24, p. 9.

⁶ *Despatch from Gov. of S. Leone reporting on Measures to deal with Unlawful Societies in the Prot.*, Cd. 6961, 1912.

⁷ *Rep. S. Leone*, 1909, No. 648, Cd. 4694-22, p. 49.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1911, No. 724, Cd. 6007-24, p. 17.

ginning to realize their own importance and to demand their rights as individuals.¹

In reading the annual reports, one notes throughout a keen sympathy with the point of view of the native, and a sincere solicitude for his welfare; it was not therefore surprising that when the testing time came, the attitude of the people was one of consistent loyalty. The chiefs rendered valuable services by furnishing rice and carriers for the Cameroons expedition, as well as by letters of sympathy, gifts in kind and generous subscriptions to the various patriotic funds²; and, in January 1915, both the West African regiment and the Sierra Leone battalion of the West African Frontier Force did valuable service in the expedition against the Cameroons.

It was considered a matter for congratulation that the colony, though far removed from the scene of warlike operations, was able to contribute in a small way towards adding another possession to those wrested from Germany.³ Though the trade of Sierra Leone was not affected by the war as was the trade of the Gold Coast and Nigeria, still during its continuance a policy of rigid economy was obviously inevitable, and the administration was of necessity greatly hampered by the shortage of its staff. The productivity of the country, however, was well maintained by the native cultivators, and the colony came through the economic strain of the war as well as could be expected; continuing to be able to pay its way,⁴ and even contributing a small sum to the imperial war funds. Nor did a severe epidemic of influenza in 1918, which killed off some three per cent of the population and struck down some two-thirds, avail to embitter the people against the British administration.

THE GOLD COAST

ASHANTI

The most striking feature in the recent history of the Gold Coast is the manner in which the Ashantis, from being fierce hostile savages, have become contented and loyal subjects of the Crown. This result was largely due to the tact, patience and judgement of the British Resident. By a wise moderation

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

² *Rep. S. Leone*, 1914, Cd. 7622-42, p. 37, and *Rep. S. Leone*, 1915, No. 888, Cd. 8172-14, p. 33.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1917, No. 990, Cd. 1-13, p. 19.

after the rebellion of 1900, the land belonging to the rebels was not confiscated, and the formal annexation of the country (1901), involved no interference with the rights of the chiefs or of the people; it being sought, so far as possible, to govern through the native instruments.¹ A Council of Chiefs, set on foot in 1905, proved very popular. Membership implied a regular status, endowed with certain privileges, and its sittings were veiled in the secrecy dear to the Ashanti heart.² Meanwhile the social condition of the people improved rapidly, slavery and the pawning system had been abolished, and the courts of the chiefs were slowly and surely undergoing reform. With a plentiful food supply, and with high prices for their produce and their labour, the people were beginning to appreciate the value of peace and political stability; and there was close touch and sympathy between the rulers and the ruled.³

Especially wise was the British treatment of the land question. The communal principle had always prevailed in theory, but the encroachments of the chiefs and headmen had, too often, made it a dead letter. It was sought to safeguard the interests of the individual, while rendering impossible improvident parting with the tribal lands.⁴

In Ashanti, no less than in the Colony and Northern Territories, the tours of the Governor played a very important part. The personal interviews and discussions with the chiefs impressed them with the sense of the share they had in the administration; and cemented confidence and good-will between the British local executive officers and the native authorities.

Under the new regime there was a steady flow of immigration from the Northern Territories into Ashanti. The Ashanti employed hired labour to clear his cocoa farm and to pick his crop, and preferred the rôle of a landlord to that of a peasant proprietor.⁵

In this state of things, when the trial came, the system of government bore successfully the strain. There was enthusiastic and unanimous loyalty expressed by the chiefs; one of them offering the whole of that year's district cocoa crop towards the

¹ *Gold Coast: Corr. relating to Ashanti*, Cd. 938, 1901.

² *Rep. Ashanti*, 1906, No. 523, Cd. 3285-10, p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, 1908, No. 603, Cd. 4448-12, p. 25.

⁴ *Rep. on Legislation Governing the Alienation of Lands in the G.C. Colony and Ashanti*, Cd. 6728, 1912, pp. 7-11.

⁵ *Rep. Ashanti*, 1912, No. 771, Cd. 7050-12, p. 34.

funds of the war.¹ When, in 1915, Ashanti was practically denuded of troops, no shadow of anxiety disturbed the local government.² The Gold Coast Regiment had always been regarded by the Ashantis as their natural foe; and yet in 1917 many of them cheerfully enlisted in its ranks,³ though in nothing like the numbers obtained from the Northern Territories.

NORTHERN TERRITORIES PROTECTORATE

Turning to the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, we find in some respects a more difficult situation. Here the chiefs themselves had little or no power, and, however friendly disposed, were helpless to prevent raiding and looting by their own followers. Every compound, consisting of some dozen houses, was in itself a small kingdom.⁴

Still, substantial progress was made. "Any official," an experienced commissioner reported, "who deals with these people patiently, honestly and fairly, paying due consideration to their native customs and national characteristics, will have no difficulty in winning their confidence and will find that they are fully capable of appreciating his efforts for their welfare."⁵

"The success of the administration of the Northern Territories," the Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir Hugh Clifford, pointed out in 1912, "is not to be judged by the returns of revenue or expenditure, nor yet by trade statistics." The population had been rescued from the tyranny of the slave raiders, and from the horror of frequent intertribal warfare. "The people come and go freely without fear of molestation. The chiefs are being taught to realize their powers and responsibilities, and are ranging themselves on the side of law and order. Serious crime is decreasing; and that at a time when our officers are annually getting into closer touch with the natives, and crime is therefore less easy to conceal."⁶

At the outbreak of the war the Northern Territories Constabulary did useful service in the operations against Togoland; and the frontier chiefs were especially eager in their help, being

¹ *Rep. Ashanti*, 1914, No. 864, Cd. 7622-55, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, 1915, No. 873, Cd. 8172-19, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, 1917, No. 962, Cd. 8973-11, p. 11.

⁴ *Rep. North. Terr. of G.C.*, 1903, No. 429, Cd. 2238-6, p. 6, and *Rep. North. Terr. of G.C.*, 1907, No. 566, Cd. 3729-30, pp. 7-8.

⁵ *Rep. North. Terr. of G.C.*, 1901, No. 357, Cd. 788-27, p. 17.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1912, Cd. 7050-6, p. 4.

filled with the hope that kindred tribes, divided by unnatural political boundaries, might obtain reunion under the British flag. Upon the whole the conduct of the people through the war, as was well said at its beginning, "increased administrative responsibilities by adding obligations to them."¹

THE GOLD COAST COLONY

Ashanti and the Northern Territories Protectorate have been dealt with first, because in dealing with them British methods of governing backward races receive their most signal illustration. Still the gulf is not wide between these and the colony proper, inasmuch as, in spite of the influx of Europeans that followed the boom in gold mining, and in spite of the numerous other signs of progress, the mass of the people in the Gold Coast still remained fetish-worshippers; although the more repulsive rites connected with their worship were becoming a thing of the past.²

In 1907 an attempt was made to put new life into the native tribunals, which, owing to their inability to enforce their decisions, to the absence of proper records and to other causes, had fallen into disrepute.³ The new Native Jurisdiction Ordinance worked very successfully. By its means the prestige of the chiefs was enhanced, and the position of the tribunals was such as to attract to its service men of good standing and education.⁴

The absence of intertribal disputes and the readiness with which matters of difference were brought to the British authorities for decision showed the confidence felt in the government. Other hopeful signs were the advances made in agriculture and education, and in the war with disease. Not only was material prosperity increasing, but there were indications of intellectual and moral progress.⁵ It was found that the Gold Coast had taken the foremost place amongst the cocoa-producing countries of the world. It was still more important that this industry had been developed by, and was entirely in the hands of, the native population of the country.⁶

¹ *Rep. North. Terr. of G.C.*, 1914, No. 863, Cd. 7622-54, p. 23.

² *Rep. G.C.*, 1902, No. 397, Cd. 1768-2, p. 62.

³ *Ibid.*, 1907, No. 573, Cd. 3729-37, p. 53.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1913, Cd. 7050-47, p. 33.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1911, No. 725, Cd. 6007-25, p. 46.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1912, No. 770, Cd. 7050-11, p. 43.

On the other hand, the establishment of municipalities, consisting partly of elected members, at Accra, Gold Coast and Secondee,¹ led to some friction; the natives not being able to appreciate the necessity for the energetic measures demanded by the British sanitary authorities.²

Similarly a proposed Forest Ordinance illustrated the lions in the path of reform. It was a matter of extreme urgency that the forest resources of the country should be maintained and safeguarded, and yet not a single native showed the slightest interest in this aspect of the question.³

These, however, were comparatively minor issues, and the general loyalty was clearly shown at the outbreak of war, which, we are told, made them take stock of things as they were and as they might have been, with the result that their attachment to the British rule became strengthened. There were innumerable proofs that the people were heart and soul with the Empire; and that any other connexion was regarded as unthinkable.⁴ Moreover in the war the Gold Coast Regiment greatly distinguished itself. The conquest of Togoland, so far as it was a British conquest, was the work of the Gold Coast alone. "All the men and all the funds for reducing Togoland, and subsequently administering the British sphere of occupation, were found by the Gold Coast; not one penny of the expense was borne by the Mother Country."⁵ Moreover, after the conquest of Togoland, the regiment greatly distinguished itself both in the Cameroons and in East Africa.

Nor was, in the excitement of the war, the need for administrative reforms disregarded. In 1916, the Secretary for Native Affairs became a regular member of the Executive Council, and the Legislative Council was enlarged, so as to make it more representative of the various interests and different sections of the community. Changes of a revolutionary character were taking place in the attitude of the people towards social questions; but it still remained the policy of the British government to support, so far as was possible, the ancient systems of tribal

¹ *Rep. G.C.*, 1906, No. 534, Cd. 5825-21, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, 1911, No. 725, p. 44.

³ *Rep. on Legislation governing the Alienation of Native Lands in the G.C. Colony and Ashanti*, by H.C. Belfield, C.M.G., Cd. 6728, p. 38.

⁴ *Rep. G.C.*, 1915, No. 894, Cd. 8172-20, p. 30.

⁵ *The Gold Coast and the War*, by Sir C. Lucas, 1919, p. 35.

administration and its native customs. Moreover, the native institutions were fundamentally democratic, whilst the spread of education and of property amongst the lower orders worked in the direction of making them democratic in fact as well as in theory. The changes in their material conditions were putting both the old system of tribal government and the character of the people to a severe and searching test ; but it was satisfactory to find that the ordeal was being undergone with creditable results. Under the guidance of a sympathetic central government, there was every promise that social and political salvation would be successfully won.¹

It deserves mention that, after the British occupation of a portion of Togoland, the natives very soon had thirty-three per cent more land under cultivation than they ever had before. This result was brought about by the release from constant vexatious interference, and the liability to forced labour of various kinds. Formerly the native had fixed his holding as far away as possible from highways and railways, so as to escape the inconvenient attentions of German administrative officers and tax collectors. Now he could boldly plant himself in the most convenient situation.²

NIGERIA

Splendid as has been the work elsewhere, it is in Nigeria that the greatest development has taken place in British West Africa. The assumption by the Crown of the governmental powers of the Royal Niger Co. in 1900 involved the substitution of an Empire for the mere project of an Empire ; and, so far from commercial greed having brought about expansion, it was not until commercial considerations were shifted to the background that genuine expansion took place. The delimitation of the northern frontier with the French necessitated the effective occupation of the Moslem emirates in 1902-03, through the instrumentality of the West African Frontier Force.³ When Sir F. Lugard effected their conquest, slave-raiding in its most revolting form was still rampant ; and, especially in the southern portions of Northern

¹ *Rep. G.C.*, 1916, No. 948, Cd. 8434-35, pp. 6-7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 44. See also *Corr. relating to the Wishes of the German Colonies as to their Future Government*, Cd. 9210, 1918, p. 57.

³ *Rep. of Sir F. Lugard on Amalgamation of N. and S. Nigeria*, Cd. 468, 1920, pp. 6-7, and *Rep. N. Nigeria*, 1904, No. 476, Cd. 2684-22, p. 101.

Nigeria, extortion and blackmailing were general. In the northern emirates, however, strong native governments were still in potential existence ; and Sir Frederick was anxious to maintain, so far as possible, the Fulani rule. These men were "born rulers, incomparably above the Negroid tribes in ability."¹ His aim was to utilize and work through the native chiefs ; so long as the fundamental principles of humanity and justice were not violated. Residents were appointed, whose duty was to promote this policy by the establishment of native courts, in which bribery and extortion along with inhuman punishments might be abolished, though not immediately or directly. Above these were the Provincial Courts with jurisdiction over Europeans and such native offences as struck at the roots of society. The traditional tribute (except that in slaves) was exacted as before ; though its incidence and collection were put on a more regular footing. It was from the first made clear that the chiefs must contribute to the revenue in return for the benefits they obtained ; but it took some time to work out a general system of taxation.²

The task before Sir Frederick was no easy one. Everywhere in Northern Nigeria the desolation and destruction of life, that were the aftermath of slave-raiding, stood out in ghastly prominence. Wide tracts of land had gone completely out of cultivation, and the ruins of great towns were seen, now overgrown with jungle. A country once described as the most densely populated in all Africa had now, throughout great portions of it, very few inhabitants.³

Sir F. Lugard was strongly impressed by the parallel that Nigeria, in some ways, presented to British India. True it was but a third of British India's size and centuries behind it in civilization, still there were points of resemblance. Sir Frederick remained convinced that the future of the virile races of the Protectorate lay, to a very great extent, in the regeneration of the Fulani. Their ceremonial, their habits of life and of thought and their coloured skins appealed far more to the native imagination than did the prosaic, business-like ways of the Anglo-Saxon.⁴

But it did not follow that the British Resident should remain in dignified isolation, unheeding what went on around him. On

¹ *Rep. N. Nigeria*, 1900-1, No. 346, Cd. 788-10, p. 15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³ *Ibid.*, 1902, Cd. No. 409, 1768-14, p. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

the contrary, there was urgent need that the Resident should be constantly on the move through his province, listening to the grievances of the people on the spot.¹ The assessment of taxation, when finally approved, was based upon the former scale shorn of its more recent features and of the extortion which was involved in them. Each province was divided into three or four "administrative divisions"; and each of these divisions became the immediate sphere of an Assistant-Resident under the general supervision and control of the Resident-in-Chief. There were also numerous "districts"; each under a "District Headman," whose duty it was to distribute the quota of taxation imposed upon the village among the individual inhabitants, in proportion to their wealth and ability to pay. He was further responsible for the good order of his district and was consequently under the necessity of residing in it; though he had to visit the capital twice a year, in order that the Emir might remain in touch with the districts and maintain his hold on the Headman.²

Under this scheme of taxation and the reforms made in the native administration, the British staff were brought into close touch with the natives and were enabled at once to prevent abuses and to form a just estimate of the needs of both the chiefs and the people.³

It was a fundamental principle that every labourer should be paid in person for his work. Payment was never allowed to be made to the chief, who might appropriate to his own use the labourer's earnings. Moreover, as a general rule, labour was never claimed as an equivalent for the amount of taxation. The rule was for the labourer to be paid what he had earned, and then for the village Headman to collect the sum due under the tax.⁴

In a striking Memorandum Sir F. Lugard explained that, in connexion with the work of the British staff, much more was at stake than the mere collection of revenue. The new system brought the political officer into touch with his people, and gave him a close and intimate knowledge of each town and village. His constant tours must involve the settlement of ancient disputes, the administration of justice, and the collection of valuable statistics. They would, above all, bring home to the petty native chiefs the policy of the Government and their own responsibilities.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

² *Mem. on Taxation of Natives in N. Nigeria*, Misc. Rep., No. 40, Cd. 3309, 1907.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

The real test of a Resident's value and fitness for promotion must be the content and quiet prevailing in his province, the absence of crimes of violence and the efficiency of the chiefs and of the native Courts.¹

As early as 1905 the Government could claim that the increase of trade and prosperity which had followed in the wake of the *Pax Britannica*, the steps taken to reform the administration and to decentralize some of the despotic powers exercised by the native rulers, through the institution of District Headmen, the increased confidence in the Native Courts and the incipient efforts to promote sanitation in native cities, were all tending to promote a higher standard of native comfort and well-being.² Nor did the rising at Sokoto in that year cause more than a momentary setback. The situation was saved by the existence of a telegraph line due to the prescience of Sir F. Lugard and of Mr. Chamberlain.³

In 1906 Sir F. Lugard left, for the time, the country with the making of which his name will always be associated, and was succeeded by Sir Percy Girouard. This appointment was, in one respect, significant. Sir Percy had first risen to fame through his work in connexion with the Sudan railway; and now that improvement in the means of transport was the most pressing of Northern Nigeria's economic needs, it was fitting that a railway expert should take the helm. The development of the railway system was essential, on grounds both military and economic. As regards military safety, the necessity for railways was obvious; and in the field of economics not only would they tend to reduce and, in time, abolish the wasteful, if not degrading, system of transport by human carriers, but they would enable cotton-growing to become a widespread and profitable industry.⁴

In his general policy Sir Percy was content to follow on the lines of his predecessor. The progress made may be gauged by the fact that whereas in 1900 only some thirty thousand out of a total of two hundred and fifty thousand square miles were under some form of organized control, in 1908 the portion of the Protectorate still outside the area of administration did not exceed the portion under administration at the previous date.⁵

¹ *Rep. of the N. Nigeria Lands Committee Evidence*, 1910, Cd. 5103, p. 129. ² *Rep. N. Nigeria*, 1905-6, No. 516, Cd. 3283-3, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴ *Further Correspondence relating to Railway Construction in Nigeria*, Cd. 4523, 1909.

⁵ *Rep. N. Nigeria*, 1907-8, No. 594, Cd. 4448-3, pp. 6-7.

A striking picture of the benefits conferred by the British occupation was drawn in a Report from the Commercial Intelligence Commissioner for Southern Nigeria, after a visit to the Northern Protectorate. Along a thousand miles of road he had heard of only one case of robbery. A woman, travelling by herself a distance of twenty-two miles, when asked if she was not afraid, replied, "No, not since the white man made the road."¹

The same authority gave a very favourable account of the capacities of the inhabitants. They were great agriculturists. They possessed the metal from which they made their farming implements, together with knives, scissors and even razors; being able, by some process, to convert their iron into steel. They made their own earthenware pots and even the pipes that they smoked. They were expert tanners and workers in leather. The implements used in their various manufactures were all home made. They grew their own dyestuffs and their own tobacco. They obtained oil from the ground-nuts and made candles from beeswax. "Truly a wonderful country and a wonderful people."²

In dealing with native races nothing is of more vital importance than a thorough understanding of their views with regard to the tenure of the land.³ The whole subject, so far as Northern Nigeria was concerned, was dealt with exhaustively by a Committee in 1909. Under native custom, it appeared, no private estate could exist. The whole of the land, occupied and unoccupied, was subject to the control of the Government (the British having taken the place of the former rulers). But that control could only be exercised in accordance with native custom. Thus each head of a household was entitled to the enjoyment of sufficient land for the support of his household; and, if his land became exhausted, he became entitled to a new plot; it being the duty of the Government to protect him from disturbance.⁴

The Committee recommended that the system of taxation should be such as entitled the Government to receive its share of increasing wealth and prosperity automatically without having

¹ Cd. 4523, 1909, p. 51.

² *Ibid.*, p. 50.

³ The *locus classicus* on the subject is now Lugard, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-353.

⁴ *Rep. of the N. Nigerian Committee*, 1910, Cd. 5102, pp. ix.-x. Sir F. Lugard is not in complete agreement with the conclusions of the Committee, *op. cit.*, pp. 288-94.

recourse to new taxes. They recommended that the work of distributing the burden of payment should belong to the village Headman ; an annual revision of such assessment being desirable.¹

At the Committee Mr. C. L. Temple, a Resident of exceptional knowledge and authority, insisted upon the necessity of a system of direct taxation. Its payment had an educational and disciplinary effect, especially necessary when a negro population was in question.

The Land Tenure Ordinance of 1910 (Ch. 65) gave effect to the recommendations of the Committee.² In expressing his agreement with the Report, Sir P. Girouard emphasized the need of extreme caution in granting concessions to exploit forest produce. The lamentable state of things in the Congo Free State had largely arisen from the Belgian claim to the ownership of "vacant lands," which term included all lands not directly cultivated. By this interpretation of the law the inhabitants were forced to gather for European concessionaries the forest produce which they had always regarded as the property of the community.³ It is curious that this same Sir P. Girouard was, in British East Africa, held up to odium as neglectful of native interests.

But, though the British rule had relieved the Hausa peasant from Fulani oppression and freed the primitive pagan from the dread of ruthless slavery, it had always to be remembered that the sense of security itself might be wearisome, since it took all the sport and variety out of life. At any moment the emotional nature of the negro and the stern fanaticism of the Moslem might precipitate a crisis which would throw back the progress of the country for many years.⁴

Meanwhile, it was marvellous what was being achieved. True a grant in aid, £300,000 a year, was received from the Imperial Treasury ; but the local administration was able to control some 9,000,000 people and to keep the peace over an area of some 250,000 square miles at a cost of about 1s. 4d. a head. The most urgent need was to train up a trustworthy native civil service ; and a good beginning was made when the Emirs and chiefs received a definite rank and authority. They were thus given

¹ *Rep. of the N. Nigerian Committee*, 1910, Cd. 5102, p. xiv.

² It is set out in *The Question of the Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Nations*, by A. H. Snow, 1921, pp. 129-33.

³ *Rep.* as above, p. xxviii.

⁴ *Rep. N. Nigeria*, 1909, No. 674, Cd. 5467-10, pp. 3-4.

a permanent stake in the stability of the Government and were definitely enlisted on the side of law and order.¹

In January, 1912, a Durbar was held at Kano, attended by Emirs and their followers from all parts of the Protectorate. No untoward incidents arose from the assemblage of a huge crowd, the component parts of which had been once bitter enemies; whilst the Residents were unanimous with regard to the good effect produced upon the chiefs, especially those from the pagan districts.²

It is impossible to exaggerate the value of the step taken in assigning a regular income to the native officials. Even the principal Emirs, who had been, at first, shy of accepting a civil list, soon became enthusiastic supporters of the new system. The conviction came home to them that those who had been formerly in authority were still provided with important and responsible work. As to the peasantry, the advantage was obvious of paying their tax on a scale which varied little from year to year, and was understood by them, especially as there was given the right of appeal through the village headman. It was calculated that in the more settled Moslem states some 75 per cent of the population were directly interested in the maintenance of the *status quo*.³

Hitherto we have been dealing with Northern Nigeria; in dealing briefly with Southern Nigeria, we note that Lagos was amalgamated with it in 1906. During the first years of the century a very distinguished British official, Sir W. Macgregor, had left his mark upon Lagos in the development of its resources and in improving the health and well-being of its people. The town of Lagos was greatly improved; the colonial revenue was nearly doubled and a new interest was aroused in sanitary improvements. Lagos was fortunately situated in that there the Native Councils were old-established institutions able to manage for the most part their domestic affairs with efficiency and dignity.⁴

In Southern Nigeria, on the other hand, the natives were of a type lower than that of the other inhabitants of West Africa; though, towards the interior, there was some improvement. In Southern Nigeria proper there were no strong native chiefs, and

¹ *Rep. N. Nigeria*, 1910, pp. 3-4.

² *Ibid.*, 1913, No. 821, Cd. 7622-12, p. 26.

³ *Ibid.*, 1913, Cd. 7622-12, p. 12.

⁴ *Rep. Lagos*, 1904, No. 470, Cd. 2684-16, and *Rep. Lagos*, 1903, No. 427, Cd. 2238-4, p. 47.

a substitute had to be found in the shape of newly-formed Councils, to which the District Commissioners gave their encouragement and support. The country was not inhabited by a single nation. It was a series of small tribal communities, without any connexion with each other in language, religion, or means of communication.¹

Southern Nigeria, however, was very rich ; and although each step in bringing it under settled government had to be made good by a show of military force, it proved possible to introduce and maintain law and order from the ordinary revenue. As each year a larger area was pacified and freedom of trade between town and town and with the coast was secured, in spite of the expenses connected with the enforcement of law, the increasing revenue enabled a further step to be taken forward in the extension of British rule.²

Nor did the people fail to respond to the efforts made on their behalf. A proposal to open a school was almost always welcomed by the chiefs and peoples ; whilst the progress made in agriculture was significant.³ Already the advance achieved was marvellous. A few years earlier Southern Nigeria had been represented as a mere blank, outside the coast settlements and a small portion of it in the western provinces and along the banks of the Niger and Cross Rivers. It was now taking the position of an ordinary colony or protectorate.⁴

There was, however, one sinister feature in the general situation. Unhappily Southern Nigeria depended in great measure for its revenue on the proceeds of the duty on spirits. There was practically no direct taxation ; more than eight-tenths of the revenue being derived from customs duties, of which alcohol furnished the great proportion.⁵

It has been already noticed that the establishment of schools was welcomed. Nevertheless, whatever may have been the cause, the spread of education failed to produce satisfactory results. Complaints were heard on all sides of the lack of discipline and self-control in the rising generation.⁶

¹ *Rep. S. Nigeria*, 1903, No. 433, Cd. 2238-10, pp. 39-40.

² *Ibid.*, 1904, No. 459, Cd. 2684-5.

³ *Ibid.*, 1906, No. 554, Cd. 3729-18, pp. 46 and 94.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1908, No. 630, Cd. 4964-4.

⁵ *Rep. of the Commission of Inquiry into the Liquor Trade in Nigeria*, Cd. 4906, 1909.

⁶ *Rep. S. Nigeria*, 1913, No. 825, Cd. 7622-16, pp. 4-5.

In 1914 the two Nigerias were united; Sir F. Lugard returning to carry out his own policy. In every way the measure was a wise one. Not only did it put an end to the grievance felt by the southern province, which was compelled, as being the wealthier, to come to the aid of its northern neighbour,¹ but it enabled a more active and consistent policy to be adopted for the country as a whole. An Executive Council, comprising the senior officials of the whole of Nigeria, replaced the former restricted ones. A new body was also set on foot termed the "Nigerian Council," which included amongst its members the leading unofficial members of the European and native communities, so as to give expression to public opinion. That this body had no direct executive or legislative powers did not detract from its value in this direction.² At the same time the system of Provincial Courts was extended to the southern portion. Unfortunately the exclusion of professional advocates from the Native Courts, the wisdom of which had been abundantly shown by experience, gave grave offence to the native lawyers of Lagos and Calabar.³ In the same spirit the educated inhabitants of Lagos protested vehemently against the institution of a small water rate, in return for a pure and abundant water supply.

Nevertheless, even this class struck no discordant note when, at the moment of crisis, there was, if ever, the need for unanimity. Nigeria, assuredly, did not fall behind the other portions of the Empire in the day of trial. The Mohammedan Emirs of the north displayed the utmost enthusiasm and readiness to help. They gave large sums from their private purses and supplied carriers, food products and other necessities. At its meeting of 1915 the Nigerian Council unanimously decided to take over £6,000,000 of Great Britain's war debt as Nigeria's own liability. The offer, however, was eventually not accepted.⁴ It was significant that the tribes nearest to the German frontier were especially to the fore in giving loyal and ungrudging assistance.⁵ Meanwhile, in spite of the war, the progress of the country went on unchecked. It was decided, in 1917, with the concurrence of the chiefs and people, to introduce into the Yoruba, Egba, and Benin kingdoms

¹ See remarks of Sir W. Egerton in Cd. 4523, p. 2.

² *Rep. Nigeria*, 1914, No. 878, Cd. 8172-4, pp. 35-6.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1916, No. 946, Cd. 8434-33, p. 37.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1915, No. 920, Cd. 8434-7, p. 29.

which alone in the south had a central organization and single acknowledged chiefs, the system of direct taxation which prevailed in the northern portion of Nigeria.¹

So great was the general prosperity, partly owing to the development of cotton-growing, that in spite of the loss of revenue from the import duties on spirits, due to the war, it proved possible, owing to the great increase in railway receipts and to the proceeds of the export duties, imposed in 1916, to bring to an end the imperial grant in aid, which had hitherto been given to Northern Nigeria.² Up to the end of 1918 the total cost of the war to Nigeria was nearly one million and a half pounds.³ Nor did she help with money alone. Nigerian troops served with the Expeditionary Force against German East Africa, receiving on their return an enthusiastic welcome.⁴

With the union of the two Nigerias the question of the dependence of the southern portion on a revenue largely arising from spirits of necessity became of pressing importance. Under the Brussels Act of 1892, as well as through the prescience and good sense of the Royal Niger Company, Northern Nigeria had remained barred against the invasion of spirits. But under the new system of government it was obviously very difficult to maintain such a distinction. It was generally recognized that the traffic was discreditable to the British name and harmful to British trade, in that the spirits came mainly from foreign countries and their consumption lessened the demand for British goods. Perhaps, however, the goad of the war was required before the nettle could be grasped effectively as was done by the Liquor Law of 1917.

In 1919 a Convention was signed between France, Italy, Portugal, and the British Empire, prohibiting throughout the territories of tropical Africa under their respective control "the importation, distribution, sale and possession of trade spirits of any kind and of beverages mixed with these spirits." A minimum duty upon all other distilled beverages was fixed and distillation in tropical areas was forbidden. (Lugard, *op. cit.*, p. 599.)

Another problem, on which we have touched, still awaits its solution. We have spoken of education; but, after two decades of British occupation, Sir Hugh Clifford, the Governor, affirmed in 1920 that the northern provinces had not produced a single native

¹ *Rep. Nigeria*, 1917, No. 1008, Cd. 1-13, p. 28.

² *Ibid.*, 1918, No. 10,030, Cd. 508-14, p. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

who was sufficiently educated to fill the lowest clerical post in a Government department ; whilst in the southern provinces, in spite of the abundance of schools, there was very little genuine education.¹ There had unfortunately been little change since, in 1914, a distinguished native had said that the indiscipline and vanity of the young men produced by the schools had become so intolerable that parents were discussing the withdrawal of their children.²

It was this kind of education that gave birth to the " West Africa Natives' Conference " with its scheme of democratic government by means of popular election ; regardless of the complete absence of uniformity or similarity amongst the peoples of West Africa.³ Nothing is so likely to impede progress as premature and ignorant haste. In the field of administration Sir H. Clifford has been able to effect some improvements. Considering the smallness of the staff, it is simply amazing what has been done by the British officials. In 1919 there were only seven first-class Residents in the northern provinces and four in the southern. The corresponding figures with regard to Residents of the second class were seventeen and thirteen. The political staff being in the proportion of one to about 65,000 natives, Sir Hugh recommended modest additions, bringing the proportion up to one in some 50,000.⁴ He deprecated the system of " short tours," seeing that they involved frequent changes and continually recurring periods of leave. He advocated security of tenure and liberal pay. When it is remembered that the incidence of taxation in Nigeria was about 7s. 6d. a year per head, it would not seem that the demands of the British Administration have been exorbitant.⁵

In a powerful letter to Lord Milner, Sir H. Clifford emphasized the importance of the natives remaining masters in their own house, so far as agricultural production was concerned.⁶ With this spirit dominant, it was natural that when British rule was substituted for German in the part of the Cameroons adjoining Nigeria, the natives should at first have welcomed the change.

¹ *Address by Governor to Nigerian Council*, 29 Dec., 1920, pp. 196 and 199.

² Cd. 468, p. 60. See Lugard, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-60.

³ *Address*, as above, p. 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵ Since then, however, taxation has increased very considerably.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

The constant fear of native risings, felt by the Germans, was evidenced by the Government stations being strongly stockaded. After the British occupation officers travelled about the country practically without an escort. It is true that a change came over the native temper when he found himself confronted with the consequences of the war, in the shape of high prices for food and other necessities, paper money, and the absence of trade spirits. German rule was then regretted because it stood for the pre-war conditions that vanished with it.¹ But nothing that British officials could have done could have remedied this.

If, in concluding this chapter on British rule in Africa, we try to estimate its value, we must remember that men should be judged by the ideals which they put before them, and not by the shortcomings that are inevitable in the case of fallible beings. But the British ideals have been made manifest—to rescue the races of Africa from the servile status that had become engrained in their blood, and to create in them that sense of individual self-respect, by which alone the traditions of slavery can be eradicated. It is an uphill task, and one in which the premature self-confidence of native windbags and of their European advocates may bring about an occasional setback. Still it points to a goal giving a justification for British imperialism, which, under modern conditions, it cannot find in the spoils of conquest, or even in the gains won by efficiency. By their fruits ye shall know them ; and the fruits of British rule must be millions raised to a sense of the dignity of human life and endowed with the happiness which is the outcome of a well-organized system of family and social relations.

[NOTE.—In this chapter mention of the Gambia and of Nyasaland has been omitted. The interest of the little colony of the Gambia is largely historical ; though it should be noted that the Gambia company of the W.A.F.F. served both in the Cameroons and in East Africa. In Nyasaland the most distinctive economic feature has been the superabundance of the labour supply.]

¹ *Address by Governor to Nigerian Council*, 29 Dec., 1920, p. 210.

CHAPTER II

MALAYA

SPACE forbids to deal with the Straits Settlements, "that happy hunting-ground of all races,"¹ with its great free port Singapore, marvellous in many ways, yet less admirable in its neglect of sanitary improvements.² It suffices to note that the community, European and native alike, responded splendidly to the demands of the war, the Legislative Council voting cheerfully an annual contribution of £200,000 towards its expenses and agreeing readily to the imposition of an income tax.³ The experience occasioned by the war did, indeed, demonstrate that rubber had been cultivated too extensively at the expense of the food crops of the people,⁴ but this can hardly be brought to the charge of the British authorities.

But whilst Singapore is in the letter the memorial of Sir Stamford Raffles, the spirit of his life is better represented by that British permeation of the Federated Malay States, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, which has done so much for the Malay people at so little cost to the British exchequer. To facilitate matters there were present two factors, not often found side by side. In the first place, the country was one of unrivalled fertility, which at once responded generously to any outlay expended upon it. Then, the native Governments were potentially strong and vigorous, and, far from collapsing under British influence, gained thereby strength and dignity.

That influence began in the different States in 1875, and progress had already been made when, twenty years later, the

¹ *Rep. Straits Settlements*, 1919, No. 1048, Cd. 508-31, p. 48.

² *Ibid.*, 1906, No. 540, Cd. 3729-4, p. 34, and *ibid.*, 1918, No. 1028, Cd. 508-12, p. 44.

³ *Ibid.*, 1916, No. 940, Cd. 8434-27, p. 20, and *ibid.*, 1917, No. 991, Cd. 28, p. 40.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

Federation was set on foot.¹ The general policy of the British advisers had been to interfere as little as possible with native customs and prejudices ; not to interfere at all in matters relating to the Mohammedan religion ; to attract capital, European or Chinese ; to encourage the immigration of labourers, Chinese or Indian ; and to secure the development of mineral and agricultural resources by making roads, railways, and works of drainage and irrigation. It was further necessary to establish security for life and property by constituting courts of justice ; to provide free hospitals and schools ; to give good titles to land ; and, finally, to abolish import duties (except on opium and spirits) and all restraints on trade and industry.²

Inasmuch as the principal industry, that of mining, was controlled by the Chinese, it might be asked : What had British Protection done for " the real Malay " ? The answer was that it had given him security for life and property unknown before, when his wife, daughters and orchards had been at the mercy of the dominant classes. It had given him a permanent title to his land. It had furnished him with the means of communication by road and rail. It had opened out a local market for his labour and his produce. It had offered him free education for his children, free hospital treatment and medicine. It had started banks in which he could deposit with safety and at interest his earnings. It had abolished slavery and piracy and had, practically, put an end to the scourges of small-pox and cholera. It had established the reign of law and equity throughout the land. It had made the raiat equal to the Raja before the law. It helped him to drain and to irrigate his padi-fields. It contributed to the cost of the building of his mosque. It had laid open to him offices under the Government, to which fixed salaries and pensions were attached, and had freed him from arbitrary taxation and forced levies and from the system of compulsory labour. In return, the only contribution he made to the revenue was a small quit rent, if he was a landowner. Perhaps, in sober truth, his only legitimate cause of complaint could be that he was not compelled to work and to become an industrious member of society after the methods pursued by the Dutch in their East Indies.³

It is only fair to recognize that the path of reform was made

¹ *Reps. on the Federated Malay States*, 1900, Cd. 815, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

easier by the good example set by the native rulers. In Perak, especially, the Sultan took the keenest interest in all matters affecting the well-being and development of his State. The native chiefs who had been entrusted with magisterial powers showed not a little intelligence and zeal in performing duties which sometimes involved the explanation of intricate laws.¹

Pahang was the drag on the wheel to the rest of the Federation, and required much to be done in the way of development before it could take its place on equal terms with its partner States.² Situated on the eastern side of the peninsula, its coast was much less accessible owing to weather conditions.

The beginnings of British Malaya have been told with the pen of a master by one who had played a leading part in the making of its history.³ From 1895 to 1901 Sir Frank Swettenham was Resident-General for the Federated Malay States, and from 1901 to 1904 he was their High Commissioner, as well as the Governor of the Straits Settlements. In the words of his successor, Sir J. Anderson: "Throughout the States his powerful personality has impressed itself indelibly on the country and on its administration. But for his vigorous initiative and resolution, his great administrative ability, the confidence with which he was regarded by the native rulers, as well as by his own officers, and his unshakeable faith in the future of the country, the enormous advance it has made in every direction could never have been made. The extent of that advance can only be properly appreciated by those who have seen something of the Malay States outside British protection. To pass from one to the other is to pass from the Anglo-Saxon period to the twentieth century."⁴

The wealth of the country was shown by the fact that the Government railways had been constructed entirely out of revenue and returned about 6 per cent on the capital invested. The revenue was mainly derived from a duty on exported tin, from the duty on imported opium, and from the proceeds of licences given for the command of certain monopolies.⁵

The weak point in the general situation was the scarcity of labour. The Malay did not care to work, except on his own land, and Indian labour remained, for the most part, deaf to the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³ *British Malaya*, 1906.

⁴ *Rep. Federated Malay States*, 1904, Cd. 2777, p. 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1901, Cd. 1297, p. 4.

inducements held out to it. Without Chinese coolies, introduced by the Chinese capitalists, the progress of the country would have been impossible.¹

That the Federation was something more than a name was shown by the agreement arrived at that from January, 1902, no interest should be charged on any loan made by one member of the Federation to another. All interest due on loans to Pahang was at the same time cancelled, the loss being apportioned between Perak and Selangor in equal shares.²

In fact, nothing could have been more smiling than the general prospect had it not been that the easy-going, indolent temper of the Malay population prevented them from rising to the opportunities put before them. The British, on arriving in the country, found no native Civil Service such as existed in Egypt, which might be gradually disciplined and reformed; and with regard to the common people no direct steps were taken to induce them to undergo steady work and thus take their part in the country's development, the goad of taxation not being applied. It was surmised that in this respect perhaps the Dutch in Java had shown more wisdom than had the British on the mainland.³

There was one exception, however, to the general rule of Malay inefficiency; the native "Penghulus" or headmen, proving themselves to be very capable and useful magistrates.⁴

The second session of the Federation Conference was held in July, 1903. It was attended by the High Commissioner, the Resident-General, the four Sultans and a large majority of the members of the Council in each of the States. Its discussions, which related to subjects of some difficulty as well as of importance, were of real value, the Sultan of Perak especially distinguishing himself during their course.⁵

As regards the land, the policy, initiated in 1904, of making loans of Government money to owners, for the purpose of discharging incumbrances and of development, proved very successful. By these means areas were brought into cultivation which would otherwise have remained untouched, unless the owner had come into the grip of the private moneylender. The British authorities set their face resolutely against the acquisition of land for the

¹ *Rep. Federated Malay States*, 1901, Cd. 1297, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³ *Ibid.*, 1902, Cd. 1819, p. 26.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1903, Cd. 2243, p. 35.

promotion of over-capitalized companies, determined to prevent, so far as in them lay, such traffic in land as should make it the instrument for extracting money from the purses of a too confiding public.¹

The keynote of the undoubted success obtained by the British residents lay mainly in the intelligent sympathy they displayed with the needs and wants of the people. To obtain results, without causing friction, was always the aim ; hence it was often necessary to proceed very slowly and with great caution. Thus though the system of debt slavery, differing only in name from ordinary slavery, had been abolished in Perak in 1884, and even earlier in Selangor and Negri Sembilan, it was not finally abolished in Pahang before 1906.²

The institution of a Federal Council in 1909 was an important move in the direction of securing greater uniformity of government. In this body sat the four Sultans, the High Commissioner, the Resident-General, the four Residents, together with four unofficial members. It dealt with matters applying to the Federation as a whole and with the annual estimates of revenue and expenditure. The native rulers gave their cordial support to a departure which they recognized to be necessary if the development of their countries was to be effected on systematic lines.³

The same year was in another respect noteworthy. In July, 1909, the Anglo-Siamese treaty came into operation, whereby an addition was made to Upper Perak, and the native states, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, came under the protection of the British Crown.⁴ Henceforth the work of the British authorities became more complicated. They had, on the one hand, to press forward the progress of reforms in the more civilized states, whilst at the same time they greatly strengthened the knees of the new arrivals into the British sheepfold.

But the new states did not always lag behind. A great step in advance had been taken when, in 1909, the Governments of the four federated states took over the opium and liquor monopolies, entrusting their management to European heads of departments ; but a still greater triumph was achieved when it proved possible in Kedah to entrust the sole management of a

¹ *Rep. Federated Malay States*, 1905, Cd. 3186, pp. 64-65.

² *Ibid.*, 1906, Cd. 3741, p. 83.

³ *Ibid.*, Cd. 4722, p. 40.

⁴ *Ibid.*

monopoly which collected more than three-quarters of a million dollars in small sums from the inhabitants to a Malay secretary, who worked his office without a single European assistant.¹

The abolition of the farming system in the Federated Malay States proved a very profitable proceeding. Notwithstanding that the facilities for opium smoking had been much curtailed, and that its consumption between 1908 and 1911 fell 50 per cent, the amount received by the Government was much larger in the latter year. There were other causes at work, but the main cause was that the State was now reaping the profits which had in the past gone into the pockets of the Chinese middleman.²

Rumours of a coco-nut "boom" to follow in the wake of a rubber "boom" excited the alarm and disgust of the British authorities. The boom in rubber had been accompanied by attendant evils, but a boom in coco-nuts, involving, as it would have involved inevitably, the buying up of the holdings of the Malay people and their sale at extravagant prices to Europeans, would have amounted to a national disaster. The Government was inflexibly opposed to any proposals that might lead to the ousting of the native inhabitants from their ancestral lands, and measures were taken to prevent such a calamity.³

Whatever its views as to booms, the administration was obviously justified in seeking to secure its share of the profits arising from rubber. That the terms on which land was offered for sale were not prohibitive was shown by the number of purchasers. That they were not unduly onerous was amply proved by the profits of the various companies. The Government's share was £3 an acre, but the profit to the producer, after paying this, amounted in 1911 to about £60 an acre. In these halcyon days for the industry the price of rubber was some 5s. a lb.⁴

In considering the question of taxation, it must be remembered that it was only by the possession of a large surplus that the Federation was able to pursue the policy of continuous development. Further, there were the new states which must receive a helping hand if they were ever to attain a place in the sun.

Again, having regard to the declared policy of the Home Government with regard to the traffic in opium, a policy to which,

¹ *Rep. Kedah, etc.*, 1910, Cd. 5955, p. 25.

² *Rep. Federated Malay States*, 1911, Cd. 6562, pp. 1-7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28. At one time in 1921 the price fell to 6d. a lb.

however unacceptable it might be to many, the administration of the Federated States was prepared loyally to conform, it would have been the height of folly to relinquish other sources of revenue, unless under absolute compulsion. The revenue derived from opium was in 1911 one-sixth of the total. It would tend to decrease in amount until it vanished altogether. Gaming was a source of revenue of which no Government could be proud, and must shortly disappear. (It did so disappear in Perak from 1 January, 1913.) In this state of things it would have been madness to abandon a tax which, in effect, was directed against the company promoter rather than the individual investor.¹

A conspicuous proof was given in 1912 of the strength of the ties binding the Federation with Great Britain. The alarm felt throughout the Empire at the apparent determination of Germany to challenge the pre-eminence of the British Navy found its echo in these distant communities. At a meeting of the Federal Council, held on 12 November, at Kuala Lumpor, the principal town in the Federation, a resolution was passed in favour of offering to the Crown a first-class armoured ship. The resolution was moved by the Sultan of Perak, and seconded by the Sultan of Selangor, and was supported by the representatives of the other Sultans. The offer was undoubtedly spontaneous, and the inhabitants of the country, Asiatics no less than Europeans, took a genuine pride in having the name *Malaya* associated with one of the most powerful and costly vessels that had, up to that time, been built for the British Navy.² It was due to the initiative of the Sultan of Perak that the resolution was framed so as to provide for the whole cost of the battleship within a period of five years. The original intention had been that the payments should be spread over twenty years.³

Mention has been made of the desire of the Government to preserve the land to the Malay. It was not, however, till 1913 that a serious attempt was made to deal with the subject by legislation, with the view of protecting the interests of the native population. The great demand for land had brought the native face to face with a temptation which he found it difficult to resist, and ancestral holdings threatened to fall into European hands. The Malay Reservation Enactment of 1913 was an honest attempt to safe-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

² *Ibid.*, 1912, Cd. 7208, p. 46.

³ *Ibid.*, 1916, Cd. 8814, p. 30.

guard native property, without blocking the way of the country's material development.¹

In sober truth the position of the Federated Malay States was probably unique among the dependencies of the Empire. It had, as we have seen, a first-rate railway system, built entirely out of revenue. It produced between 40 and 50 per cent of the world's total production of tin. It took the lead in embarking on a large scale upon the plantation rubber industry, and in 1915 was producing about one-third of the total rubber produce of the world.²

With these sources of strength, though the outbreak of the Great War caused temporary trouble owing to the sudden cessation of credit, the setback was very short-lived, and was followed by years of prosperity. Thus we find in the third year of the war the highest revenue ever reached in the history of the Federated States, the excess of revenue over expenditure amounting to over nineteen million dollars. The Federal Council thereupon decided to make a contribution to the Imperial Government and a sum of £500,000 was given.³ In the following year the proceeds of the taxes were such that it was possible to contribute a further sum of £500,000 to the British exchequer, making a million sterling in all. The war taxes were kept on foot, and a resolution was passed, approving of a contribution of £750,000 as an instalment for 1918.

The enemy at the gate was not taxation; and there was little or no poverty such as exists in most countries. The one danger which threatened was profiteering with regard to the necessities of life. The difficulty lay in dealing with this danger, without checking production or importation.⁴

A new link had been added in 1914 to the chain of British ascendancy in Malaya by the voluntary action of the Sultan of Johore, who requested the presence at his court of an official British adviser, and undertook to govern according to his advice. The Sultanate of Johore had been so closely associated with Singapore for many years that the new arrangement could not fail to be of great advantage to both Johore and British Malaya.⁵ A substantial proof of good feeling was given when, at the breaking

¹ *Rep. Federated Malay States*, 1913, Cd. 7709, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, 1915, Cd. 8377, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.*, 1916, Cd. 8814, p. 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1917, Cmd. 26, p. 20.

⁵ *Rep. on the Federated Malay States under British Protection*, 1914, Cd. 7622-53, p. 31.

out of the Great War, the Sultan at once placed himself and his forces unreservedly at the disposal of the imperial authorities.¹ Again, the incident of the Singapore Mutiny in 1915 served to show that the Sultan was no fair-weather friend. His forces gave valuable help in the rounding-up of the mutineers, for which action the Sultan received the warm thanks of the King from the mouth of the British adviser.²

British interference soon led to practical results. Paid headmen were instituted in 1917, performing such of their duties as were connected with the land settlement under the direct control of the collectors. The new system, which was altogether in the interests of the small-holders, received their cordial approval.³

During the time of the war Johore was in the extraordinary position of being almost too prosperous, because of the demands thereby made upon the man power of an administration already reduced to the lowest minimum, so that it became necessary to retard rather than to encourage new enterprise.⁴

Whoever should wish to weigh the effects of British superintendency should carefully compare the state of things in the new states before and after the Anglo-Siamese treaty mentioned above. When the first British adviser arrived in Kelantan he found it a common practice for two cases to be heard at the same time by the same judge. The administration of justice was forthwith greatly improved.⁵ In Perlis, under British advice, the Sultan was induced to abolish forced labour and so to modify the system of debt bondage as to ensure its gradual abolition.⁶ It is noteworthy that before the terms of the treaty were known, the people had shown extreme anxiety to come under the British protection.⁷ In Kedah, also, British ascendancy meant an early doom to debt bondage, and when a "rice combine" threatened the native padi-planter with disaster the British adviser took vigorous measures to avert the danger.⁸ There was, indeed, much in the state of things in Kedah

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, 1915, Cd. 8378, p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, 1917, Cmd. 27, p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁵ *Rep. of Adviser to the Kelantan Govt.*, 1909-10, Cd. 5374, p. 7.

⁶ *Rep. of Adviser to the Perlis Govt.*, 1909-10, Cd. 5389, p. 62.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁸ *Rep. on the States of Kedah, etc.*, 1912, Cd. 7209, pp. 15-6, and *ibid.*, 1913, Cd. 7795, pp. 23-4.

requiring amendment. The economic growth was rapid, but the methods of administration were in urgent need of reform. Under the old regime the "penghulus" had received no salary, living on the proceeds of extortion. In 1913 they were constituted Government officials, and were given adequate salaries. At once a striking improvement took place in their work.¹

The British authorities fully realized the necessity of moving slowly and cautiously where a deeply conservative peasantry was concerned. The system of land tenure was the framework on which had been built the customs, the habits and the life itself of the Malay, and any attempt to change the system to which he was accustomed would inevitably have aroused his stubborn and determined opposition.

Still, by tact and goodwill, substantial progress could be made. The headmen in Kelantan had been for years a body of tax gatherers, at once inefficient and despised. It was decided to bring them together at periodical meetings. By these means they began to recognize that they were trusted by the Government and were soon found to acquire a new *esprit de corps*. Nor were these meetings less valuable to the British adviser, because at them through these headmen he was able to feel the pulse of the peasantry and to put them in touch with his own views and aims.²

Trengganu had the advantages of great natural wealth, a singularly industrious population, and the absence of a public debt. On the other hand, its relations with the British authorities were less close than those of the other new states. Thus, progress in Kelantan and Kedah was proportionately more rapid, and the general well-being of their raiat distinctly superior. As the level of prosperity and morality grew in the other states, the deficiencies in their backward sister showed up more sharply, and were more difficult to excuse. But even here there were hopeful signs, such as a greater accessibility on the part of the local Government to British suggestions, and a growing sense of the obligations incurred by the presence of British protection and support.³

The best test of the feelings of a subject people is—What was their attitude at the breaking out of the Great War? In this respect the response of these new states was singularly impressive.

¹ *Rep. on the States of Kedah, etc.*, 1913, Cd. 7795, p. 20.

² *Rep. on the Federated Malay States under British Protection*, 1916, Cd. 8812; *Kelantan*, p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*, 1917, Cmd. 27; *Trengganu*, p. 11.

The Sultan of Kelantan gave convincing proof of his goodwill by convening a public meeting to pray for the early success of the British arms, and by ordering weekly prayers for this object. He further solemnly announced that the entry of Turkey into the war did not make Great Britain the enemy of Islam. In Trengganu the attitude of the Sultan and his chiefs was no less loyal, whilst from Kedah there came in 1916 the gift of a battleplane to cost twenty thousand dollars, private subscribers furnishing a similar sum for the gift of a second.¹

Not, then, without their reward have been the services of Great Britain to the Malay Peninsula. The time may come, as it has come elsewhere, when, filled with a new sense of their own value, the native races may spurn the ladder by which, if at all, they have reached the height to which they have attained; but in Malaya, so far as one can see, generations will pass before such a state of mind comes about.

¹ *Rep.*, etc., 1916, Cd. 8812; *Kedah*.

CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

IT would in any case have been impossible to deal in the closing pages of a single volume with the whole range of what have in the past been known as Crown Colonies. The definition of our subject matter excludes the consideration of possessions such as Malta, which is now attempting, in favourable circumstances, to put in force the new principle of dyarchy. Ceylon, to the ordinary mind, seems always connected with continental India. The West Indies, however, and the Pacific Islands, which to all of us possess a glamour of romance, such as is possessed by no other portion of the globe, are strictly germane to our subject matter, and it is only exigencies of space which make it necessary to concentrate on those Colonies and Protectorates in Africa and Malaya which most clearly show forth British methods in the government of backward races. Still, in further illustration of the British attitude, as brought out in the two preceding chapters, we may cite the language of the British administrator of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, written in the crisis of the war: "To those who remain to carry on the work of government the magnificent spirit displayed by the native community is a matter of consolation and pride. It remains to be worthy of the privilege of guiding the flock. . . . The confidence shown in the British rule is inspiring. It is sometimes even embarrassing, for it is difficult to live up to the standard of wisdom which the natives ascribe to British officers."¹

If it be said that self-praise is no recommendation, or that an encomium of British methods by a British official counts for nothing, we can cite the striking testimony of the distinguished American theologian and philosopher, Professor J. Royce, of Harvard: "I have had occasion," he wrote, "three times in recent summers to visit Jamaica and Trinidad at a time when few

¹ *Rep. Gilbert and Ellice Islands Prot.*, 1914-5, Cd. 8172-10, pp. 16-7.

tourists were there. . . . I watched the negroes in various places and talked with some of them too. Jamaica has a population, surely, of not more than fourteen or fifteen thousand whites, mostly British. The black population considerably exceeds six hundred thousand. The plantation life in the days before emancipation was much sadder and severer by common consent than ours in the south ever was. Both the period of emancipation and the immediately following period were of a very discouraging type. In the sixties of the last century there was one very unfortunate insurrection. The economic history of the island has been, in many ways, unlucky even to the present day. Here, then, are certainly conditions which, in some respects, are decidedly such as would seem to tend towards a lasting state of genuine irritation, such as would make, you might suppose, race questions acute. . . . And yet, despite all these disadvantages, whatever the other problems of Jamaica, whatever its defects, our present southern race problem, in the forms which we know best, simply does not exist. There is no public controversy about social race equality or superiority. Neither a white man nor a white woman feels insecure in moving freely about among the black population everywhere in the island.

“The negro is, on the whole, neither painfully obtrusive in his public manners nor in need of being sharply kept in his place. Within the circle of the black population itself there is, meanwhile, a decidedly rich social differentiation. There are negroes in the Government service, negroes in the professions, negroes who are fairly prosperous peasant proprietors, and there are also the poor peasants ; there are the thriftless, the poor in the towns, and, as in any tropical country, the beggars. In Kingston, and in some other towns, there is a small class of negroes who are distinctly criminal. On the whole, however, the negroes and coloured population, taken in the mass, are orderly, law-abiding, contented, still backward in their education, but apparently advancing. They are genuinely loyal to the Government. The best of them are aspiring in their own way, and wholesomely self-conscious. Yet there is no doubt whatever that English white men are the controllers of the destiny of the country. But these English whites, few as they are, control the country, at present, with extraordinarily little friction, and wholly without those painful emotions, those insistent complaints and anxieties which at present are so prominent in the minds of many of our own southern brethren. Life in Jamaica is not ideal.

The economic aspect of the island is, in many ways, unsatisfactory. But the negro question, in our present American sense of the term, seems to be substantially solved."

The solution, Professor Royce affirms, was found "by the simplest means in the world—the simplest, that is, for Englishmen, viz. by English administration and by English reticence; when once the sad period of emancipation and of subsequent occasional disorder was passed, the Englishman did in Jamaica what he had so often and so well done elsewhere. He organized his colony; he established good local courts which gained, by square treatment, the confidence of the blacks. The judges of such courts were Englishmen. The English ruler also established a good County Constabulary, in which native blacks also found service, and in which they could exercise authority over other blacks. Black men, in other words, were trained under English management to police black men. A sound Civil Service was also organized, and in that educated natives found in due time their place, while the chiefs of each branch of the service were, and are, in the main, Englishmen.

"The excise and the health services, both of which are very highly developed, have brought the law near to the life of the humblest negro in ways which he sometimes finds, of course, restraining, but which he also frequently finds beneficent. Hence he is accustomed to the law; he sees its ministers often, and often too, as men of his own race, and, in the main, he is fond of order and respectful towards the established ways of society. The Jamaica negro is . . . especially fond of bringing his petty quarrels and personal grievances into court. He is litigious, just as he is vivacious. But this confidence in the law is just what the courts have encouraged.

"That is one way to deal with the too forward and too strident negro. Encourage him to air his grievances in court, listen to him patiently, and fine him when he deserves fines. That is a truly English type of social pedagogy. It makes in the direction of making the negro a conscious helper towards good social order. Administration, I say, has done this larger half of the work of solving Jamaica's race problem. Administration has filled the island with good roads; has reduced to a minimum the tropical diseases by means of an excellent health service; has taught the population law and order; has led them some steps already on the long road 'up from slavery'; has given

them, in many cases, the true self-respect of those who officially co-operate in the work of the law. . . . Administration has allayed ancient irritations. It has gone far to offset the serious economic and tropical troubles from which Jamaica meanwhile suffers. Yes, the work has been by administration, and by reticence. You will know that in dealing as an individual with other individuals trouble is seldom made by the fact that you are actually the superior of another man in any respect. The trouble comes when you tell the man too stridently that you are his superior. Be my superior, quietly, simply, showing your superiority in your deeds, and very likely I shall love you for the very fact of your superiority; for we all love our leaders. But tell me I am your inferior, and perhaps I may grow boyish and throw stones. Well, it is so with races. Grant, then, that yours is the superior race. Then you can afford to say little about that subject in your public dealings with the backward race. Superiority is best shown by good deeds and few boasts. . . . In any case, the southern problem will never be relieved by speech or by practice such as increases irritation. It will be relieved when administration grows sufficiently effective, and when the negroes get an increasingly responsible part in the administration, in so far it relates to their own race. That may seem a wild scheme. But, I insist, it is the English way. Look at Jamaica and learn how to protect your own homes.”¹

In dealing with Africa and the Federated Malay States, it has been sought to lay stress on the all-importance of the question of the land. It has been impossible to dwell on the requirements of capitalist production in the way of railways, etc., except so far as they affect the question of labour. And here brief mention may be made of a system which did untold good in the nineteenth century, blessing both him that gave and him that took, a system which gave a second life to colonies like Mauritius, British Guiana and Trinidad, but which is now condemned by an ex-viceroy of India as involving a “wound to racial self-respect.”² To form an estimate of the practical working of the system of industrial labour, it is sufficient to read the reports of the two Commissioners, one of whom was an Indian, who

¹ Quoted by Sir S. Olivier in *White Capital and Coloured Labour*, 1906, pp. 64-71.

² “India and Some Problems,” by Lord Chelmsford, *United Empire*, Vol. XII (New Series), p. 783.

made an exhaustive study of it, on behalf of the Indian Government, shortly before the war. It will be sufficient for our purpose to take the case of Fiji, a colony especially suffering from the lack of labour, a scarcity due partly to the indolent character of its natives, and partly to the land system, under which these natives are able, in great measure, to live comfortably on the amounts paid to them in rent without being obliged to work. The report was, upon the whole, a striking vindication of the methods of the British authorities. The colony was fortunate in being free from malarial fever ; but the very low rate of sickness from all other diseases furnished conclusive proofs of the efficiency of the general sanitary arrangements. What was still more satisfactory was that it was clear that neither the inspectors nor the employers themselves were under the belief that in sanitary matters it was ever possible to rest and be thankful.¹ Again, the constant and substantial decrease in the number of prosecutions, notwithstanding the equally marked rise in the number of labourers during the last five years, was a clear proof that the labourer was stimulated and not driven to work regularly.²

The good wages earned by the free Indian labourers accounted for the small number of repatriations, and, when once the arrangements for land settlement and for education had been placed on a more satisfactory footing, industrious Indians, emigrating from densely populated districts to sparsely populated Fiji, would find a comfortable livelihood, and, in some cases, prosperity.³

It was pointed out, however, that the presence of Indians in the colony had greatly raised the rental value of the land, which must have remained almost nominal had only Fijian labour been available. It was simple justice, therefore, that the Indian, by whose work the land had attained its value, should be given facilities for obtaining holdings from the large area still open to settlement at rents which reflected the economic value of the land, and were not the mere outcome of a legalized monopoly. The Commissioners, therefore, were of opinion

¹ *Rep. to the Government of India on the Condition of Indian Immigrants in British Colonies and in Surinam*, by Mr. J. McNeale and Mr. Chimman Lal. Part II, *Surinam, Jamaica, Fiji and General Remarks*, Cd. 7745, 1915, p. 247.

² *Ibid.*, p. 253.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

that the future needs of the Indian immigrants would not be adequately protected unless the Fijians were obliged to pay taxation on the rental value of their lands, and recommended that the continuance of the system of indentured Indian immigration should be conditional on the granting of facilities for the occupation of land by Indian settlers on reasonable terms.¹

Nevertheless, the Commissioners were convinced that the advantages of the system far outweighed its disadvantages. The great majority of the immigrants exchanged grinding poverty with, practically, no hope of betterment, for a condition varying from simple, but secure, comfort to solid prosperity. They lived under far better conditions than their kinsfolk in India, and had opportunities of improving their lot which exceeded their wildest hopes. They became citizens of the colonies to which they emigrated, and their descendants might attain to positions commanding respect and consideration. It was not an uncommon thing for an immigrant who had settled down after his period of indenture in the neighbourhood of an employer by whom he had been prosecuted, to pay occasional friendly visits to his old master—a proof that he bore him no ill-will. The earnings and remittances of the industrious represented only the material gain. The immigrants, on the whole, were probably more conscious of the far-reaching legal protection which they enjoyed than of the legal liabilities which they incurred. The Commissioners' proposals involved the recognition of further rights, and the reduction of those liabilities. If they were adopted, the system might be described as one of protected emigration, in which the protection only ceased when it was no longer required.

It was not right to regard the system as one concerned with merely securing fair wages and fair treatment for such Indian labourers as were content to emigrate for a few years, save a few hundred rupees, and then return to their homes. When one considered the course taken by the majority of the emigrants themselves, and the consequences to their descendants, the system must be regarded as one of colonization, under which poor, but industrious, Indians, who were content to undergo training and acclimatization under private employers in need of a steady supply of labour, were given opportunities much more favourable than could possibly have been open to them at

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 263-4.

home. Although it was clearly necessary jealously to safeguard the right of an emigrant to obtain repatriation, if such were his choice, it would be folly to shut one's eyes to the fact how few in the past had availed themselves of this opportunity. The Commissioners were convinced that, if their proposals were accepted, the number of those electing to be sent home would, in all the colonies, be an insignificant minority of those emigrating under indentures.¹

The Indian Government, however, in defiance of the advice of their own specially appointed commissioners, instead of bringing pressure to bear upon the Fiji authorities to make the suggested amendments in the law, decided, in 1917, altogether to abolish the practice of allowing the emigration of Indians under indentures. Moreover, the decision was arrived at before any scheme of voluntary emigration under Government sanction and superintendence had been taken into consideration.² The withdrawal of Indian labour could not but have a serious effect on the sugar industry, which was the chief source of wages in Fiji, and the disorganization of the system of Indian immigration of necessity resulted in a reduction of the amount of sugar produced.³

But whether the discontinuance of the system of indentured labour was wise or unwise, it, at least, serves to show the rapidity with which, under modern conditions, Governmental action responds to any demand of the public opinion which surrounds it. Why it should be more degrading to enlist for a certain term of years in the service of the economic development of a country than to enlist for military service is not apparent, but educated Indian public opinion so decides, and consequently distinguished officials must say ditto. It only remains for those who have marked what the system of indentured labour has, in the past, done for certain British colonies, as well as for the immigrants themselves, to rejoice that a previous generation had a less queasy conscience.

Although, however, in most British tropical colonies and protectorates the labour problem is a cause of constant anxiety,

¹ *Rep. to the Government of India on the Condition of Indian Immigrants in British Colonies and in Surinam*, by Mr. J. McNeale and Mr. Chimman Lal. Part II, *Surinam, Jamaica, Fiji and General Remarks*, Cd. 7745, 1915, pp. 322-3.

² *Rep. Fiji*, 1917, No. 966, Cd. 8973-15, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, 1918, No. 1006, p. 7.

there can be no doubt with regard to their potential resources. Mr. Chamberlain came to the Colonial Office determined to act as a far-seeing landowner in endeavouring to develop those untold resources that should be the Empire's patrimony. He was able to achieve much, but the anxieties that preceded the South African war and the war itself diverted his thoughts to a great extent to other channels, and when the Liberals came into power party traditions and the criticism that had been showered on the construction of the Uganda Railway prevented them from moving forward in this direction. Lord Milner was the natural successor in the working out of Mr. Chamberlain's policy. "Nothing," he had told the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce on 7 June, 1909, "strikes me more constantly in what I may call 'the misdirection of natural energy' than the extraordinary contrast between the amount of time and labour and ingenuity, and, I may add, temper, which is expended on the least of our home political questions compared with the plentiful lack of thought and energy devoted to even the biggest problems of Empire, and especially the biggest problems of our Crown Colonies." Lord Milner, as Colonial Secretary, assuredly knew well the need of developing imperial resources, but the aftermath of the war, and obligations such as those connected with Mesopotamia, tied his hands, and it was not till the coming to power of Mr. Winston Churchill that the policy of development could be undertaken on a large scale. Loans to Nigeria, Kenya and the Straits Settlements should serve the double purpose of developing these countries' resources and of giving employment to British labour.

The economic field, however, is one too large and too difficult to enter upon here, and our glance at it can only be in its relations to the well-being of the native communities. The one question that need trouble us here is—how far, having constituted themselves their backward brethren's keeper, have the British rulers fulfilled the obligations of their trust? And if, as seems tolerably clear, the British record can be shown to be satisfactory, the reason, perhaps, lies not in any exceptional wisdom in British methods of government, but in the fact that the instruments, by whom the system has been worked, have been peculiarly adapted for the business in hand. On paper British methods may not have been much superior to German, but the mistake made by a careful investigator, like the late Mr. A. H. Snow, who

submitted the results of his inquiries to the United States Government in the form of a treatise on *The Question of Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Nations* (1921), is that he takes the letter of the various laws and derives his conclusions from it, without considering the spirit in which those laws are worked.

A distinguished French writer, M. Baillaud,¹ whose intimate knowledge of West Africa gives him the right to speak with authority, has criticized the variety of policies pursued by Great Britain in West Africa. He is especially puzzled by the action of Sir W. Macgregor, in recognizing the quasi-independent character of the Yoruba chiefs. No doubt there is a tincture of unreality in such recognition, conditional, as it must always be, on the needs of good government. M. Baillaud maintains that the French system of direct annexation is both the most logical and the most satisfactory, though he reprobates the attempted assimilation of native conditions with French institutions. But may it not be reasonable that some variation of system should take place according to the manner in which the country came under British rule, and according to the character of the native community? The important thing, surely, is not the letter of the law, which, in any case, will probably not be understood by backward natives, but the spirit which animates the men who are the instruments of government. And here, without boastfulness, it is possible to maintain that there are certain qualities in the British character which are especially useful when dealing with backward races. Instinctive love of justice and fair play, sense of humour, absence of pomposity, dislike of red tape, keenness for an open-air life and untiring energy in the fulfilment of the allotted task, especially when it is connected with adventure and physical exertion—these are the qualities that have justified Lord Rosebery's remark that the British Empire "rests on men." These public servants have been, for the most part, recruited from the ranks of the upper middle classes. You will not find among them the sons of dukes or of mechanics. The Oxford and Cambridge tutor knows well the type; the pupil who will not, he recognizes, obtain a first class, but of whom he is no less sure that he will make a more dependable comrade in the battle of life than will very many of his more brilliant fellow-students. In this field, no doubt, as elsewhere, brilliant men are necessary if progress is to continue; and, to take only two instances, it is impossible

¹ *La politique indigène de l'Angleterre en Afrique occidentale*, pp. 275-8.

to exaggerate the greatness of the debt that the British Empire owes to Sir Frank Swettenham in Malaya and to Sir Frederick Lugard in Nigeria. Still, their work could not have been accomplished without the ungrudging help of ordinary men; for, to give a new application to George Eliot's words: "The growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts, and that things are not so ill with you and me, as they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life and rest in unvisited tombs." It has been suggested that, inasmuch as the less laborious work of the clerks in the Colonial Office at home receives better pay than that of many of the men who toil and moil and often risk their lives in tropical countries, there should be an interchange of position between the two classes. But the kind of character, of temperament and of intellectual endowment in the two cases is so fundamentally different that to attempt such an interchange would be to court disaster. Hitherto, fortunately, suitable candidates have not been lacking to fill any vacancy. "*Primo avulso non deficit alter.*" It is the way of the world that men are not strictly rewarded according to their moral merits. But, when the future of the British Empire is in question, the nature of the reply must largely depend upon the answer to the further question, whether, under new conditions, Great Britain will be able to produce the special type of character needed for this special kind of work. We know to our cost that the Indian Civil Service is offering at the present time less attractions to capable Englishmen; but, in this case, there are special reasons at work, and the unpopularity of service in India may serve to increase the candidates for service in the other tropical dependencies of the Empire.

But, even though Great Britain and the Dominions—(for it is much to be desired that the Dominions should take their share in this good work)—are able to send forth in the future the same material that has been our strength in the past, another condition must be fulfilled, if the dependent Empire is to continue and to prosper. There must be the presence of sympathy on the part of the Government at home. We all know that the secret of Mr. Chamberlain's success lay, in no small measure, in the way in which, when once an official had obtained his confidence, he stood by him through thick and thin; and, both before and since his time, Secretaries of State, to whichever party in politics they belonged, have not been lacking in sympathy with those

through whom is carried on the administration of those vast territories. But here there are storm clouds on the horizon which it is impossible to ignore. We have in these pages naturally nothing to do with the aims and aspirations of the Labour party which, one of these days, we may find in power. But it is necessary to form some idea of what, in such circumstances, would be its attitude towards the problems of the Empire? Responsibility might, indeed, beget a new attitude of mind; but, as yet, it is not, perhaps, presumptuous to say that the Labour leaders are much under the sway of the idols of the market-place and of the cave, and are inclined to decide intricate questions on mere abstract *a priori* reasoning. From this point of view it is a thousand pities that some of the energy which was displayed in visits to countries, not a word of the language of which the envoys of the Labour party were able to understand, was not directed to a tour of the British Empire, so that the leaders of the new movement might have learnt by first-hand discussions on the spot what are the actual problems awaiting solution. The proposal, put forward during the war, that all Africa, between the Sahara and the Zambesi, should be the subject of a European condominium could never, we may venture to assert, have been made by men in touch with actualities. A Labour Secretary of State would start with a strong bias against imperial expansion as the outcome of capitalist greed, and as involving the exploitation of the native. Would he be willing to give fair play to the point of view of the local administrator? But, unless the question can receive a favourable answer, there will be breakers ahead.

Still, our last word must be one of hope. We have seen, in the case of Papua, that the most democratic of democracies can play with wisdom and dignity the part of autocrat. Is it too much to credit the British democracy with equal sagacity and good sense? In any case, the past is assured; and it is amongst the wonders of history that from this little island there has sprung not merely a partnership of great, free nations, spanning the globe, but a dependent Empire so various in its resources that these seem to give actual embodiment to the hyperbole of Marlowe's "Tamburlaine." Nevertheless, of more importance than material resources are human beings; and the judgement of history upon the British Empire will depend upon the extent to which it has anticipated, in spirit and in fact, those methods of

government to which the mandatory system, under the League of Nations, has given solemn sanction.

[NOTE.—The above chapter was written before the appearance of Sir F. Lugard's great work on the government of Africa. The annual reports from Nigeria, however, had already given expression to many of his views.]

INDEX

- Aborigines, *see* Natives
 Aborigines Protection Society, 189
 Africa, Central : German policy and activities, 117 ff. ; railway development, 123-4 ; condominium proposal, 250
 Africa, East, proposed Federation of, 209 ; British East, *see* Kenya
 Africa, German East, 196, 204-5
 Africa, German S.W., 74, 191
 Africa, Portuguese East, 119, 188
 Africa, South : war of 1899, 1-2, 247 ; settlement, 4-6 ; Native Affairs Commission, 13 ; Native Administrations Act (1908), 14 ; Natives, *see that heading* ; Selborne Memorandum cited, 16-17 ; Convention of Oct. 1908, 17-20 ; Union of S. Africa Act, 20 ; 1909-1914, 49 ff. ; mine riots (1912-13), 51 ff. ; war response (1914), 42, 56, 57, 64 ff. ; tariff policy, 79, 81-2 ; naval policy, 103-4 ; military policy, 107-8 ; Governor-Generalship, 132 ; Mandatory Power, 163 ; British Indians, 176-81 ; railways, 183 ; Rhodesian refusals to enter the Union, 186, 191 ; Rand outbreak (1922), 77 *n.*¹
 Africa, Tropical : Liquor Convention (1919), 226
 Africa, West, Baillaud cited on, 248. (*See also* Sierra Leone)
 Alaska boundary, 25-7, 114
 Alberta and Saskatchewan, 29
 All-Red Route proposal, 141
 Allen, Sir James, cited, 103, 163
 Alverstone, Lord, 27
 Amery, Rt. Hon. L. S. : *Migration within the Empire* cited, 140 and *n.*²
 Anderson, Sir J., quoted, 231
 Angola, 120
 Ashanti, 212-14
 Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., cited, 148, 149 *n.*³, 150
 Association of the Parliaments of the Empire, 169
 Atlantic cable, 142
 Australia : character of constitution, 33 ; constitution criticized by Labour Party, 42 ; Governors-General, 131-2 ; State Governors' position, 132 ; State rights claimed, 33, 37, 43, 69 ; "white Australia" question, 35 ; immigration problem, 38, 43-4, 140 ; deterrents to, 38 ; Immigration Restriction Bill, 35 ; Kanaka labour question, 35 ; Labour Party, 36, 42-3, 65, 68, 70, 169 ; Labour and Anti-Labour the confronting parties, 38, 41 ; strikes, 40-1 ; compulsory arbitration, 42 ; land policy, 37, 38 ; Northern territory, 43-4 ; Papuan administration, 44-5 ; tariff policy, 81 ; tariff of 1921, 91 ; the new protection, 38 ; attitude to Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902), 143 ; (1921), 111, 158 ; supports Imperial Council proposal, 136 ; New Hebrides question, 112-

- 14; attitude to Privy Council, 133; naval policy, 93, 94, 101; military policy, 106-7; Kitchener's visit (1909), 107; war response (1914), 42, 56, 57, 64 ff.; navigation questions, 138-40; postal rates, 142; Prince's visit (1920), 128; Industrial Peace Bill (1920), 69; mandate for German New Guinea, 45; diplomatic representation at Tokio possible, 168
- Barton, Sir E., 34-6
 Basutoland, 173
 Bedford, Adm., 132
 Beer, G. L., cited, 170-1
 Belgian Congo, 119, 123-4, 222
 Bhowndagree, Mr., M.P., cited, 176
 Boers, 2, 4, 6, 9-10
 Bond, Sir R., 144
 Borden, Sir R., 24, 29-31, 61, 63, 152-3, 166; his naval policy, 96, 98-9; quoted, 63, 128 *n.*, 159-60; on tariffs, 82-3, 88-9
 Bosanquet, Adm., 133
 Botha, Gen., 7, 49, 108; quoted, 9, 50-1, 137, 148; cited, 23, 177
 Bourassa, H., 24-5, 32, 131
 British Columbia, 28, 114
 Bryce, Lord, 85-6; *Modern Democracies* cited, 70 and *n.*
 Buxton, Lord, 191; quoted, 188
 Byng, Lord, 131
- Cable communications, 142
 Cameroons, 227-8
 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., 137
 Canada: Alaska boundary question, 25-7, 114; internal history, 21 ff.; pre-war connexions, 169; compared with U.S., 22; conservatism, 23; racial bitterness, 25; immigration question, 28-9; restrictions against Indians, 145; new provinces (1905), 29; Newfoundland (1906), 15; Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (1907), 31; naval defence policy, 3, 92 ff., 109; Naval Service Act (1910), 31-2, 95-7; French's visit (1910), 105; military policy, 105-6; tariff questions, 79, 81 ff.; American reciprocity question (1911), 31-2, 83 ff.; Navy Contribution Bill (1912), 32, 98-101; war response (1914), 55-6, 57 ff.; attitude of Quebec, 57; against Imperial Council and permanent Committee, 136, 137; the bilingual question, 59; views on Supreme Court, 135; the Prince's visit (1919), 128-9 and *n.*¹; against Anglo-Japanese alliance (1921), 111, 157-8; Conservative rout, 158; hereditary titles question, 61; cattle embargo, 62; the Farmers' Party, 61; diplomatic representation at Washington, 167; Governors-General, 130-1
 Cape to Cairo Railway, 120, 124
 Carnarvon, Lord, 16
 Chalmers, Sir D., 210
 Chamberlain, J., 1-3, 6-8, 25, 45, 133, 210, 247, 249; Tariff Reform, 78, 82, 90; quoted, 34
 Chelmsford, Lord, cited, 243 and *n.*²
 Chinese labour: in S. Africa, 7-8; in Samoa, 73; in Malaya, 230, 232
 Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., 135, 140, 209, 247; cited, 13
 Clark, Michael, cited, 55, 61
 Clifford, Sir H., cited, 214, 226-7
 Colonial administrators, 248-9
 Colonial Conferences, *see* Conferences
 Colonial Governors: of Dominions, 129 ff.; of States, 132; of dependencies, 248-9
 Colonial Office, 135; Dominions Dept. of, 137; proposal for African Council at, 209

- Colonial opinion ignored: instances, 113, 115, 122, 124-5
- Conferences, Colonial and Imperial: beginnings of, 135; work of, 137 ff.; usefulness of, for criticism, 144; for co-operation, 148
- Conferences held:
- (1894), 142
 - (1901), 133
 - (1902), 2-3, 78, 82, 136
 - (1907), 23, 46, 78-9, 104, 106, 107, 112, 113, 133, 135, 141; preferential trade discussion, 137-8; publication of proceedings, 136; subsidiary Shipping Conference, 138
 - (1909), 94-5, 101, 104
 - (1911), 23, 39, 47, 91, 122, 124, 134, 138-40, 142; Indian discussion, 144-5; publication of proceedings, 136
 - (1917), 145, 155
 - (1918), 135, 147
 - (1921), 110, 111, 142, 147, 209; important achievements of, 157, 159, 166
- Connaught, Duke of, 131
- Cook, Sir J., 41-2, 65
- Cotton-growing, 196-7, 220
- Crewe, Lord, quoted, 144
- Crown as Imperial link, 127-8
- Crown colonies, 144
- Curtis, Lionel: *The Problem of the Commonwealth* cited, 149
- Deakin, Rt. Hon. A., 35-7, 69, 113, 137; quoted, 92-3, 132; on Imperial preference, 79-81; on Conferences, 136; cited, 106, 112-14, 133
- Declaration of London, 124-5, 144
- Dinizulu, 12-13
- Dominion Judges, 134
- Dominion status, 127; need for recognition of, 156, 160; at the Peace Conference (1919), 159 ff.; in the League of Nations, 163-5; responsibilities of, not faced, 165
- Dominion separate diplomatic representation, 167-8
- Dundonald, Lord, 27-8; cited, 105
- Dutch East Indies, 230, 232
- Eggleston, Mr., cited, 160 *and n.*², 163-6
- Elgin, Lord, 114, 136-7, 177; cited, 10, 13
- Eliot, Sir Charles, 200-1
- Emigration statistics, 140
- Fielding, Hon. W., 63, 82-3
- Fiji, indentured Indians in, 244-6
- Fisher, Rt. Hon. A., 38, 101, 169; quoted, 39, 64, 68, 125; cited, 168 *n.*
- Forrest, Lord, 36
- Foster, Sir George, quoted, 30, 56
- France: Anglo-French agreement (1904), 14, 111-12; African concession to Germany (1911), 118; Washington Pact (1921), 159
- French, Sir J., 105
- Gambia, 228
- Gandhi, Mr., 147, 179
- George, Rt. Hon. D. Ll., 159
- Germany: Canadian tariff policy regarding, 90; divergent views as to menace from, 96; in Samoa, 115-17; Central African policy and activities, 117 ff.
- Gilbert and Ellice Is., 240
- Girouard, Sir P., 202-3; in Nigeria, 220, 222
- Gladstone, Lord, quoted, 52-3
- Glen Grey Act (1894), 11, 173-5
- Gokhale, Mr., 178
- Gold Coast: Ashanti, 212-14; Northern Territories, 214-15; the Colony, 215-17
- Gouin, Sir Lomer, 60
- Grey, 4th Earl, 130-1 *and nn.*
- Grey, Vis., 120, 122, 124-5, 169
- Haldane, Vis., 97, 104; cited, 120, 134-5

- Hamilton, Sir Ian, cited, 106
Harcourt, Lord, 54, 137
Hardie, Keir, 54
Hausa, 222
Hertzog, Gen., 18, 49-50, 103 ;
 quoted, 51, 73-6
Hughes, Hon. W., 64-9, 166 ; cited,
 157
- Immigration ordinances, 8 (*see also*
 Indians)
Imperial Cabinet proposal, 47, 150
 *n.*², 153-5
Imperial Chamber proposal, 150 *n.*²
Imperial Chambers of Commerce, 169
Imperial Conferences, *see* Confer-
 ences
Imperial Council suggestion, 3-4,
 47, 136, 154-5
Imperial Court of Appeal, proposal
 as to, 133
Imperial defence, 78, 151 ; Brod-
 rick scheme, 92 ; naval
 defence, 92-104, 109 ; Pacific
 fleet, 95, 101 ; Naval agree-
 ment, 92 ; (1911), 97 ; sub-
 sidiary Conference (1909), 94-
 5, 101, 104 ; military defence,
 3, 104-8
Imperial Defence Committee, 148,
 152
Imperial Federation League, 148
Imperial foreign policy, problem of,
 151 ff.
Imperial naturalization, 138, 140-1
Imperial preference, 78 ff.
Imperial Press Conference, 169
Imperial War Cabinet and Confer-
 ence of Premiers, 153, 156, 162 ;
 suggestion of attendance of
 opposition leaders at, 168
Income tax concessions, 141
Indians in the Colonies, 144-8 ;
 Canadian Immigration Order as
 affecting, 29, 144-5 ; in South
 Africa, 176-81 ; in East Africa,
 207-9 ; indentured, in Fiji,
 and Report of Messrs McNeale
 and Chimman Lal on, 244-6
- Irish question, 151
- Jamaica, 240-3
Jameson, Sir S., 17, 18, 49
Japan : emigration restriction
 agreed, 28-9, 145 ; Australian
 fear of, 94 ; British alliance
 (1902), 111, 143 ; renewed
 (1921), 40, 157 ; Washington
 Pact (1921), 159 ; Australian
 diplomatic representation sug-
 gested, 168
Jellicoe, Lord, 110
Johnston, Sir H., cited, 194 *n.*¹,
 195-6, 207
Johore, 236-7
Judges of Appeal, 133 ff.
- Katanga, 123, 183
Kedah, 233, 237-9
Keith, Dr. A. B., cited, 63 *n.*³, 119
 *n.*¹, 122, 133 *n.*¹
Kelantan, 233, 237, 238
Kenya (Brit. E. Africa) : natives,
 200 ff. ; Indians, 147, 207-9
King, Hon. W. Mackenzie, cited, 63,
 97
King of England, position of, 127-8
Kingston, Hon. C., 35
Kitchener, Lord, 107 ; cited, 5 *n.*
- Labour Party, British, 250
Lagden, Sir G., 7, 169-70
Lagos, 223
Land settlements, 5 ; native, 14
Lansdowne, Lord, 169, 176
Laurier, Sir W., 3, 15, 88, 89, 134 ;
 personality and views of, 22-4 ;
 naval defence policy, 93-5,
 99-100 ; quoted, 4, 28, 55, 82,
 96, 97, 129, 131, 143 ; cited,
 29, 105, 130
League of Nations, 63, 155 ;
 Dominions' status in, 163-5
Leggatt, Sir H., on cotton growing,
 196-7
Lemieux, Hon. R., 28 ; quoted, 88,
 145 ; cited, 135, 149

- Lichnowsky, Prince, 123; quoted, 120-1
- Lodge, Senator, 27
- Lucas, Sir C., 169; *The Empire at War* cited, 110
- Lugard, Sir F., 209; his work in Nigeria, 217-20, 225, 249
- Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. A., 8-9, 136
- McCallum, Sir H., 12
- Macdonald, Sir J., 21, 32, 87, 100
- Macgregor, Sir W., 223, 248
- McKinley, Pres., 26
- Maguire, Rochfort, quoted, 185-6
- Malay States, Federated, 229 ff.; achievements, 230; land policy, 232-6; productivity, 236
- Mandates, 163
- Manitoba, 29-30
- Maoris, 71-3
- Masai tribe, 201-2, 204
- Mashonaland, 182, 185, 189-90
- Massey, Rt. Hon. W., 56; quoted, 71, 102, 157, 162
- Matabele, 182, 189-90
- Meighen, Rt. Hon. A., 158
- Merriman, Rt. Hon. J., 18; cited, 50, 174
- Mesopotamia, 247
- Milner, Vis., 5-9, 206; quoted, 167, 247
- Minto, Lord, 131
- Moore, Prof. Harrison, cited, 33, 34
- Mozambique, 121
- Murray, J. H. P., cited, 44
- Natal, 11-14
- Native Land Bill of 1913 (S.A.), 174; Native Affairs Bill, of 1920 (S.A.), 174-5; Native local councils proposed (S.A.), 175
- Natives: in S. Africa, 12-13, 17, 19, 172 ff.; Papua, 44-5; Pacific islanders, 35, 67 *and n.*⁵; Askaris, 122; in N. Zealand, 71-3; in Portuguese Africa, 122; Rhodesia, 182 ff.; Uganda, 194 ff.; Kenya, 200 ff.; slave-raiding, 200, 214, 217-18; German E. Africa, 204-5; Labour Circular (1919), 205-6; Sierra Leone, 210-12; Ashanti, 212-14; Northern Territories, 214-15; G.C. Colony, 215-17; Togoland, 217; Nigeria, 218 ff.; the Fulani, 218, 222; "a wonderful people," 221; cultivation of cotton by, 196-7; education, 226-7; proposal as to Native Conferences, 175; labour difficulties, 205, 231, 244, 246; Royal Commission in Natal in 1907 on Native affairs, p. 12; Snow's Report on laws as to, 247-8
- Naturalization, 138, 140-1
- Naval defence, 3, 47, 92 ff., 101-4, 109
- Navigation Laws, 138-140
- Negri Sembilan, 229, 233
- New Guinea, North, 45, 64, 115
- New Hebrides, 112-14
- New Zealand: military policy, 3, 107; attitude to Australian Commonwealth, 45; status of, 46; *Dreadnought* offer, 46-7; policy as to education, arbitration, 48; and land, 48-9; war response (1914 *seq.*), 56, 70; Native rights, 71-3; tariff policy, 81; naval policy, 93, 94, 102-3; Samoan question, 115-16; Judge for Judicial Committee of Privy Council, 134; immigration statistics, 140; attitude to Anglo-Japanese treaty (1902), 143; to its renewal (1921), 158; attitude to Peace Conference responsibilities, 160-1
- Newfoundland, 14-15, 111
- Nigeria: Northern, 172, 217-23; Southern, 223-4; Liquor Law (1917), 226
- Northcote, Lord, 131-2
- Nyasaland, 228

Orange River Colony, 4, 10

Pacific cable, 142

Pacific Is., 67 and *n.*⁵, 68

Pahang, 229, 231-3

Papua (New Guinea), 44-5, 64, 115

Peace Conference (1919), 71, 126;

Dominion status question, 63,
159 ff.

Pearce, Senator, 39

Perak, 229, 232, 233, 235

Perlis, 233, 237

Pierre-Alype cited, 118 *n.*⁴, 123

Pollard, Prof.: *The Evolution of
Parliament* cited, 150 *n.*²

Pomare, Dr., quoted, 71-2

Portuguese Africa, 119-20, 122

Postal rates, 142

Principe, 121

Privy Council as link, 133 ff.

Quebec, *see under* Canada

Raffles, Sir S., 229

Reid, Sir G., 36-7

Rhodes, Cecil, 11 and *n.*, 81, 174

Rhodesia, 181 ff., 191

Robertson, Sir B., 180

Ross, Sir G., 32

Round Table movement, 149, 170;

Review cited, 164, 181 *nn.*

Royal Colonial Institute, 170

Royce, Prof. J., quoted on Jamaica,
240-3

Samoa, 64, 72-3; N. Zealand man-
date, 115-17; Sir J. Allen
on, 163; Constitutional Order
(1920), 163

San Thomé, 121

Scholefield, G. H., cited, 115

Seddon, Rt. Hon. J., 3, 45-6, 115-16

Selangor, 229, 232, 233

Selborne, Lord, 9; Memo. on S.
Africa cited, 16-17

Shaw, Lord, cited, 4 *n.*⁵

Sierra Leone, 210-12

Sifton, Sir C., cited, 170

Silesia, 159

Singapore, 229

Sinha, Lord, cited, 147

Slave-raiding, 200, 214, 217-18

Sleeping sickness, 196

Smuts, Gen., 6, 18, 166-7, 191;
estimate of, 49, 76; speech on
Imperial federation, 153-6;
cited, 4 *n.*⁵, 108; on veto right
of any Dominion, 76, 168;
quoted, 74-6; on Crown as
link, 127-8; on Dominion
status, 156, 163, 164; on
Native problem, 174-5; on
British Indian problem, 179-81

Snow, A. H., cited, 201 *n.*¹, 247-8

Sokoto rising, 220

Solf, Dr., quoted, 118

Solomon Is., 115

Stanmore, Lord, cited, 8

Stewart, Hon. Downie, quoted, 160

Swettenham, Sir Frank, 231, 249

Sydenham, Lord, 132

Taft, Pres., quoted on reciprocity,
83-5, 87

Tanganyika (German E. Africa),
208, 209

Tariffs: party differences, 21;
Australian "new protection,"
38; Canadian Farmers' Party
programme, 61; preferential,
78 ff.; British wheat tax, 82;
Franco-Canadian Treaty, 83
and *n.*⁴; Budget of 1919,
91; Australian, against New
Hebrides, 112 and *nn.*

Taschereau, Hon. L., 60

Temple, C. L., 222

Togoland, 214, 216-17

Tonga, 115

Trade, *see* Tariffs

Transvaal, 4, 7, 10

Treaties:

Anglo-French (1904), 111

Anglo-German, secret (1898), 119

Anglo-Japanese (1902, 1921), 40,
111, 143, 158

Anglo-Siamese, 193, 233, 237

Bond-Blaine (rejected), 15

- Treaties: Clayton-Bulwer, 114
- Franco-Canadian, 83 *and n.*⁴
- Vereeniging (1902), 4, 6
- Washington (1921), 159
- Treaties, British, question of Colonial withdrawal from, 143-4
- Trengganu, 233, 238, 239
- Tudor, Hon. F., 65, 66
- Turner, Senator, U.S.A., 27
- Uganda, 193 ff.: natives, 194-6, 197-9; transport, 197 *and n.*⁴; its future, 200
- Uganda Railway, 201, 208
- United States of America: Newfoundland fisheries question, 14-15; compared with Canada, 22, 24; Alaska boundary question, 26, 114; Canadian reciprocity question, 31-2, 83 ff.; Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 114; Washington Pact (1921), 159; Canadian diplomatic representation in, 167
- Vancouver riots (1907), 28
- Veto right of any Dominion, proposal of, 76, 168
- Victoria Nyanza, Lake, 196, 197, 201
- Wales, Prince of, 128-9
- Walton, Sir E. H., cited, 17 *n.*², 18
- War of 1914-18, Colonial response to: S. Africa and Australia, 42, 56, 57, 64 ff.; Canada, 55-6, 57 ff.; N. Zealand, 56, 70; Straits Settlements, 229; Federated Malay States, 236, 238; Gilbert and Ellice Is., 240
- Ward, Sir J., 47-8, 138; his Imperial Council plan, 148, 149 *n.*³
- Williams, B., Prof., cited, 11 *n.*¹
- Williams, R., cited, 123
- Yoruba Chiefs, 248
- Zimmerman, Emil, quoted, 117-18
- Zululand, 12

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